A SHORT DEFENCE OF RELIGION

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CHIEFLY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AGAINST THE UNBELIEVERS OF OUR DAYS

BY THE

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE first edition having been exhausted in a few months, another, almost entirely rewritten, and enlarged by many chapters, so as better to suit the wants of our time, now comes to light.

I do not address myself to the public in general, or to the learned in particular, but to the studious young people of our schools, whose faith is to-day so much endangered by attacks made in the name of science, history, and criticism. Hence I confine myself to the defence of the primary and fundamental truths of religion, which in our days are specially aimed at by scientific unbelievers. This is likewise the reason why, notwithstanding the brevity imposed on me by the character of the book, it seemed to me proper to dwell a little longer on some points.

I have endeavoured to be clear, letting facts speak, and avoiding arguments too difficult or subtle. And I shall be very glad if this work, written hurriedly the first time as a short summary for private use, will succeed in doing a little good, even outside the sphere that inspired it. Its moderate price may easily place it in the hands of all.

PAVIA, 1907.

LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR

SHORTLY after the first appearance of this work in English the Translator received a very kind letter from the Author, which runs as follows:—

"Absent for a few days from Pavia, I had the agreeable surprise, on my return, of finding two elegant copies of the SHORT DEFENCE, translated by you into English. I thank you most sincerely for them.

"I am also exceedingly obliged for the words with which you present me to the English-speaking public in your judicious preface, and I regard as most happy the idea of adding the New Syllabus of Pius X., which indeed, as you say, gives greater usefulness to the book, being, for the reasons stated in it, an authoritative confirmation of what is defended or maintained in the book.

"Even in regard to the few notes that you have added, I ought to congratulate myself, for they show that your Reverence is *au fait*, not only in the matter of modern questions, but also in that of the book which you have been pleased to translate.

"Hoping that the English edition may have an equal success with the Italian one, I salute you most respectfully, and I beg of you to recommend me sometimes to the Lord.

"PAVIA, *Aug.* 1, 1908."

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

It is very proper that Catholics should not only have a good knowledge of their religion, but also be able to give a correct and satisfactory answer to the honest inquiries of non-Catholics. At the present day there are great discussions everywhere on matters connected with religion, and immense multitudes of people take erroneous views. Unfortunately, it often happens that Catholics are not in a position to remove their difficulties. In a recent paper on Catechetical Instruction, the Most Rev. Dr. Delaney, Archbishop of Hobart, mentions the case of a Catholic gentleman, very well read, who supposed that the Immaculate Conception meant the birth of Our Saviour from a Virgin Mother, and actually explained the dogma thus to a Protestant who asked him about it.

The present volume supplies a solution to many important questions, seldom brought together, as the reader will soon find. He can hardly fail to be pleased in meeting with so learned an author as Father Ballerini, who knows how to treat every subject in a clear, concise, and comprehensive manner. The Italian work (second edition) having been published in 1907, the translation may be considered as well up to date. A glance at the Table of Contents will show the variety of matters on which it treats.

It is certainly remarkable that the philosophy of the ancients often turned men into gods, while that of the moderns seems to glory in turning men into beasts—anything to escape the obligations of the Christian religion, which strives to lead them to a happy eternity, but which, by a culpable abuse of their free will, they can resist.

The arguments of such philosophers as Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, Spencer, Harnack, Loisy, &c., are here weighed according to their true value, and, as a consequence, are shown to be totally unworthy of learned or intelligent men.

Hoping to increase the usefulness of the book, I have added, at the end, an English version of the Syllabus recently issued by the Holy See, in which sixty-five of the propositions set forth by the rash critics and scientists of our day are condemned. Rome has given few more important documents to the world since the celebrated Syllabus of Pius IX. As might be expected, it confirms in many points the teaching of Father Ballerini.

The youthful reader will do well to bear in mind that when a proposition is false, its contradictory must be true. A universal affirmative proposition is contradicted by a particular negative one; thus, *all men are white—some men are not white.* A universal negative proposition is contradicted by a particular affirmative one; thus, *no men are pagans—some men are pagans.* In singular propositions the word *not* suffices for the contradiction; thus, *John is a wise man—John is not a wise man.* By examining the condemned propositions in this way, each of them becomes like a pillar of light, showing in its contradictory what is true doctrine of the Church. Yet this may not be the whole truth. For instance, if it is said, *No dogma of the Catholic Church is infallibly true*, and we say in reply, *Some dogmas of the Catholic Church are infallibly true*, this is true indeed, but it is not the whole truth, for the whole truth is, *Every dogma of the Catholic Church is infallibly true.*

A simpler rule for finding the contradictory of a false proposition is to prefix to it the words, *It is not true to say.* Let the reader prefix these words to any of the condemned propositions at pp. 185–188 and he will have its contradictory, or at least what is the equivalent thereof, from which a variety of inferences may then be drawn

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A SHORT DEFENCE OF RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFENDING RELIGION.

THE study of religion can have as its scope either to know what we ought to believe, or to find reasons for what we believe, so that we may know how to defend it against those who attack it. For the first design, an elementary study of the Catechism may suffice; for the second, we require a deeper and more scientific study, which is called defensive or apologetic, because it aims at an unanswerable demonstration of the truth.

This demonstration may be directed against unbelievers who deny the divinity of the Christian religion, and then we have a general defence; or against heretics who deny the divinity of the Catholic religion, and then we have a particular defence. We confine ourselves here to the former.

The importance of such scientific study of religion results chiefly from three considerations: the nature of the religious problem, the nature of our social surroundings, and the tendencies of modern science.

1. *The Nature of the Religious Problem.*—There are two great problems about which no man can be indifferent: the existence of God and the future life. On the different solutions given to these problems depends the practical life of the individual, of the family, and of society. We have either to regard the present life as a preparation for the future, or as a term to itself.

2. *The Nature of our Social Surroundings.*—Having made due exceptions, society may at present be divided into two classes: the indifferent and the incredulous. Indifference and incredulity have passed into public life and unchristianised its institutions. Hence, the abolition of all religious instruction in schools, the ignorance of the rising generations on matters of religion, and the many, many prejudices that are entertained against the Church.

3. *The Tendencies of Modern Science.*—Modern science is of a very empiric character, so much so that it is based on the facts of sensible experience. If it did not pretend to make experience the only criterion of truth, we should have no reason to oppose it. But, instead, the great majority of modern scientists have made

experience the sole and exclusive criterion of truth, reducing everything knowable to the sensible. Thus, empiric science, which of itself ought not to be credulous or incredulous, becomes, in the hands of materialists, positivists, &c., an instrument of atheism and unbelief. Hence, the pretended discordance between science and faith—a discordance that extends to the denial of everything supernatural.

Modern scientists do not admit any other truths than those perceivable by the senses—facts or phenomena. For creation they substitute evolution. They attribute the origin of all religions to ignorance of natural phenomena. They therefore reduce religion to a sentiment merely subjective, which developed itself in three successive phases—fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism.

Such being the case, we ought above all things to prove the two great truths that are presupposed to be the foundation of religion—namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

If God did not exist, we should have no need to speak of religion; and if the soul were not immortal, man might laugh with impunity at God and religion.

In referring to these two truths we must naturally discuss many others connected with them. But the necessity for so doing is easily understood by all.

CHAPTER II.

THE PLAN OF DISCUSSION WITH OUR ADVERSARIES.

Before coming to a demonstration of these truths, it will be well to mention briefly the different classes of the adversaries against whom we have to contend, and to point out the exact ground on which the discussion turns.

The following classes deny that the existence of God or of the soul can be proved :—

i. Those who deny any reality beyond phenomena, and reduce all reality to what is sensible. Such are the followers of materialistic positivism.[1]

ii. Those who neither affirm nor deny the existence of reality beyond phenomena, but restrict all the certainty of our knowledge to facts and phenomena alone (whether internal or external), and to their laws. They consider everything over and above as unknowable. Such are the followers of agnostic positivism,[2] who form the great body of modern scientists.

[1] " No being or form of being, essentially different from what is known to us by experience, is possible." So says Professor De Dominicis.

[2] The word " agnostic " was introduced in 1869 by Huxley, who took it from the Acts of the Apostles, in which St. Paul speaks of an altar raised by the Athenians to the *unknown* God. Here the word *unknown* corresponds to the Greek *agnosto*. The word " agnostic " has become common among modern scientists to denote the inability of reason to know anything beyond

iii. Those who acknowledge the supersensible and the supernatural, not as a basis for the demonstrations of reason, in which they recognise no real value unless they are regulated by experience, but as a basis for the wants and tendencies of sentiment, of the heart, of the human mind, and also for the requirements of moral and religious order. Such are the followers of criticism or new criticism, of Kantism or New Kantism, whom the so-called philosophers of (psychological) immanence and voluntarism are at present joining.

iv. Those who recognise some value in the demonstrations of reason, based on facts, from which they may conclude for *the beyond*, but not so as to be certain of this *beyond* without some subjective wants and sentiments that may supply for the insufficiency of rational arguments.[1] Such are the followers of the last grade of new criticism, of the philosophy of immanence and voluntarism.

Hence the reason why all those would-be philosophers limit the name of science to knowledge only of an empiric character, which is to include all our certainty, and say that "science ought to stand by facts," inasmuch as outside of them nothing exists (*materialism*), or, if anything exists, it cannot be known (*agnosticism*), or at least it cannot be known and proved with certainty (*new criticism* and the *philosophy of immanence*).[2] And, as God and the soul are not things that fall under the senses, it must be concluded that they do not exist, or they cannot be known, or they cannot be known and proved with certainty. In short, all knowledge that has the supersensible or the supernatural for its term has no scientific or objective value.

If by the saying "science ought to stand by facts" is meant only that physical and natural sciences ought not to concern themselves about God, the soul, or the future life, because these

the sensible. Hence the expression, afterwards celebrated, of Du-Bois-Reymond, at the Congress of Berlin in 1881 : *Ignoramus et ignorabimus* (*we are ignorant and we shall remain ignorant*). Yet agnosticism, as a system, existed long before Huxley presented it under this name. Nor is its origin to be sought in Herbert Spencer, as some would have it, on account of his doctrine regarding the *Unknowable ;* rather, its material origin is to be sought in Locke and Hume, and its formal in Kant. Spencer was only the organiser of agnostic positivism ; on one side, he even separated from common agnosticism, inasmuch as he affirmed the reality of the Unknowable, or *affirmed the existence of what nobody can know !* In the early ages of the Church we had gnosticism ; now we have agnosticism. It is proper that the case should be repeated ; extremes meet.

[1] "The three miracles of the baptism, transfiguration, and resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ *are true, because the heart of man defends the cause of them.*" So says Herder, quoted by Bremond.

[2] "All those disciples of Hume, Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte, and Kant, notwithstanding the variety and the absurdity of their opinions, and sometimes their complete opposition, agree in saying that phenomena are the only objects of our knowledge, and that the *noumena*—that is to say, the substances and the causes of phenomena—do not exist, or they are not knowable. So that the first principles of human reason (especially the principle of causality) have no absolute or objective value."—*Farges.*

things do not pertain to empirical sciences, all would be well. The scope of experimental science is only that of proving the existence of phenomena, the powers that cause them, the laws that govern them; and nobody can complain if it does not go farther, because no science is bound to meddle with what is outside its borders or its competency. But it is one thing to take an interest in what lies beyond the limits of experience, and another to claim the right of denying what lies beyond the same limits of experience: just as it is one thing for a mathematician to occupy himself with nothing but quantity, and another for him to deny the existence of anything that cannot be reduced to quantity. This would mean that there is no other science but what is experimental, and that whatever is knowable is reducible to what is sensible.

The saying "science ought to stand by facts" may therefore be understood in two ways. Taken in an affirmative sense, inasmuch as all our reasoning ought to rest on facts, it is true. Taken in a negative sense, inasmuch as nothing ought to be admitted as real except facts and phenomena, it is false:—

i. Because a mere knowledge of facts is common to man and beasts. But man is superior to beasts in his knowledge; therefore, also in the object or term of his knowledge.

ii. Because those positive or experimental sciences themselves rest on principles and laws that are inaccessible to sense. Therefore, either these principles and laws have an objective and scientific value, and then it ought to be said that our knowledge has such value even when things not of a sensible order are presented to us, or these principles and laws have no objective and scientific value, and then empiric science itself falls to the ground.

iii. Because unbelievers themselves acknowledge many things as real and existing, which, however, do not come under the senses. Who has seen the cosmic ether? Who has seen the source of attraction? Who has seen genius? Yet nobody doubts of these things. Why? Because, although they are invisible, they are continually manifested by their effects.

iv. Well, say the same thing of God and of the soul. Although they are not visible, they manifest themselves by their effects. God manifests Himself by means of creatures, as an artist manifests himself by means of his chief works. The soul manifests itself by means of the vital actions that it performs, as the power of steam is manifested by the movements of machinery.[1]

[1] "You ask me," said Napoleon one day to General Bertrand, "what is God, if I know Him, and what I know of Him? Do you answer me first: How do you know the genius of a man? Is genius visible? Perhaps you have touched it? Why do you believe in it? You believe because you see its works: seeing the effect, you ascend to the cause. And on the field of battle, why did you believe in my genius? Because you were a witness of my victories. My victories made you believe in me. Well, the universe makes me believe in God. I believe in the cause of what I see. Are not these wonderful effects of the divine omnipotence so many realities, much

v. We must not therefore confound the invisible with the unknowable. God and the soul are invisible to the senses, but they can be known by the mind of man.

vi. For the same reason we must not confound invisibility with nothingness. The real is distinguished into corporeal or material (which is visible) and incorporeal or spiritual (which is invisible).

vii. Let the contradiction of method into which unbelievers fall be observed. After having established that everything knowable is reduced to the sensible, they admit the existence of things neither visible nor sensible, but absurd ; for example, that matter and power are eternal, without having ever been produced.

The general argument on which all those rely who deny any objective value to the knowledge that they have by the term "beyond"—that is, the supersensible or supernatural—is the relativity of our knowledge. But here we must explain more particularly.

i. That all our knowledge is relative to facts or phenomena, in the meaning that we directly know only what falls under the senses, is not an invention of agnosticism, but a dictate of common sense. Yet it does not thence follow that we cannot in any way know the divine essence ; it follows only that we cannot know it directly or immediately, as sensible facts are known. Now who does not know that, besides a direct or immediate knowledge, there is also an indirect or mediate knowledge, which is obtained by means of the knowledge of other things ? Thus, a work of art leads us to a knowledge of its author ; and, in general, the knowledge of an effect always leads us to a knowledge of the cause. If, therefore, the universe is an effect, or rather a combination of effects, the knowledge of it ought naturally to lead us to a knowledge of the cause that produced it. If our knowledge is relative with regard to the universe, the universe in its turn is relative with regard to God. In other words, from the moment when the universe cannot be known as it truly is in itself without its setting before us its character of dependence on a first cause, the knowledge of the universe itself cannot but lead us to a knowledge of its author—God.

ii. Moreover, that all our knowledge can be called relative in the meaning that from a knowable object we know only as much as comes into relation with our faculties of knowing, and that part of the reality which escapes the same remains therefore unknowable : even this is not a discovery of our days. But all this does not prove that the Divine Being is unknowable or undemonstrable to us. It proves only that we cannot know Him in a perfect and complete manner—not that we cannot possibly know Him in any

more eloquent than my victories. What military movements so beautiful as to compare with the movement of the stars ? . . . Do you understand me ? The effects prove the cause, and divine effects make me believe in a divine cause."

manner. Besides perfect knowledge, there is an imperfect or analogical knowledge, which enables us to know God to that degree in which creatures reveal Him to us as their cause. In short, God is truly incomprehensible, but He is not unknowable. Nor, in point of fact, do the arguments of the agnostics prove anything else. How could Spencer himself declare the existence of the Unknowable, if indeed he did not know it in any manner?

When, therefore, Morselli, followed by all the crowd of agnostic positivists, says that no religion has ever been able to represent *the beyond* without availing itself of *data* contained in the conscience and coming exclusively from our relations with *the beyond*,[1] and draws thence his conclusion that the supernatural is a thing altogether chimerical and illusory, he is simply to be pitied.

In only one way the relativity of our knowledge can favour the pretensions of agnosticism: that of saying that our intellectual knowledge is relative in the sense of *subjective*—that it is an idealisation or superstructure of our thought, without any objective reality corresponding to it. It is in this sense that moderns understand the relativism of our knowledge with regard to *the beyond*. And this is a basis for the doctrine of E. Kant, who admits a knowledge of *phenomenon*, but not of *noumenon*; because, according to him, all the ideas of our mind that do not relate to the facts or phenomena of the physical world are forms or categories merely subjective—that is, they are only representations without the things represented.[2]

But then there would be an end for ever to reason and to science.

i. *To Reason.*—Because, if all human knowledge is derived from phenomena that are objects of the senses, what is reason but an empty name, a title without substance? As a matter of fact,

[1] In the Conference against F. Brunetière on the pretended failure of science.

[2] It may appear incredible, yet this is the platform of modern science, from Kant to Spencer, in its opposition to the supernatural. At a time when the glorious traditions of scholastic thought were held up for general contempt, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, as can easily be believed, gave the last shake to Aristotelian-scholastic metaphysics; and very soon were gathered round it almost all the tendencies of contemporaneous thought to lay the basis of that great restoration from the lowest foundations (*magna instauratio ab imis fundamentis*) which Bacon had signalised in the experimental method. And, in point of fact, if reason is no longer to be attended to when it rises above the sensible, it is then done for ever with metaphysics and theology, and everything knowable is to be reconstructed on a new basis. To strengthen still more this fancy came the strange whims of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, against whom it was difficult to keep science on the ground of facts. Then positivism began its triumphal march. It was thus that the idea of the Absolute Being—gradually falling from the high regions of abstraction, to which it had been confined by transcendentalism, stripping itself of all personality, and reducing itself to the mere idea of an indeterminate being—became afterwards that of real being in all things; and the real being in all things could be nothing but the perception of the senses (a mere phenomenon), because all objective value was denied to everything beyond empirical knowledge. This is the final explanation of our knowledge, according to modern science.

all the unbelieving scientists may, on this point, be divided into two classes : those who identify reason with the senses, and those who admit it as a faculty subjectively distinct, but do not recognise any value in it beyond that of phenomenon. Now, in both cases, we always come to the same conclusion, which is at the same time a terrible lesson : man cannot forget God without forgetting himself ; he cannot renounce the knowledge of God without renouncing his own reason—that is, without ceasing to be a man.

ii. *To Science.*—Because physical, experimental, empiric science itself cannot do without the principles of reason. The senses give facts or phenomena ; but it is reason that examines them—connects them—searches out their relations, the laws that govern them, the causes that produce them. The knowledge of facts or phenomena becomes scientific only when reason has discovered the dynamic relation or causal link that joins the phenomenon to the principle from which it came. This is the reason why unbelieving scientists themselves regard the principle of causality as the basis of all science.[1] Therefore, one of two things : either deny the principle of causality, and then all is over with empiric science, or admit the principle of causality, and then you cannot deny the existence of God.[2] Because the same law that guides the physicist to seek in an antecedent phenomenon the cause of a consequent phenomenon, is also that which guides the metaphysician to seek outside the universe the cause of the universe. This is the law or principle of causality ; it is the dependence that every effect has on its cause.

Such is the plan of our discussion against the unbelievers.

It is not, therefore, from the philosophers of immanence (psychological) or voluntarism that we are going to seek arguments. The good or the bad dispositions of the soul can certainly have an influence in determining us to consider or not to consider what is necessary to know the truth, or to consider it in one way rather than in another. They can also have an influence in making us see and welcome more or less easily the demonstrative force of one argument rather than another. The mentality, or the

[1] "If we examine closely, and in its wonderful complications, the body of scientific doctrine, we find that one, single, exclusive principle dominates and regulates all the ideas that we form about ourselves and the world ; and this principle is the principle of causality."—*Morselli.*

[2] Another book of mine, *Il Principio di Causalità e l'Esistenza di Dio di fronte alla scienza moderna,* turns entirely on this same dilemma. Considering that the unbelieving scientists of our days reduce everything knowable to the sensible and recognise no other science than empiric, I applied myself to analyse the nature of this science. And seeing that it can do nothing without reason ; seeing that empiric knowledge is one thing and empiric science another ; seeing that empiric knowledge becomes scientific only inasmuch as it submits to the examination of reason, which looks to the necessary dependence of one phenomenon on another—I believed that I had a right to press the unbelieving scientists of the various schools with this dilemma. The polemics that they follow in Italy and elsewhere have only set the truth and the great importance of said dilemma in a clearer light

subjective disposition of the intellect, often varies in individuals by reason of the instruction or education that they have received. Even the affections of the will can concur to form one mentality rather than another, inasmuch as "the affection binds the intellect." This is most true. But it is also true that the objective value of an argument is altogether independent of our good or bad dispositions. Even with the best will and mentality in the world we can never make that to be true which is not true in itself, and *vice versa*. To maintain the opposite is to make the truth subjective, and changeable according to the tastes, the inclinations, the caprices of individuals.

Certainly no one can deny that knowledge is a subjective fact, in the sense that the faculty of knowing and the act of knowing are those of the subject knowing. But, on the other hand, no one can deny that it is equally an objective fact, inasmuch as the knowing faculties are determined to know by their objects. There may indeed be question about the manner in which things exercise their causal influence on the knowing powers, but the fact cannot be denied on account of the difficulty found in explaining it : just as there may be question about the manner in which bodies lay their image on the photographic plate, but no one can deny the fact of that reproduction because there is difficulty in explaining it. Now, in this fact we have all the objectivity of knowing, whether on the part of sense or on the part of the intellect. And so much may suffice to answer the sophisms of all the Kantians, Neo-Kantians, and philosophers of psychological immanence and voluntarism.

Those, accordingly, who do not recognise arguments objectively certain, and demonstrative of the existence of God and of the soul, and affirm that such truths become certain by the determination of the will to admit what reason cannot demonstrate, are in a grave error.

Nor does it avail to say that the existence of God is "undoubtedly a moral and religious truth" in order to conclude that there cannot be arguments to prove it independently of the will. There is no religious or moral truth that is not first of all speculative ; nor could God be the object of our worship if He were not first the object of our knowledge. Can we be certain of a supreme moral law if we are not first certain, at least implicitly, of the existence of a Supreme Legislator ? Can we be certain that we ought to do good and avoid evil if we are not first certain of the existence of Him who commands us to do good and avoid evil ?

Ridiculous, therefore, is the obstinacy of those who tell us that we should go to God with our whole soul, especially with the heart and the will, and not merely with the mind. Who doubts it ? But religion is one thing, and the knowledge of God another. The former presupposes the latter. We go to that which we know.

To argue in their way, it would be necessary first of all to deny any real distinction between the intellect and the will, as some

voluntarists actually do. But then it would suffice to appeal to the testimony of conscience, which makes all feel that there is an intrinsic difference between the acts of the one and those of the other, so much so that there is often a striking contrast between the mind and the will, between the dictates of the one and the operations of the other.

They say :—" According to Christian theology, the not-affirming or the denying of the existence of God is a fault or a sin. Therefore, the affirming of it is a virtue ; and since there is no virtue into which the will does not enter, the affirmation of the existence of God is a work also of the will." But why, or in what sense, is the denying of God a fault? Perhaps inasmuch as the will ought to make us admit the existence of God even without any proof, or make us regard some proofs as available that are not such ? No, certainly. The fault or sin of the will consists in not applying the mind to study and know the proofs themselves, and in not removing the obstacles that shut out the vision of truth from the intellect. And as man has a moral obligation to know God—being destined by Him for a last end—and he cannot satisfy this obligation without the help of the will, which applies the intellect to know, so it is understood how good sense does not charge with a fault him who is ignorant of a theorem in mathematics, because there is no moral obligation for such knowledge (unless one is bound to it by his profession), but instead charges him with a fault who is ignorant of the existence of God or denies it. But the fault does not consist " in rejecting, as apparently insufficient, the proofs of the existence of God." If it were so, good sense would not have the right to charge atheists with a fault. The fault is on the part of the will, which does not apply the intellect to study the proofs themselves in that dispassionate manner which is necessary to arrive at the truth.

That even the will therefore enters into the admission of the existence of God, no one doubts. But there is question with regard to the mode. Does it enter only by moving the intellect to consider that which determines the intellect itself to admit the existence of God ; or does it enter by determining the intellect, not indeed to know, but to admit, the existence of God ? In the former case, the influence of the will on the intellect is purely extrinsic or mediate, such as it has in all knowledge, even scientific ; in the latter, it is intrinsic or immediate, such as it has in an act of faith, which is not determined by the things known, but immediately by the command of the will.

Now, it almost suffices to have stated the question in its terms, in order that it should be settled.

Objective certainty, therefore, which the followers of voluntarism contest with us, is that on which our arguments will properly rest : a physical, rational certainty, which moves from visible facts and goes to the invisible cause ; a certainty, in short, that

comes to us from the principle of causality. And this principle is that which we can and should make available even in the analysis of psychological phenomena, if we wish to deduce anything certain or true of *the beyond* of those same phenomena.

CHAPTER III.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Some persons adopt a wrong method in proving the existence of God. They have recourse to a kind of intuition of the Divine Being—to a sentiment of the infinite—to an idea of the divinity innate to our spirit—to an idea of a most perfect being, from which they would wish to derive even the existence of God.

Christian science has justly proscribed such methods, and desires that we should have recourse to facts. These can be studied in themselves, or according to the causes on which they depend. In the former case we have the empiric or positive sciences ; in the latter the physical-rational, which guide us ultimately to the first cause—namely, God. The method that we follow in proving the existence of God rests altogether on the principle of causality : " every effect must have a cause that produced it." An effect is that which begins to exist by derivation from a cause. Hence the axiom " every effect must have a cause " is equivalent to another, " whatever begins to exist must have a cause that made it exist." Nothing can be clearer. If a thing first of all did not exist, and then began to exist, not being able to give existence to itself, it had need of a cause to exist. And if this cause was itself produced by another, and this second by a third, and so on, we should finally arrive at the original cause, from which all other causes depend. It is then evident that the productive or efficient cause is always distinct from its effect, as the artisan is always distinct from his work. If, therefore, we can show that the world is not from itself, but had a beginning, and therefore depends on an external cause that made it exist, it is thereby proved that the original cause is really distinct from the universe.

The unbelieving scientists of our days, though recognising in the principle of causality the basis of all scientific order, limit it to the empiric order alone. And here is the reason. The derivation of one thing from another, they say, cannot be known, if both are not objects of experience. From the moment that the causal connection is made plain to us by the derivation of one thing from another, it is necessary that both—that which is called the cause and that which is called the effect—should be subject to our observation. Only in this manner can the origin or derivation of one thing from another be proved. The principle of causality has, therefore, a value merely relative to the phenomenal world, and is expressed in a formula of Kant : " Every phenomenon

that begins has its genesis or reason in a preceding phenomenon." Therefore it is absolutely impossible that in virtue of this principle we should arrive at an antecedent cause non-phenomenal, supernatural, or invisible—that is to say, God. A supernatural being, just because supernatural, is essentially unknowable. Not coming, under the senses, He escapes all our researches, and we therefore cannot know whether He has any relation with the universe.

This argument, which appears good even to some Catholic apologists, rests on a miserable equivocation. That the physicist, as such, having to stand by the facts of experience, cannot go outside of them in establishing relations of causality, may be granted; but that the principle of casuality cannot avail for *the beyond* of facts or phenomena must be denied. In order to know that one thing is derived from another, is it necessary that both should be subject to our empiric observation ? No ; it is enough that what is present to our senses reveals its genesis, or its dependence on an antecedent cause, let this cause be invisible as long as you please. In such case the existence of the antecedent invisible cause is revealed to us by the very fact or phenomenon that stands visibly before us. So it is with God. He is not visible in Himself, but His existence is made evident to us by means of visible creatures, which (as we shall see) show us their dependence on a first cause. Therefore, that very law which guides the physicist to seek in an antecedent phenomenon the cause of a subsequent one is that which guides us also to seek outside the universe the cause of all the phenomena in it.

And now for our demonstration.

It is certain that whatever is in the universe began to exist. But it is certain that the universe could not begin to exist without a cause antecedent to it, distinct from it, unproduced. Therefore, the existence of God, as the first or producing cause, is certain.

It only remains for us to prove the first part of this argument—that whatever is in the universe began to exist. And this we prove by considering the origin of the different realities that surround us.

i. *The Origin of Living Things.*—It is certain that there was a time when there were no men, no animals, no vegetables, no living things (the *azoic* period). But it is also certain that life appeared, not by generation from other living things, for no such things then existed—nor by spontaneous generation, the possibility of which even the unbelieving scientists of our day deny.[1] Therefore, the first living things could not begin, except by the immediate production of God. Therefore, God exists.

ii. *The Origin of Things not Living.*—As it is certain that living things have not always existed, so it is certain that the other things of which the universe is composed have not always existed. There was a time when the various mineral substances were not yet formed ; or rather when our globe was not yet formed, or the

[1] See extract from *Rivista Scientifica*, p. 22.—*Trans.*

sun, or the moon, or the stars. Geology and astronomy therefore give a temporal genesis to the universe. A sign that the universe did not always exist, but began to exist; and, if it began, it required a cause. Therefore, the same conclusion as in the first case.

iii. *The Origin of the Cosmic Mass.*—Supposing the cosmic mass not to have been produced, we must think of it as in rest or in motion from all eternity. But if it was in rest from all eternity it could not set itself in motion, and therefore the present universe would not have appeared. If, on the other hand, it was in motion from all eternity, the formation of the universe would also have happened from all eternity, and there would not have been a temporal genesis of the present universe. To explain, therefore, the temporal formation, it would be necessary to have recourse to a first cause that produced the cosmic mass in time, or at least determined to develop it in time.

iv. *The Origin of Physical Energies.*—Science assures us that all the physical energies of the universe are continually diminishing, so that the day will come when all corporeal or material phenomena will cease. But if the energies of the universe existed from all eternity, they would ere now, after the lapse of infinite ages, have attained their ultimate and complete development. A sign that they began! Therefore, they had a cause. In point of fact, bodies receive and transmit motion, but they do not originate it of themselves: they are inert matter. Yet all bodies in the universe move. It is proper, therefore, to admit that they were moved, and not merely by other bodies, because then it would remain to see by whom those other bodies were moved. Not to go on to infinity, we must admit an Agent that, not being a body and being able to move, moved all things that move.

v. *The Origin of the Order that Exists in the Universe.*—Every effect requires a cause proportioned to it, and hence where there is order there must have been a regulator—that is, a mind that conceived this order and a will that desired it. But in the universe there is an admirable order, not only in the careful structure of each particular thing, but in the wonderful harmony that prevails among all. Therefore, the universe is the work of a supreme regulator, who, for us, is God. It is the same reasoning by which a child, seeing the hands of a clock so regulated as to show the hour, cannot think that the clock was made by chance or by itself, but attributes it to a clockmaker. He who denies the existence of a supreme regulator of the universe is obliged to grant intelligence to the forces of dead matter—a thing absurd.

Let us dwell on the absurdity of the hypothesis to which unbelievers have recourse. To escape the necessity of a creative act, and at the same time to explain the fact of a temporal genesis of the universe, with all the other phenomena that characterise it, unbelieving scientists have recourse to the hypothesis of a continual evolution, progressive and regressive. They say that

nature, like Penelope, is continually doing and undoing its work. Before this universe infinite others should have existed, and after it infinite others will exist.

i. But this hypothesis is against experience, which attests that the forces of nature necessarily and therefore always act in the same manner, follow the same course. Therefore, it is absurd that they can reverse their path without the intervention of a greater, opposing, external force. Mark well: here we do not propose to explain the different direction of this or that force—for which it would be enough to have recourse to a greater, opposing, natural force. Instead, we treat of reversing the whole course of nature. And then what or where would be the greater, opposing force, capable of producing a total reversal, if we do not admit an eternal cause, superior to the universe?

ii. Then, this hypothesis of a continual evolution, progressive and regressive, is repugnant to the fact of a diminution of energies. which science sets before us as a thing certain and unquestionable.

iii. It is not true, therefore, that the hypothesis of Laplace annuls the hypothesis regarding God, as was impiously written. Apart from the condemnation already passed by many learned men on such an hypothesis, it always remains to ask—

Who Made the Nebulous Mass?—It being admitted that everything was derived from a nebulous mass, it then remains to show whence this mass was derived. To suppose it unproduced is not possible, because in such case it could not be imagined otherwise than in rest or in motion. If in rest, nothing could ever be derived from it, and evolution could not have begun; if in motion from all eternity, then the temporal genesis of the universe could not be explained.

Who Endowed it with that Motion which we Observe?—To explain the origin of the universe, unbelievers have recourse to a rotatory motion that was given to the mass. But this motion, which is necessary to explain the present rotations and revolutions of the planets—whence did it come? "Motion not being necessary to matter," said the materialist, Du-Bois-Reymond, in his celebrated speech at the Academy of Berlin on the 8th of July, 1881, "the need of causality requires either an eternity of motion, and then nothing can be understood by any man of sane mind, or a supernatural impulse, and then a miracle must be admitted—difficulties that drive positivism to despair."

Who Directed its Development with that Order and those Laws which we Admire in the Universe?—Looking at the order and the aim of the universe, there is nothing but a dilemma: either admit that the forces of nature are intelligent, or admit that they are produced and governed by a Supreme Intelligence. "Although I declare myself an evolutionist and a follower of modern naturalism," wrote Professor Tommasi, of Naples, "I confess that when I begin to consider the special connections of organisms, and contemplate their inner and wonderful structure, and seek

a teleological reason for their respective functions, I am petrified, I waver in my convictions. And not once, but a hundred times, have I been obliged to exclaim: How is it possible that they could have been formed by the law of a mere mechanical evolution?"[1]

Who Made Living Things Arise from that Mass?—From the moment when it is acknowledged that living creatures have not always existed, and spontaneous generation is ostracised by unbelieving science itself, it only remains to seek the cause in the creative act of God. Therefore Vacherot wrote:—"Evolution, by means of which all things would have been formed, would itself remain an inexplicable mystery. . . . How could evolution have been able to raise from matter things that have properties widely different from those of matter? How could it have performed those miracles of effect without any cause? . . . And here precisely is seen the impotence of the physical and natural sciences, and the imperative necessity is felt of seeking elsewhere a key for the enigma." We need hardly say that this is the language of all the greatest naturalists and biologists, as may be seen in the inaugural discourse of Professor Grassi last year.[3]

To facts of the physical order, we can add those of the moral and supernatural orders.

Facts taken from the moral order are:—(*a*) The sentiment of duty. (*b*) Consolation or remorse of conscience, according as works are good or bad. (*c*) The continual longing of man after a happiness that cannot be found in this life. All these are things that cannot be explained without the existence of a Supreme Being, to whom we must render an account of our actions, and by whom all the desires of our hearts can be satisfied. (*d*) And hence there has been no people, ancient or modern, barbarous or civilised, that has not admitted or does not admit a God the author of all. Even pagans, with whom the idea of God was much obscured by admitting many gods, recognised at the same time one above all the others—as, for example, Jupiter, the father of gods and men.

[1] *Evoluzione*, &c., by S. Tommasi, p. 17.

[2] *Revue des deux Mondes*, Dec. 15, 1878.

[3] The celebrated senator, Edward Porro, who died at Milan in 1902 amid the regrets of civic Italy, left in his will these memorable words:—"Those who say that science is destined to become material are mistaken or wish to be mistaken. Whoever studies most, whoever seeks most to fathom a secret of nature, discovers most plainly the infinite wisdom of the Creator, and finds it absurd to suppose that chance or nature could have co-ordinated the wonderful arrangements that are to be seen in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. If, then, we go on to consider reason in man, we are amazed by so many evidences of the wisdom of the Supreme God, who, giving a mind to man, distinguished him from all other beings, and placed him in a position to know whatever little he knows or suspects out of the innumerable things that he has not been able and perhaps will never be able to explain. Biological phenomena open the door to an infinity of doubts—to a mystery so profound that we are obliged to confess the narrow limits of our intellect before Him who can harmonise everything in a moment by His powerful *fiat*."

Facts taken from the supernatural order are miracles and prophecies. The existence of a single miracle or a single prophecy being once certain, the existence of God is thereby demonstrated in the clearest and most evident manner. Because a miracle or a prophecy, being an effect or a fact above all natural power, it cannot but have a supernatural cause. Now, the Old and New Testaments are full of these supernatural facts, which manifest the immediate intervention of God in the clearest and most evident manner, as we ourselves will show in the latter part of this work. Hence, Jesus Christ could say: "If you will not believe Me, at least believe My works."

It is not true, therefore, that the idea of God comes from popular ignorance. Neither is it true that the first idea of the supernatural began with fetichism. Rather the contrary is historically certain, as appears from the most ancient of books, the Bible, and as we shall see more extensively in its own place, when we speak of the origin of religion.

CHAPTER IV.

GOD IS REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE WORLD.

Believers and unbelievers agree in admitting the existence of a First Being, eternal and unproduced, from whom all things have been derived. It is clear. If absolutely nothing existed before the universe, never could the universe have begun.

While, however, believers say that the First and Unproduced Being is really distinct from the universe, and is He who made it by a true production from nothing, unbelievers, on the contrary—such as pantheists, materialists, monists, atheists, &c.—say that the First and Unproduced Being is not really distinct from the universe, but immanent, and undistinguished from finite realities, which came forth by successive evolutions from the same First and Unproduced Being.

But against this doctrine:—

i. All the arguments that we have hitherto brought forward, in demonstrating the existence of God, protest.

ii. The very idea of an efficient and producing cause protests, for it is always distinct from its effect, as the artificer is always distinct from his work.

iii. The method used by those same adversaries in determining the cause of any series of facts protests. For example, they even go outside the series of all men to seek the cause of the first man; they even go outside the series of all animals to seek the cause of the first animal; they even go outside the series of all plants to seek the cause of the first plant, and so on. Therefore, to find the cause not of this or that series of facts, but of all the series

of facts, they ought necessarily to pass beyond all finite realities, and go outside the universe.

iv. The very fact of the temporal character of the universe protests. If the First Cause were not distinct from the world, it should be said that the world always existed. But this is false, as we have shown. Therefore, that doctrine which confounds the First Being with finite realities is also false.

v. The testimony of our conscience protests. Everyone of us feels that he has his own proper being, really distinct from that of everyone else. Therefore, the doctrine of monism or ontological immanence, which assigns one only being to all things, is false.

vi. The very existence of the moral order protests. For if God is not really distinct from the universe, the idea of a Supreme Judge is taken away, responsibility for our actions is taken away, the difference between good and evil is taken away.

In fine, we must not omit that the existence of supernatural facts gives the most prompt denial to this doctrine. If facts are immediately produced by a power superior to that of all nature, it means that the First Being is really distinct from all nature. But of the existence of these facts we cannot doubt, as we shall see in its place. Therefore, we cannot doubt that God is distinct from the universe.

CHAPTER V.

NATURE OF THE DIVINE BEING.

The existence of God, and His distinction from the world, having been demonstrated, we can now form some idea or notion of the nature of the Divine Being.

Even here we proceed by the way of causality—that is, we make use of the perfections that are found in effects to know those of the cause from which they are derived. As the masterpieces of art reveal to us the talents of their authors, so the perfections of creatures reveal to us those of the Creator.

Applying this method, we ought to attribute to God all the perfections that we see in creatures—being, life, intelligence, liberty, goodness, &c.—and say: God is living, is intelligent, is free, is good, and so on.

But the perfections of creatures are always limited, and mixed with many defects. Instead, we ought to attribute to God all the perfection that is in them, but without any limit or defect, because they follow the mode of being of creatures, not that of perfection considered in itself or as it is in God. Creatures are limited in their being and in their perfections, because they depend on one who limits—on God; but the First Being has no one who can limit Him in His being or in His perfections, precisely because He is the First Being. Therefore, all the perfections of creatures ought to be attributed to God without any limit, in an infinite

manner. Accordingly, we can not only say that God is living, but that He is life; we can not only say that He is good, but that He is goodness. And so we may speak of every other perfection that does not imply any defect. These perfections are not in God anything but God Himself. God, therefore, is conceived as the Fulness of Being, or Infinite Being.

In point of fact, this is the definition that God gave of Himself in Holy Scripture. When Moses was commanded to go into Egypt in order to liberate the Hebrew people, he inquired of the Lord: "If the children of Israel should ask me what is Thy name, what shall I say to them?" And God answered: "Thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is hath sent Me to you." That is, He who is Being itself, hath sent Me to you.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CREATION.

The same arguments that prove the existence of God also prove the creation of the world. If the world had a cause, it therefore began to exist; if it began to exist, this means that it did not exist before; if at first it did not exist and afterwards began to exist, this means that it was produced out of nothing, or was created.

To produce out of nothing does not mean to produce an effect without any productive cause. In this sense we say: *From nothing, nothing is made.* To create there is, on the other hand, required a cause of infinite power, which by its omnipotence may cause the whole being of a creature to exist.

It is absurd to substitute evolution for creation, as unbelievers do. Even if we admit that the universe was formed by evolution, it is always true that evolution presupposes a substance that should be developed. This, then, cannot be given by evolution, nor can it be conceived as eternal and unproduced. We must, therefore, have recourse to creation.

Unbelievers can never and will never explain the origin of living creatures, the origin of the cosmic mass, the origin of order, &c., without having recourse to an efficient cause, supernatural and creative. We have seen it.

The incomprehensibility of the creative act is not a sufficient reason to disprove the fact of creation. We cannot comprehend the precise mode of generation; can we on that account deny the fact?

To think of denying creation because in all nature there are no examples of production from nothing, and every fact happens always according to natural laws, is the height of folly. Consider how even Stuart Mill writes:—We see at present that every phenomenon occurring is natural, or connected with natural laws.

For materialists this is equivalent to a denial of the supernatural; but wrongly, because experience can tell us nothing of the origin of the world; and, on the other hand, theology, teaching that God is the author of this world, that He created it with order, and that He governs it by constant laws, agrees very well with the experimental system. Materialism can indeed suppose that the world had no beginning (that is, it may leave the field of fact to enter that of argument); but then it becomes dogmatic, and how is it to prove the supposition? What experience supplies the proof? It makes an hypothesis, to which spiritualists oppose their doctrine. Perhaps it will have recourse in such a case to natural laws; but if these laws can explain the mode of the formation of the universe, they will never explain the mode of their own formation.[1]

CHAPTER VII.

SPECIAL POINTS RELATING TO THE CREATION.

THE World was not Created from all Eternity, but in Time.—It is a dogma of faith that the world was created in time, in so far as the word *time* denotes the opposite of eternity.[2] And even science, as we have seen, furnishes many arguments in confirmation of this dogma.

What was the precise time in which the world began to exist? We do not know. Neither science nor faith has settled anything on the point. Biblical chronology began only with the appearance of man; and nobody knows what time passed from the first moment of creation till the appearance of man, because it is not certain if the creation of the earth, as described in Genesis (I. i.), was immediately followed by the work of the first day, as described in the succeeding verses (ii.-v.).

Nor is it certain in what sense the six days of Genesis are to be understood: whether they were days of twenty-four hours, or periods of time more or less extensive, or rather symbolic days, without any relation to time.

[1] Three Essays.

[2] To avoid equivocation, let it be observed that creation can be considered actively, or on the part of God, in so far as it denotes the creative act, and then it is eternal like God Himself, because in God there is no succession of acts; it can also be considered passively on the part of the effect, that is, of the things produced, and then it is temporal, as creatures are temporal. It may be asked:—How, then, is it, if the creative act is eternal, that the world has not existed from eternity? Granting the cause, ought not the effect to follow? We answer:—The difficulty would hold if there was question of a cause that acts necessarily, but not when there is question of a free cause. It is true that the effect not only follows the cause, but also follows the mode of operation in the cause. If a cause operates freely, it can be decided to-day that a certain thing will be done to-morrow. So it is with creation. The creative act is eternal, but God, because free, could decide that the effect, or the world, should exist in time. And as He willed, so it was done.

This, however, is certain, that the creation of the world ought not to be confounded with its formation. Because God did not create the world as it is at present. He first of all gave existence to matter and its energies; then followed the formation, from which came the present universe. The creation and the formation of the universe happened in time; but it is evident that the former preceded the latter by a duration more or less long, which is not indicated to us either by faith or by science. More: even natural forces could concur to the formation of the universe: nor is it improbable that our globe was formed as Laplace imagined. On the other hand, at the creation of the universe it was only God who could act by His omnipotence, drawing forth from nothing all that which did not as yet exist.

The World was Freely Created by God.—Thus another dogma of faith is the freedom of the creative act. Even reason demonstrates it. To admit in God any kind of necessity for creating the world is as much as to say that God had need of the world. But this is absurd:—

i. Because God is a most perfect Being.

ii. Because He cannot derive any perfection from the world, nothing being found in effects but what they have received from their cause.

iii. Because the very fact that the world was created in time proves that God had no need of the world; otherwise He would have given it existence from all eternity.

The World was Created according to the Design and the End that God proposed to Himself.—God did not create the world blindly, without knowing what He was doing, but He produced it according to the design conceived in His mind. As the order that appears in any machine made by man is only an actuation of the idea or design conceived in the inventor's mind, so the order that exists in the machine of the world is only an actuation of the idea or design conceived in the Divine mind.

But the order in which anything is arranged is only a means to attain the scope or end proposed by its author. The works of a clock, for example, are so arranged as to show the hours. If, therefore God did not act blindly in the creation of the universe, but arranged all things *in number, weight, and measure,* as the Scripture says, it means that He had also an end in view.

And what, therefore, was this end?

Before answering the question, it is proper to distinguish the end of a work from that of the worker. The end of a work is the scope for which the work in itself was ordained: thus the end of a clock is to show the hours. The end of the worker is the scope looked to by him who produces the work: thus the end of the clockmaker is the profit that he will earn by the sale of the clock, or, if he does not work for gain, the honour that he will receive by the perfection of his work. The same in creation. The end of created works is that which comes from the scope for which

each one of them was ordained—for example, the structure of the eye is ordained for the scope of seeing. Here we have the finality of nature. On the other hand, the finality of the Creator consists in the scope that God proposed to attain on His part by means of the creation of the universe.

What, therefore, was this scope ?

The End for which God Created the Universe was His External Glory.—To have a clear understanding of this very important point, it is well to observe :—

i. That every intelligent and free being always works for some good.

ii. That it can tend to good in either of two ways : to attain it, or to communicate it. Thus science is a good about which the scholar and the professor are occupied : the former to attain it, the latter to communicate it. Now, God did not create the world in order to have some acquired good : He, being the fulness of being, had need of nothing. Therefore, He created, in order to communicate good.

iii. This communication consists in His giving existence to creatures that share more or less in His perfections, and consequently in His being thus revealed or manifested by means of creatures. Indeed, every effect reveals the virtue of the cause that produced it. Created beings, therefore, which are an effect of the divine virtue, reveal the perfections of the Creator.

iv. Now this manifestation of the divine perfections in creatures forms the glory of God, as the manifestation of the abilities of an artist in his work forms the honour and the glory of the artist.

v. God, in creating the world, did not intend only to give existence to beings that would resemble Him in His perfections (*material glory*), but also to make Himself known and loved by means of those perfections (*formal glory*) ; and this implied the existence of intelligent creatures, who alone are capable of knowing God by means of His works, of admiring Him in His perfections, of praising Him, and of thanking Him as the Supreme Author of all things. And behold man constituted, so to say, king and high-priest of the universe ! To him all irrational creatures *relate the glory of God*, that he (man) may know, admire, praise, and love his Lord. The only fruit that God intended to gather from the creation of the world was, therefore, that of being known and loved. To know and love God is likewise the ultimate scope of our life.

Government of the World, and Divine Providence.—If God created nothing without an end, and if He therefore appointed a special end for every creature, it is evident that He ought to have disposed all things in such a way that every one of them could attain it. Now, this disposal or direction of all things for the end that God assigned them, constitutes the Rule of God and Divine Providence.

The order, the finality, and the constancy of natural laws are the best proof of the divine management and government of the

physical world; since, if the world were subject to chance, there would be no order or constancy in the operations of nature. What is that constancy or determination, if not the guidance and control of forces towards an end that God allotted to them?

The same conclusion might be drawn from a consideration of the order, the finality, and the constancy of the operations of nature in the animal and vegetable kingdoms. How, for example, can anyone fail to admire the care of Divine Providence in the instinct of animals?

But Divine Providence shines still more clearly with regard to man, especially if we consider the supernatural government of God in the Old and the New Testament. Here, God does not Himself determine our activity; but He makes known to us the laws (the rules of what is just and right) that we ought to observe in our operations, with the sanction of reward or punishment.

Nor does the existence of evil prove anything against Divine Providence. True evil, which is the evil of guilt, depends entirely on the abuse of our will, which God respects because He made it free.

The evil of guilt being granted, the evil of punishment must necessarily follow: the Lord would not be a provident God if He had not to punish the guilty. If men offend God every moment, abusing their gifts, and chiefly that of liberty, it is natural that He should make them feel His justice by a chastisement or an expiation for sins committed.

But if many times the hand of God seems to weigh more heavily on the just than on sinners, we ought to reflect:—

i. That there is no sinner who has not performed some good work, which, however, not being worthy of the happiness to come, receives from God a temporal reward in this life.

ii. That there is no just person, except Christ and the most blessed Mary, who has not committed some sin, which ought to be visited at least with a temporal penalty.

iii. That the present life is a time of trial. Hence, evils are not always a chastisement or punishment. They are often sent to purify our virtues. They detach the heart from the world and raise it to God.

iv. That, after all, we ought not to forget that the complete and final sanction is not in this life, but in the next. Here, events are lamented; but they are set right elsewhere. Thus, Divine Providence, leaving something manifestly incomplete among us, compels us, so to say, to turn our eyes towards Heaven; and in this way the sufferings of virtue are a revelation of the future life.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

The teaching of faith with regard to the origin of man is well known; but it is also known that this teaching is nowadays

ridiculed by the great majority of modern scientists, who explain the origin of man by evolution and transformation from inferior beings.

Of the evolution and transformation of species as a system we shall speak later on. Here we shall speak of them only in so far as they concern our question.

The unbelieving scientists of our days make man the last term of an indefinite series of evolutions and transformations through which primordial matter would have passed. They say that the first living thing or protoplasm was formed by spontaneous generation ; that from it were derived all living things by successive evolutions and transformations ; that the near ancestors of man are, therefore, to be sought in those animals which most resemble man, because nature does not advance by leaps, but proceeds gradually in its works.

Now, all this is mere hypothesis. It has no support from any fact ; it is contrary to physical laws ; it is contrary to the dictates of reason ; and it is founded on miserable equivocations.

1. *It has no Support from any Fact.*—None from the natural formation of the protoplasm ; because spontaneous generation has been ostracised by science, and, although Haeckel endeavoured to bring it under the name of "autogenesis," and believed that he had caught nature in its passage from the inorganic to the organic world by the famous "bathybius," discovered by his faithful friend, Huxley, he was afterwards obliged to throw it aside without hope of ever again returning to it. The celebrated Virchow, being asked to give his opinion on the discovery of his disciple, should unwillingly declare :—"There is not a single positive fact to show that an inorganic mass has ever been transformed into an organic one. Therefore, if I do not wish to believe in the existence of a special Creator, I must have recourse to spontaneous generation. The thing is evident ; *tertium non datur*, there is no other resource left. When it is said, I do not admit the creation, and I want an explanation of the origin of life, a first proposition is made ; but it is necessary, willingly or unwillingly, to come to the conclusion, to the *therefore*, I admit spontaneous generation. But we have no proof of it[1]; no one has ever seen a spontaneous production of organic matter. It is not the theologians, but the scientists, who reject it. . . . It is necessary to make choice between creation and spontaneous generation ; and, to speak candidly, we learned men have had some little preference for spontaneous generation. Ah, if there came only one single demonstration that it exists ! . . . But with 'bathybius' the hope of a demonstration has vanished for ever" (in *Rivista Scientifica*). Nor was the judgment of Virchow belied by later attempts, up to the pretended "radiobes," of which there was so much talk about two years ago.

[1] There is a small Italian book, entitled *Evolutionismo ?* by an Italian medical doctor, Girolamo Danesi, of Carrara, which treats this subject in

The aforesaid hypothesis finds no support in a natural derivation of higher from lower species in the natural kingdom. Because, as long as the world has been a world no evidence has ever appeared to attest the passage of lower living creatures to a higher species. The things called " middle forms " exist only in the imagination of the transformists. Geology and paleontology, as demonstrated by Stoppani, Lapparent, Barrande, and so many others who have gone deeply into the study of fossils, do not offer us a single example of it. " Whether this transformation is made slowly and by a progressive gradation, as Lamarck and Darwin would have it, or suddenly, and at a bound, as Geoffroy, Owen, and Mivart say, or even that the species, before being constituted, passes through an indeterminate number of incomplete forms, incapable of propagating themselves, as Koelliker, Naudin, and others think, the phenomenon remains in substance the same. Now, this phenomenon, absolutely hypothetical, of which no trace is found anywhere, and which is irreconcilable with other phenomena attested by experience and observation, is a phenomenon of which I cannot admit the reality. I have therefore been obliged to combat all the theories to which it has served as a basis." So said Quatrefages to the *Science Society* in 1892.

It is true that even some Catholics to-day favour the hypothesis of a genetic evolution of zoological species inferior to man.[1] But, besides that their thoughts are so involved that it is not yet understood in what the new hypothesis properly consists, it appears clearly from a recent debate that there are no new facts against the fixity of species.

Lastly, the hypothesis finds no particular support in the derivation of man from a beast. Virchow himself, at the International Congress of Moscow in 1892, had to exclaim :—" On the question of man, we are beaten all along the line. All the researches undertaken with a view to find continuity in a progressive development have been without result. No pre-anthrope exists, no man-monkey exists : the middle link remains a phantom." And, speaking of fossil man, he adds :—" To-day the existence of fossil man is a fact certainly scientific. But this fossil man we always

a most scientific manner from beginning to end. The doctor shows the absolute impossibility of an organic body being produced by an inorganic body. He remarks how wonderful it is that each little leaf of a plant makes itself without knowing what it is doing, and the very moment it attains a certain size and shape, which may be called the artistic standard, it ceases to grow—otherwise it would make a monstrosity. He examines minutely the structure of the brain, the eye, the heart, &c., and shows that not only is each of these organs formed with the most admirable skill, but, being perfectly adapted to its purpose, it displays the highest intelligence in its Author. All the objections of unbelievers are considered, and are refuted with the ability of a master in science and the zeal of a true son of Holy Church.—*Trans.*

[1] The authors of this hypothesis ought not to be confounded with evolutionists in general. They do not apply evolution to man, and, even with egard to lower living things, they admit the creation of the original species.

find a man like ourselves. Scarcely ten years ago, a skull was found in a river, or a hole, or a marshy place. Immediately it was believed that a discovery was made—that the skull offered peculiar characteristics of a savage state or an imperfect development. There, there was to be seen a certain appearance of the monkey! To-day, all these illusions have vanished: we must admit that no human fossil type presents characteristics of an inferior development."

Such is the language of all true scientists, even unbelievers, of whom Virchow was certainly one. Not one of them dares any longer to speak of a beastly origin of man on the basis of fact.

It would be enough only to consider the period in which man appeared—the quaternary[1]—in order to destroy all the dreams of the transformists.

If to arguments of geology and paleontology we wished to add those of physiology and psychology on the natural differences between man and beast, which also result from facts, we should have in our hands the most crushing refutation.

2. *It is Contrary to Physical Laws.*—Many of the unbelieving evolutionists, seeing the want of any fact in support of their hypothesis, maintain all the while that such facts may be found in the future.

[1] The following diagram may help some readers to understand better the author's remarks regarding periods in the formation of the crust of the earth. It is, of course, understood that proportion of parts cannot be here observed.



Azoic means without life; Paleozoic, ancient life; Mesozoic, middle life; and Cainozoic, recent life.

The table on next page may also be useful.

But we say that this their hope is utterly vain and ridiculous, because not only the evolution of an inorganic to an organic kingdom, but the evolution or transformation of a lower organic species to a higher is contrary to the very laws of nature. If there is anything certain, it is the constancy of natural laws. The forces of nature act necessarily, always, and everywhere in the same manner. External circumstances and conditions may indeed influence more or less their development, but can never change the course, the law, or the mode of their operation. And is not this perhaps the reason why unbelievers say that a miracle is impossible ? Now, behold the argument that we build on this fact.

Nobody can deny that the law or the mode of operating in creatures not living is one thing, and the law or the mode of operating in living creatures another ; as also nobody can deny that the law or the mode of operating in living creatures of one species is one thing, and the law or the mode of operating in living creatures of another species is another. Therefore, if nature constantly acts in the same mode, it is absurd to expect this natural passage either from the inorganic to the organic kingdom, or from a lower organic species to a higher organic species.[1]

Hence, Wallace, although an evolutionist (in his recent work entitled " The Position of Man in the Universe "), writes thus :— " There are at least three periods in the development of the

PERIODS	STRATA	ORGANISMS
Quaternary	Alluvial Glacial	Man
Tertiary	Pliocene Miocene Eocene	Mammals, quadrupeds, large and small; deinotherium, mastodon, mammoth
Secondary	Cretaceous Oolitic Triassic	Abundance of life. Enormous reptiles. Amphibians. Birds
Primary	Permian Carboniferous Devonian Silurian	Exuberant vegetation. Fishes of all kinds and shapes. Crustacea. Molluscs. Corals. Mosses. Spiders. Sponges. Worms
Azoic	Schist Granite	No trace of life

The above particulars are taken chiefly from the learned work, *L'Opera dei sei Giorni*, by the Rev. A. Lépicier, O.S.M., Professor in the College of Propaganda, Rome.—*Trans.*

[1] The metamorphoses of caterpillars into chrysales and butterflies do not avail to the contrary : they are rather a confirmation of the aforesaid law, because constant, and with a definite process within the circle of their life.

organic world, in which it is necessary to recognise the active intervention of another cause or power than that of evolution. The first period is the passage from the inorganic to the organic, when the first vegetable cell, or rather the protoplasm from which it issued, appeared for the first time. The second is the introduction of sensation. The third is the existence in man of various things among his most noble and characteristic faculties, those which distinguish him from beasts and raise him above them. . . . Such faculties could never have been developed by an effect of those laws which have determined the progressive development of the general organic world, and even of the physical organism of man."

3. *It is Contrary to the Dictates of Reason.*—One of the fundamental dictates of our reason is that every effect must have a cause proportioned to it. Now, what does transformism do ? It denies this principle, inasmuch as it affirms that superior beings are derived by evolution from inferior ones, and thus comes to admit that more is derived from less. To pretend that a superior species can naturally originate from an inferior one, to pretend that a force can give more in its development than what it has in its principle, is the same as to wish for an effect without a cause ; and all the discoveries to come will never, we are certain, avail to belie us on this point. " It is a notorious fact," writes Farges, " that created beings have not received an unlimited power. Every one of them has received a certain degree of entity and power : the maximum degree fixes its position in the scale of beings, and is called *species*. The species is therefore fixed in this sense, that a being cannot by its own force alone issue out of the sphere of operations assigned to it. We see, for example, that a bird's egg has a complete virtue, but limited to its own sphere : it always produces a bird, never a fish, never a reptile, never a mammal."

4. *It is Founded on Miserable Equivocations.*—Such are natural selection, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, generation by crossing and the transmission of hereditary phenomena, the influence of surroundings and the law of relation, &c., which we shall examine elsewhere. Here we shall refer only to equivocations less apparent, but more serious :—

i. The successive appearance of beings on earth is a fact : first the inorganic, then the vegetable, then the animal ; and then man. Now, what do the unbelieving evolutionists do ? They say that the beings which come afterwards are derived by evolution from those which go before. In the same manner we might say that the roof of a house is derived from the walls that support it, because it comes after them.

ii. Again : as all beings are arranged in a regular scale, without any break or interruption between one species and another, the evolutionists believe that they are joined among themselves by " a bond of intrinsic natural continuity," so that some are derived from others by successive and gradual transformations. And

they do not think that this gradation only proves the unity of plan and design on the part of Him who produced them, not at all a natural affiliation of the same from one single type or one single primordial being. Does it not happen thus in works of human art ?

iii. Moreover : because there exist some resemblances between beings of a proximately inferior species and those of a proximately superior species, they conclude that both have the same genesis and nature. As if a resemblance in genus (for example, of man with a beast as an animal) is the same as a resemblance in species (for example, of a beast with man as a rational creature) : and as if it is not true that while some resemblances exist between one species and another, there also exist greater non-resemblances, as may be verified between man and beast.

iv. But behold the argument of arguments on which are founded all their equivocations with regard to the beastly origin of man ! Considering the state of a savage man, and the little knowledge that he possesses in comparison with a civilised man, they reason thus :—The savage man is more distant from the civilised man than a gorilla or other such animal is from the savage man. As, therefore, man, who was formerly a savage, could raise himself up to his present state of civilisation, we may well believe that the more perfect animals are naturally joined with the state of the savage man. But this is false, most false :—

i. Because immensely greater is the distance that separates the savage man from an animal, even the most perfect, than that which separates the same savage man from the civilised or cultured man. The extra that is in the civilised man, when compared with the savage, is only an accidental perfection, the root of that perfection (which is reason) being even in the savage, whereas in the animal that root is absolutely wanting.[1]

ii. Because, while the savage man in contact with civilisation is developed and makes progress at an equal pace with others, the beast, even the most perfect, always remains stationary in the midst of the greatest civilisation.

iii. Because even in the most brutalised and savage man there are always found some moral and religious ideas with regard to *the beyond*, of which there is not the slightest trace in beasts. Precious on this score is the testimony of Quatrefages, who made special researches on the condition of savage peoples. He proceeded as a naturalist, who, before all things, searches into facts ; and behold how he announces the fruit of his labours ! " In man," he says, " are found three fundamental phenomena, with which are connected a multitude of secondary phenomena, of

[1] At the death of a gorilla in the Zoological Gardens, Dublin, a few years ago, some one facetiously remarked that during life it was impossible to get him to learn the Catechism. Yet this is a feat accomplished not only by children, but even by the deaf and dumb, whose written answers show how correct is their knowledge.—*Trans.*

which nothing hitherto has given us an idea either in living beings or in the bodies of beasts: (*a*) man has a notion of moral good and evil, independently of any physical well-being or suffering; (*b*) man believes in superior beings, who can influence his destiny; (*c*) man believes in the prolongation of his existence after this life."[1]

It being, therefore, certain on the one hand that man has not always existed, and on the other that he did not originate by evolution or transformation from an inferior species, nothing remains for science but to accept the teaching of faith or to acknowledge itself absolutely incompetent to solve the problem. It will be able at most to affirm that the first living creatures had not progenitors, and therefore were not produced as such are now produced. Farther it cannot go, without meeting the creative act.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.

The transformists naturally assign to man an antiquity well nigh fabulous—a hundred thousand years, say the Canestrines. And they pretend to have a confirmation of it in the existence of the tertiary man—that is, of man existing in the tertiary period—which reaches to a very ancient time. But these are dreams and inventions set forth only by reason of a preconceived system, without support from any real fact.

The tertiary man (whom it would be necessary to prove a member of the present human family) is only a phantom, vanishing as often as the most accurate examinations have reduced to their scientific value the discoveries on which it rested—the *used flints*, the *cut and perforated bones*, the *human skeletons*, lying in miocene or pliocene. Thus, coming to things near us, the skeleton of Castenedolo, about which there was lately some rumour, according to the judgment certainly unsuspected of Dr. Topinard, "cannot be said to be fossilated, and has nothing that permits us to regard it as very ancient: probably it is only the remains of a grave." And, therefore, from the scientific congress of Blois in 1884 to the most recent ones held in our days, the existence of the tertiary man has been absolutely excluded, and the appearance of man only in the quaternary period admitted. Now, as the eminent geologist De-Lapparent observes, "in the geological facts of the quaternary epoch we do not see anything of considerable importance—before which certain authors have not shrunk back."

If we stand on generalities, we can say that in these matters

[1] *La specie umana.*

there reigns the greatest harmony between the Bible and science. The Bible tells us of man created, the last among living things, on the sixth day ; and science can find no traces of him except in the quaternary period, the last of all.

If, however, we wish to descend from a general to a particular question, with regard to the precise date of man's appearance, then all true certainty is absent, as well from the Bible as from science.

According to the judgment of the best Catholic interpreters and scientists, there are undoubtedly found in the Bible some elements of chronology, but not of chronology properly so called. Nor can such be constructed with safety, those elements being uncertain and incomplete. Assembling the various genealogies of the patriarchs—on which precisely we find Biblical chronology founded—from Adam to Christ, we shall have, according to the Hebrew text (followed in the Vulgate) about four thousand years ; and according to the Septuagint version (followed in great part by the Roman Martyrology) about five thousand four hundred years, which one of the Fathers (Clement of Alexandria) raises to more than six thousand years. This is enough to show that those genealogies (not in original documents, but in ones derived from them) offer us uncertain figures. Add that we cannot decide whether solar or lunar years are meant. Moreover, it is not certain that the genealogies even of the patriarchs are complete ; there are rather some cases that seem to point the other way. Nor need this make us wonder, " if we never forget that Biblical history is essentially the history of salvation—altogether independent of questions of time." Hence, Father Mattiussi writes :— " Faith tells us nothing in this matter ; nor can we say that Scripture contains a true chronology of the human race. The time that elapsed from Adam to Noe, and afterwards from Noe to Abraham, is not determined. Versions differ by more than a thousand years. The exact, round number of ten generations from Adam to Noe, and of as many more from Noe to Abraham, gives reasonable suspicion that there was a desire to signalise some more famous names without descending step by step from father to son, as certainly St. Matthew did, counting three times fourteen generations from Abraham to Our Lord Jesus Christ. We, being uncertain of the sense or of the Biblical text, may accept the probable conclusions drawn by the study of others. But if we seek the truth, we shall take good care not to admit as unanswerable arguments those which are only slight conjectures."

As for what regards science, we may quote the words of De-Lapparent. " The quaternary epoch, although nearest to ours, is still very mysterious. The succession of deposits is sometimes most obscure. The absence or the presence of organic remains renders specially difficult any determination of a relative age. . . . The atmospheric precipitations (whence the glacial periods with their telluric consequences) were at least ten or twenty times more abundant than in our days. . . . Science has not yet

arrived at the possession of a chronometer that permits it to measure the time passed even in the period immediately preceding ours. It is the duty of a wise man to await this conquest of the future, and, as for us, it suffices that we have shown how unprovided with a proper basis are all those calculations which generally distribute hundreds and thousands of ages through the various phases of the quaternary epoch."

In the judgment of the most learned men, much uncertainty also prevails with regard to historic and prehistoric arguments taken from the ancient traditions and monuments of the Egyptians, Chaldees, Indians, Chinese, &c.

Considering from different points of view—geological, paleontological, ethnographical, linguistical, historical, &c.—the most probable conjectures of science at the present day, in reference to the first period of man's existence on earth (*the interglacial quaternary epoch*), as well as the second period (*the recent postglacial epoch*), there would be given at most a duration of eight or ten thousand years; in all, from Adam to us, a maximum duration of fifteen or twenty thousand years.

And these figures, which are so far removed from those of the transformists—some of whom place the appearance of man two hundred thousand years ago [1]—may very well be reconciled with Biblical chronology, taken in that broad sense which the variations of the different codices and the gaps of the patriarchal chronology allow.

CHAPTER X.

PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN.

That the first man found himself in a very different state from man at the present day is admitted by all. But was it a state more or less perfect than ours?

Here, again, the teaching of faith is known to us: the first man was created in a state much more perfect than that in which we now find ourselves, and from which state he fell by sin, dragging all his descendants with him.

But can this teaching be maintained to-day, in presence of the data of science? Because, although the various paleonto-

[1] De Mortillet assigns no less than two hundred and forty thousand years! And to defend these figures, Professor De Stefano rejects *in the name of science* the time assigned by Professor Trombetti, who maintains that "the antiquity of language, and therefore of man, lies within a maximum of fifty thousand and a minimum of thirty thousand years" (*Rivista d'Italia*, July, 1906). But the same Professor De Stefano warns us that the question of the origin of man will not be settled "till the day in which paleontology will discover to us the intermediary forms apt to indicate the mode in which was effected the passage of mammiferous animals to the precursors of the present man."

logical discoveries—aided by ethnographical, linguistical, historical, and other studies—are still incomplete and uncertain, they let us know clearly enough the great law of development, the gradually increasing perfection of man, in virtue of which, setting out from a primitive state little less than savage, he would have ascended slowly to civilisation. The various steps of this wearisome journey would have been specially marked for us by a succession, in the geological strata, of tools, weapons, ornaments, &c., always becoming more perfect in regard to matter and form. First, the stone age (divided into three epochs—the eolithic or of broken stone, the paleolithic or of cut stone, and the neolithic or of polished stone); then, the bronze age; and then the iron age, which brings us to historic times.

Now, is not all this in contradiction with what revelation teaches about the primitive state of man?

We answer, No. Because that teaching regards only the state of the first man, not of humanity: which, miserably fallen in its head, should, even according to revelation, rise again slowly and laboriously. The same Biblical account lets us assist at the sorrowful epic of civilisation regained, with its successive halting-places: the wandering life, the first entrenchments, the chase, the domestication of useful animals, the invention of arts, &c.

On the other hand, revelation is the only thing in a position to reconcile the results of modern discoveries with the ancient belief, spread among all people, in the existence of a golden age and of a subsequent general decadence.[1]

CHAPTER XI

THE WHOLE HUMAN RACE DESCENDS FROM ONE HEAD-STOCK.

Faith teaches us that the human family comes from one couple, Adam and Eve. With this teaching is connected the dogma of original sin and redemption. *Of original sin*—because men are born in sin, inasmuch as they are derived from Adam, who, sinning, fell from that state in which God had created him, and from him, thus fallen, men derive their origin. *Of redemption*—because Christ, the Second Adam, came to repair the evils brought on mankind by the sin of the First Adam.

If science has not clear and decisive arguments to prove a unity of origin in the human race, yet it has none contrary thereto; rather, the strong and certain facts that it furnishes confirm the teaching of faith, as we shall now see in answering the arguments of our adversaries.

First of all, the evolutionists present themselves. They, deriving man from a beast by natural evolution from a lower species, cannot certainly limit evolution to a single couple.

[1] See the periodical *La Scuola di Religione*, first year, *n.* 4.

In the second place come those who endeavour to show that the different races of mankind cannot be reduced to one, since they must necessarily have come from as many primitive couples, formed according to climate in different parts of our earth.

Now, if there is anything certain, even on the part of science, it is the specific unity of all mankind. It is an axiom of zoology that those living things which have the same organic structure and perennially transmit life among themselves, belong to the same species. But it is a fact that these two characteristics are found in all the different races of mankind: nobody can deny the organic similarity of the various races,[1] and likewise nobody can deny that life is transmitted, even by crossing among them, without their descendants becoming sterile. Therefore, the human species is one. Experience shows that the union of different species is either sterile or ends very soon in producing one or other of the two species. "The human groups," wrote Quatrefages, "however much they can be or can appear to be different, are races from one and the same species, not from distinct species. . . . Of truly learned men certainly few will refuse to admit this point of departure, or to conclude with the great men of whom I am scarcely a disciple, with Linneus, with Buffon, with Humboldt, with Müller, &c., that all mankind are of the same species and that only one human species exists."

From this identity of nature or species "is deduced, at least with the highest probability, the oneness of the first couple, from whom all the human family have descended; since, if various independent couples had been constituted from the beginning, they would have had the same organic constitution. On the other hand, as God is pleased to obtain by secondary causes the effects of which they are capable, He certainly placed only one couple to produce all mortals agreeing among themselves in species."[2]

In the third place come those who pretend to demonstrate the same assumption as a basis for the diversity of languages, some of which appear not to have a common root.

But if there is any argument that our adversaries ought not to touch, it is this one; because all the most eminent philologists hold that all the languages of the different peoples took their rise from one primitive language, as so many branches from one trunk. And if this is true, as the able Professor Trombetti maintains, we have also here a proof of the unity of origin of the human race; since this radical unity of language would be impossible where the descent of all peoples from one head-stock would not be

[1] In every species there may be considerable modifications, which regard only accidental properties. They do not alter the typical resemblance nor the faculty of reproduction. They merely constitute varieties, which take in animals the name of races, when they become constant. This is the reason why the mastiff, the spaniel, the hound, &c., belong to the same species, although they differ so much in shape

[2] Mattiussi.

admitted. Such is, in point of fact, the conclusion drawn by Professor Trombetti.

And to this glossological proof, which regards the form, another might be added, still more important, which regards the matter. It is a fact that among all peoples there is heard an echo, even though confused by myths and fables, of the primitive revelation recorded in Genesis : a sign, therefore, that all people come from Adam.[1]

But even if all this were not certain and established, and we should hold by faith to the unity of the origin of the human race, it would always be true that our adversaries have nothing to oppose to us.

Lastly come those who assign another head besides Adam, because, they say, the Adam of whom the Bible speaks is comparatively near to us, while it is certain that in times more distant there lived other men, who may be called prehistoric.

But this difficulty we have already answered in Chapter IX., when referring to the antiquity of man and the tertiary man ; and we need not repeat what has been said.

We shall only, before concluding, call attention to the great importance of this question, not only on the religious side, as we have already remarked, but also on the historical and the moral.

Historical.—Because it thereby becomes more easy to understand the journey of humanity throughout the ages, from east to west.

Moral.—Because we have here the natural basis of that fraternity which makes us feel that we are all truly of one family, taking away thereby every pretext for slavery. All know that some Americans, when they wished to continue slavery among them and treated the Redskins as beasts, sought to justify their inhuman barbarity with the pretext that these were not real men. (On this point, the wise observations of Cantu may be seen in his *Storia Universale*, book I, chap. 3).

CHAPTER XII.

EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

After the existence of God, there is no truth more important than that of the existence and immortality of the human soul.

[1] "Among all the ancient peoples that came to any civilisation, there was in their chief religious practices and deities and mystic notions an agreement so unanimous and manifest that a universal and systematic affinity of these things among themselves must be admitted. The foundation on which rests the whole mythological and religious edifice of antiquity is the same for all peoples, and cannot have been laid except once. The harmony that is found among all peoples on the fundamental plan of their system is so great that we cannot suppose gods, dogmas, rites, and symbols beginning in different places, independently of one another and without a common origin."—Hillman, *Ricerche*, &c., part I.

Without it, not only is the heart deprived of the sweetest hope amid the troubles of this life, but the whole moral order would be deprived of a foundation. It is on the two great truths, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, that the practical direction of the present life depends. We will, therefore, endeavour to be very clear in this demonstration.

Before all—what is meant by the human soul? We mean that principle by which we live, feel, think, and will.

Does this soul, or principle of vital acts, really exist within us? As certainly does the human soul exist within us as it is certain that we live, feel, think, and will. Because, if the soul is the principle of these acts, we, not being able to doubt of our living, feeling, thinking, or willing, can no more doubt of the existence of the human soul.

But is this soul, or principle of vital acts, a thing material and corporeal, or rather immaterial and incorporeal? We answer:—

i. All that is corporeal can be seen, touched, weighed, measured. But no one can see, touch, weigh, or measure thought, feeling, will. Therefore the soul, which is the principle whence these acts proceed, is not corporeal, but incorporeal.

ii. All that is corporeal changes, and science assures us that in the course of a few years our body is completely changed. Whereas the soul always remains the same in the midst of all changes, as is proved by the consciousness of I MYSELF, which we preserve all our life long.[1] Therefore, the soul is not corporeal.

iii. All that which is corporeal does not move, unless it is moved. But the soul is that principle by which a living creature moves. Therefore, the soul cannot be corporeal.

iv. If living, feeling, thinking, and willing were functions of matter or of corporeal force, every body ought to live, to feel, to think, and to will. But this is not so. Therefore, the soul is not a function of matter or of corporeal force.

[1] "Man says *I* in all the phases of his existence. When a little heedless child, whose vivid fancy roves like a butterfly over the flowers of life, he was *I*; when a boy, and seeing the roads of life open out before him he chose that on which he should fix his steps, he was *I*; when a young man and he struggled in the combat and cried out, 'O my God! save me, I perish,' he was *I*; when a grown man, and he begins to understand the nothingness of human things, and to open his ears to the rapid steps of the coming eternity, he is *I*; when an old man, who, in a few years, lamenting his mistakes and hoping in the mercy of God, will daily look for the end of his miseries, he will be *I*—always *I*—the same, the unchangeable *I*. Nature, with its perpetual motion, passes like a river, pushing one wave before another. It passes in such manner that science can determine with mathematical precision the day on which, of all that now exists, there will not remain an atom. Nevertheless, I say *I* always, and I shall always say *I*. An impossible affirmation, if I were only matter! Because, in the unceasing flux of the elements of which I am composed, I should infallibly lose the consciousness of my identity. This consciousness I cannot retain unless because an unchangeable substance that is within me sees the river of my life passing away, and in its unchangeable simplicity joins the wave that comes to the wave that goes."—Monsabrè, *Confer.* xvi., p. 176.

v. The struggle that exists between the body and the soul, and the dominion that the virtuous man knows how to exercise over his own body, mortifying it, and even sacrificing it, show clearly that there can be no doubt of the existence of an immaterial principle, superior to all corporeal functions.

vi. The mere fact of liberty ought to convince the most sceptical. It is a universal law of corporeal nature that, given the antecedents, the consequent necessarily follows. Instead of this, when our free acts are concerned, even given all the antecedents necessary for making the act, the act may follow or not follow. If it takes place, it is because the will freely determines on one course rather than another.

After all these facts, it is impossible not to recognise in man a principle altogether immaterial and spiritual. And this is precisely what is called the human soul.

CHAPTER XIII.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN SOUL AND THE SOULS OF OTHER LIVING CREATURES.

We speak of a plant as living, a beast as living, a man as living. Ought we, therefore, to believe that in all living things there is the same life, and consequently the same soul? No, it would be a great mistake.

As we come to know the existence of life by means of operations that are proper to living things, and different in not-living things,[1] so we come to know the different kinds of life in different vital acts that are performed by living things. The acts are the product or the effect of the operant, and the different qualities of the effect always make known the different qualities of the operant.

[1] Many are the differences between living and not-living things: (*a*) in *origin*—which in the former class is by generation, and in the latter by chemical composition or decomposition; (*b*) in *substance*—which in the former is organic, and in the latter inorganic; (*c*) in *growth*—which in the former is by internal assimilation, and in the latter by mere application; (*d*) in *preservation*—which in the former is by nutrition, and in the latter by cohesion, or by simple resistance to disintegration; (*e*) in *duration*—which in the former is limited, and in the latter unlimited. Still the first difference is the most fundamental—that on which all the others depend. The not-living things have only a transient act—that is, they operate on other bodies, but not in themselves; whereas the living things have, besides a transient act, an immanent one, by which they operate in themselves and by themselves. Hence, life consists in the immanence of operative activity, which not only proceeds from a principle within the operant, but likewise remains (with its act) within the same operant. Thus, the act of feeling or understanding remains in the subject that feels or understands. Since, therefore, the body cannot exercise any act in itself, unless in so far as it is active according to some parts and passive according to others, we see why every living body is *organic*—that is, consists of parts variously disposed for vital functions.

It is true, therefore, that even plants live; but it is also true that all their vital acts are reduced to nutrition, growth, and generation: three functions that certainly cannot be explained by forces merely physical or chemical, because they are performed in a manner quite contrary to and superior to the laws of matter, and they therefore lead us to suppose a principle higher than physical and higher than chemical. Yet it is a principle totally exhausted in those three functions, and it pretends to no others.

Likewise it is true that even animals live; but it is also true that, besides vegetable functions, they have sensitive ones, by which they perceive, and have an appetite for material and corporeal things. In them, therefore, we must suppose not only a principle more than physical and more than chemical, but also a principle more than vegetative—that is, a vital activity essentially superior to that of plants.

Finally, it is true that even men live; but it is also true that, besides vegetative and sensitive functions, they have spiritual ones, by which they understand and freely will. In them, therefore, we must suppose a principle not only superior to physical and chemical forces, not only superior to vegetative functions, but also superior to mere animal functions.

The error of those who do not recognise any medium between matter and spirit is very great. They find themselves in the dilemma of denying the existence of any vital principle in plants and beasts (as was done by Descartes, who wished to explain all their acts by means of mechanical, material motion), or of granting a spiritual vitality even to plants and beasts. And, in point of fact, those moderns who admit a hyperphysical and hyperchemical principle in plants and beasts, run generally into the opposite extreme, so as even with Professor Delpino to recognise psychical and conscious forces in the lowliest vegetable cell.

No, they are not right. Life is presented to us in a triple gradation—vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.

But what concerns us more is the difference that exists between corporeal or organic life and spiritual or inorganic life.

By corporeal or organic life is meant that vital activity which does not subsist in itself and by itself, but only in an organism or with an organism of which it has need to exist and operate: so that what properly exists and operates is the vivified corporeal organism. On the other hand, by spiritual or inorganic life is meant that vital activity which subsists in itself and by itself independently of a corporeal organism. Not that it is not united to an organism, but inasmuch as it does not require an organism in order to exist; and even when united to such, its operative activity is not bound to any corporeal organ

Now, does this spiritual and inorganic vitality really exist in man, or is his life quite corporeal and organic, like that of plants and beasts?

We have only to compare the acts of man and those of a beast in what is proper and characteristic of each, so as to be fully convinced regarding the answer to this question.

i. Before all, the very fact that the beast is stationary and man progressive, lets us at once see that all the vitality of the former is bound to and dependent on a corporeal organism, while such is not the case with the latter. Since the animal is stationary, inasmuch as it is determined to one object in its operation, and it is determined to one object inasmuch as all its vital activity, being bound to an organism and the conditions thereof, cannot be developed except in that manner which corresponds to the organism. For a contrary reason, therefore, man is progressive, inasmuch as he possesses a vital activity not bound to a corporeal organism, nor operating in a corporeal organism.

ii. In point of fact, every sensitive power, just because organic, is always compelled to perceive bodies according to that determinate mode in which they make an impression on the sensory organ. Thus, the sight perceives bodies inasmuch as they are coloured, not inasmuch as they are sonorous ; the hearing, inasmuch as they are sonorous, not inasmuch as they are coloured ; and so on of every other sense. The intellect, on the other hand, because inorganic activity, is not forced to know bodies under this or that aspect ; it considers them under any aspect, as appears from its judgments about various things. A sign, therefore, that intellectual activity is not bound to any corporeal organ ! Otherwise, it would follow the mode of operating that is proper to organic powers.

iii. This is not enough. While the senses perceive only corporeal things—precisely because these alone can make an impression on the sensory organs—the intellect, instead, reaches even to incorporeal things, such as truth, virtue, God, &c. It may be said with unbelievers that knowledge of this kind has nothing really corresponding to it outside. It is, however, a fact that the mind thinks on immaterial things ; and to do so, to rise above all that is corporeal, it is necessary that the intellectual activity should not be bound to any corporeal organ.

iv. There is still more. Corporeal things are apprehended by the intellect in an immaterial manner—that is, by abstraction from individual and quantitative conditions : whence arises in us a universal idea of what the senses apprehend in particular. Now a virtue capable of abstracting from corporeal conditions is a virtue independent of corporeal organs. Otherwise, how could a faculty fixed, bound, dependent on a corporeal organ, apprehend an object as if divested of the corporeal conditions in which it is found ? Every organic faculty, inasmuch as it works in and with a sensory organ, must have acts corresponding to the organic conditions—acts therefore retracing the object in that precise manner in which it makes an impression on the organ.

Where, however, appears still better the spirituality of understanding is in the judgment or reason. This is not the place to recall all that philosophers have written. We shall only say that in the judgment or reason our mind discovers a relation of agreement or disagreement that exists between two or more terms. Now let us observe the immense difference that exists between perceiving things as agreeing or disagreeing with the wants of an animal, and perceiving the relation of agreement or disagreement of a certain predicate with its subject. The former knowledge is of a concrete order, and belongs even to an animal, as a judgment of instinct; the latter is of an abstract order, and belongs only to man, as a judgment of reason. The abstract relation of agreement or repugnance between two or more ideas is not a sensible or tangible thing that can make an impression on an organic faculty. Therefore, the power that perceives such relations must of necessity be inorganic.[1]

vi. The same is deduced from reflection, or psychological consciousness, by which the soul turns on itself. To reflect means that it places itself above itself, to have its own act as its object, to think on its own thought. Now all this is impossible in a force acting in and with a corporeal organism; because the placing of that force above itself would imply the placing there of the organ on which it depends, and, consequently, the penetration or disappearance of the parts of which the corporeal organ is composed.

vii. The same is deduced from the extent of our knowledge. "It is characteristic of intelligence to have an urgent need of seeing and knowing. The mind has a longing—shall I say absurd or sublime?—for infinite light. Yesterday I did not exist; to-morrow I shall no longer be. I have only a little intelligence. A piece of sky, a star, or a flower suffices to exhaust its powers.

[1] We might add to the same conclusion by analysing speech. "It is a law of the physical order that phenomena are constantly differentiated according to different causes, and that the same cause regularly produces the same phenomena. Hence, it follows that speech, which is nothing materially but a series of articulate sounds, being applied to matter, ought to produce phenomena different if the sounds vary, and phenomena similar if the sounds are alike. Now, listen to a wonderful thing! Contrary to the law, words altogether different produce phenomena perfectly similar, and words perfectly similar produce phenomena altogether different. A Frenchman meets me and says: *Comment vous portez-vous?* I reply: *Very well, thank you.* An Englishman comes up: *How do you do?* I reply: *Very well, thank you.* An Italian arrives next: *Come sta?* I reply: *Very well, thank you.* A German, a Russian, a Hottentot would have the same answer, if I understood his inquiry. A strange thing indeed! There is question of understanding a language—that is, of perceiving a relation between some signs and some ideas—a thing for which matter is perfectly unfit. Matter will receive impressions as long as you like; but its reaction, measured by the impression received, will never be able to give the same answer to different signs producing different impressions. It is not, therefore, matter that responds to speech, but a simple principle that receives the impression of that immaterial thing which is called relation: the same principle reappearing, of which we have ascertained the existence in the judgment or reason."—Monsabré, Confer. XVI., p. 186.

But no! I wish to see everything, to fathom everything. My spirit passes beyond all times, all regions, all created things, and, like that poet who at the point of death cried out, *Light, more light!* I, after turning over all the pages of a book, or studying all the stars, or passing through all the sciences, eager and unsatisfied, I say, *What next?* Such is the spirit of man."[1]

viii. Lastly, the same is deduced from an analysis of the will, its acts, its objects, its aspirations, &c. For the sake of brevity, we shall confine ourselves to one observation. It is a fact that there is a struggle or opposition between tendencies purely sensitive or animal and tendencies purely rational or spiritual. Now, does not this fact prove in the clearest and most evident manner that the acts of the will are altogether independent of any corporeal organism? Otherwise that struggle would not be possible.

And now let us sum up. (*a*) Animals live and feel, but they do not reason; man, on the contrary, not only lives and feels, but thinks and reasons. (*b*) Animals are stationary; man is progressive. (*c*) Animals are guided by instinct; man, according to the dictates of his conscience. (*d*) Animals are strangers to science, art, virtue, morality; man is capable of becoming familiar with them all. What conclusion therefore have we to draw?

As an effect cannot be superior to its cause, it follows that, if incorporeal or inorganic acts are found in us, there must also be in us an incorporeal or inorganic principle from which these acts proceed. And this means that the human soul is not only simple or immaterial, like that of a beast, but it is also spiritual—that is, independent of a corporeal organism, and, being such that it exists by itself, it is a true substance.

CHAPTER XIV.

UNITY OF THE VITAL PRINCIPLE IN MAN.

Besides spiritual acts, there are also sensitive and vegetative acts in man. Ought we therefore to recognise three souls—one for the functions of the vegetative life, another for those of the sensitive life, and a third for those of the intellective life?

So thought some of the ancients, and so think some modern vitalists. But falsely:—

i. Because in ordinary language man is said to be *a* living being.

ii. Because all the vital actions of man are referred to the *I*. Thus we say: *I eat, I feel, I think.*

iii. Because we perceive by our consciousness that the principle which understands is also that which lives and feels.

iv. Because the dependence on one another that exists among the acts of the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective life

[1] Bougad, *Il Cristianesimo*, &c., I., 65.

proves clearly the radical and fundamental unity from which they spring. It is a fact, for example, that an excessive intensity of one kind of operations prejudices the others He who gives himself entirely to a life of study suffers for it in the organic life. And he who gives himself entirely to a life of the senses suffers for it in the life of the spirit. Now, if the acts of the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective life were not all derived from the same source, the intensity of one class would not at all prejudice the exercise of the others. Admitting that all those acts come radically from the same principle, the fact is explained ; because then the more of vital energy goes to one part, the less remains for the others.

This is the fact to which the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas refers (I., q. 76, a. 3) in order to demonstrate that the soul of man is only one ; and it is also the fact to which Dante alludes in the fourth canto on Purgatory :—

> " When by sensations of delight or pain
> " That any of our faculties hath seized,
> " Entire the soul collects herself, it seems
> " She is intent upon that power alone,
> " And thus the error is disproved which holds
> " The soul not singly lighted in the breast.
> " And, therefore, when as aught is heard or seen
> " That firmly keeps the soul toward it turned,
> " Time passes, and a man perceives it not."[1]

To answer the difficulties of adversaries, we may observe (*a*) that the human soul is not, properly speaking, a vital force, nor sense, nor intellect, but the foundation, the principle, the source of all these activities ; (*b*) that the human soul is therefore essentially one, but virtually multiple, by reason of the different powers that issue from it ; and (*c*) that the different vital functions require indeed different faculties from which they are derived, but not different vital principles or souls, when they belong to the same subject, because in such case the higher vital form virtually includes the lower vital form.

CHAPTER XV.

ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

The nature of the soul being known, we have now to examine its origin.

Some, exaggerating the excellence of the human soul in regard to its noblest part, say that it is a particle of the Deity, or at least something belonging to God. But this is absurd ; for the Divine Being is indivisible, and cannot enter into composition with a finite being.

Others speak of it as coming from genitors. And this can be

[1] Cary's Translation.—*Trans.*

understood in two ways: (*a*) that the soul of the generated is derived immediately from the soul of the genitor; and (*b*) that the soul of the generated is derived immediately, not from the soul of the genitor, but from the generative virtue of the same.

Now, in neither case is the origin of the human soul explicable. It is inexplicable in the first, because genitors cannot draw a new soul from their own soul, which is indivisible, nor create it from nothing, as Frohschammer of Monaco taught, creation from nothing being a work of God alone. The origin of the soul is inexplicable in the second case, because the seminal virtue or plastic force that is in the human germ, or in the fecundated maternal ovule, being a corporeal force, cannot be the cause of a substance altogether incorporeal. A force that acts dependently on matter or on a corporeal organism, as is the generative virtue, will never give an effect that exceeds the capacity of matter or of a corporeal organism—that is, a spiritual soul independent of a corporeal organism. To pretend, in fine, that the human soul is generated like that of beasts, and then becomes intellective by intrinsic evolution, is the same as to pretend that an organic activity can of itself become spiritual and inorganic—which is absurd.

Therefore, no other way remains but the immediate creation of God. In point of fact, the mode in which anything begins ought to correspond to the mode of its existence, the duration of anything being only a continuation of the mode in which it began to exist. But the human soul, inasmuch as it is spiritual, does not depend on a body. Hence it could not begin dependently on a body, or by generation. Therefore, it can begin only by creation.

But how, then, are we to explain the intellectual and moral resemblances that are found between the souls of the generated and those of their progenitors (fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, &c.), if the soul that exists in us is immediately created by God?

"In the spiritualistic hypothesis," writes Ferrière, "the soul of the generated, having an essence opposed to that of matter, is a stranger to the body in which it dwells; and, not coming from father or grandfather, it is also a stranger to the souls of both. It can therefore receive nothing either from the body into which it enters or from the souls that preceded it; and, therefore, the most certain intellectual and moral resemblances that are found between the generators and the generated are absolutely inexplicable." [1]

It is not true. The fact can be explained quite as well without having recourse to a generation of the soul.

The body, before being informed with a rational soul, is prepared and moulded by the generative virtue of parents, who give

[1] *L'ame est la fonction*, &c.

it their aptitudes and dispositions, good or bad, according to which the vital power is afterwards expressed in its development, when the functions of the soul are exercised in the body. These aptitudes and dispositions, which are by themselves organical-physical, directly influence only the vegetative and the sensitive life, whose operations are bound up with a corporeal organism ; but they indirectly, or, as philosophers say, accidentally, influence also the spiritual life, inasmuch as the understanding and the will are moved by what the senses offer.

CHAPTER XVI

IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

Once the human soul has begun to exist, does it continue in an eternal existence, surviving the body, and remaining immortal ; or rather does it cease at the death of the body, as the souls of plants and beasts cease ?

We answer. In two ways a thing may cease to exist : either because it is decomposed into the parts of which its essence consists, and in this way bodies cease when they are dissolved into their component parts ; or because the subject of which it had need is taken away (as, for example, a painting, which ceases to exist when the canvas on which it was drawn is destroyed), and in this way the souls of plants and beasts cease to exist. These souls do not perish because their essence is decomposed, they not being corporeal things, composed of parts ; but they cease simply because, at the dissolution or death of the body, a failure takes place in the subject of which they had need for existence, and to which they were bound, as a painting to canvas. Now, our soul cannot cease to exist in either the one way or the other. Not in the first : because the soul is not a corporeal thing. Not in the second : because our soul is spiritual—that is, independent of an organism. Therefore, even the body ceasing to exist, the soul does not cease to exist ; because its existence is not bound to a corporeal organism. It had an existence of its own independent of the body, even when joined thereto ; therefore that existence which is proper to it cannot be lost when it is separated from the body.

As we have seen, the immortality of the soul is a consequence of its spirituality. If the soul cannot depend in its origin on a corporeal organism, because what is spiritual is independent of matter, neither can it depend on the same for its duration. As it began to exist independently of the body, so it continues to exist independently of the body.

And a sign of this immortality is the natural desire that urges us :—(*a*) To an endless life. (*b*) To happiness beyond this world. (*c*) To a state in which full justice is done to all. " Though I

had no other proof of the immortality of the soul," said Rousseau himself, "than the triumph of the wicked and the oppression of the just, this alone would prevent me from doubting of it. So great and so painful a contrast makes me say: All does not end here below; order will appear after death." (*d*) And it is on this account that all nations have always professed a belief in the future life, as is demonstrated by the religious ceremonies of the grave, which no people neglect.

"Human nature," writes Chateaubrïand, in his work *The Genius of Christianity*, "shows itself superior to all the rest of creation and declares its high destiny. Does the beast know its grave? Is it concerned about its ashes? Does it care for the bones of its parents? Among all created beings, man alone gathers up the ashes of his kind, and treats them with religious respect: in our eyes the dominion of death has something sacred. Whence comes, therefore, the great idea that we have of the departed? Would a grain of dust deserve our homage? No, certainly. We respect the ashes of our ancestors because a secret voice whispers to us that all is not over with them; and it is this voice that consecrates funeral worship among all the peoples of the earth. All are alike convinced that the sleep is not lasting, not even the sleep of the tomb, and that death is a glorious transformation."

The belief of the peoples is thus known regarding the state of souls separated from the body: those souls are eternally happy or miserable, according to the life led by them in this world.

That the human soul should cease to exist, it would be necessary that God should annihilate it; and if He wished, He could do so.

But even prescinding from what faith teaches, reason itself assures us that God cannot wish to annihilate it:—

i. Because God would contradict His wisdom by creating a substance, of its nature incorruptible, if He wished to destroy it. If He made the soul incorruptible, it was because He wished it to exist for ever; if He had not wished it to exist for ever He would have made it corruptible, like that of the beast or the plant. The nature of a being produced is a sign of the will of the producer.

ii. Because God would contradict His providence by inspiring us with a desire of perfect and perpetual happiness that would be illusory or chimerical.

iii. Because God would contradict His justice if the diversities that are here bewailed were not remedied elsewhere, experience showing us every day that virtue has not its reward nor vice its punishment in this world.

Very foolish is the objection of those who say:—"No one has returned from the other life. Therefore, we do not know if the soul continues to exist after the death of the body."

i. A stone thrown into a lake sinks to the bottom, and is seen no more. Are we less certain of its existence, even after it has

escaped from our sight? So it is with our soul after the death of the body.

ii. It is not true that no one has ever returned from the other life. The dead raised to life by Christ and His Saints have returned. And did not Christ Himself return, rising from the dead, and remaining with us for forty days before ascending into Heaven?

iii. At a time when unbelievers give themselves to spiritism, in order to evoke the souls of the dead, there ought to be no harping on this string.

CHAPTER XVII.

WHY THE MAJORITY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGISTS DENY THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL.

If the arguments hitherto set forth are clear and evident, the question readily occurs: Why, then, do the majority of modern psychologists deny the existence of the soul?

The answer is easy. They do not deny the existence of the soul, because they have succeeded in proving our arguments false—they do not even take any interest in such arguments—but because they employ in their studies a method that leads them only to corporeal realities. Setting out with the positivist canon, *everything knowable may be reduced to the sensible*, they limit all their inquiry to an order purely empiric or sensible; and, since vital phenomena are presented to the senses as functions more or less complicated with matter and the forces inherent to it, they conclude that, therefore, the soul does not exist, or (what amounts to the same) that the soul is nothing but a function of an organism. Thus modern psychology has become only a natural history of the nervous system and of cerebral phenomena, exactly because it proceeded in the study of psychical phenomena with the same method that it adopts in natural sciences. Hence, *psychophysics*, *psychophysiology*, *pathological psychology*, *&c.*

Now, all this is simply ridiculous. It is ridiculous to study the soul with the same method that is employed in natural sciences to acquire the knowledge of an organism. To know what is within us, it is proper to have recourse, not to external, but to internal observation—that is, to consciousness. External experience on our organs, and on the conditions for the performance of their functions, can indeed become useful in a subsidiary or complementary way, but alone it is not enough. It is not enough to bore holes in skulls, to make sections of brains, to rip up corpses; but it is necessary to turn upon ourselves, to listen to the testimony of our own consciousness, and then to analyse, not with a microscope, but with our reason, the facts of consciousness. It is necessary, in short, to have recourse to that method which is

to-day called introspective. As the facts of the external and material world are discovered by external observation, so the facts of the internal or psychical world are discovered by internal observation. It was precisely a recall to this method that, in the last International Congress on Psychology, held in Rome in April, 1905, determined the defeat of materialist psychology.

"You may," as was said in substance by Lipps and so many others, "you may study the body in its relations with the various forms of psychical activity, and you will make psychology physiological; but do not presume to arrive in that way at an explanation or interpretation of what is most noteworthy and characteristic in the life of the spirit. Besides that between a physical and a psychical fact there is *incommensurability*, there are many forms of spiritual activity which it is impossible to reduce to manifestations of physical energy, howsoever this may be conceived. There is no doubt that in the study of the phenomena of the life of the spirit, a greater degree of exactness and precision is desirable; there is no doubt that physical preparations are most useful to develop psychical facts artificially, to fix and register their external manifestations; but all this has nothing to do with that doctrine which considers thought as a production of the brain."

So spoke Professor De-Sarlo, who presided at the second session of the Congress, from whose debates, as the same Professor informs us, the following truth was made clear and evident: "Matter does not contain the nature of spirit, and therefore psychology is an autonomous science and is not comprised in physiology." [1]

And now let us answer the chief reasons alleged by our adversaries.

The materialists consider thought as a material function of the brain, and this specially for two motives: (*a*) Because science has been able to show that in intellectual work there always occurs a production as well as a consumption of azote, phosphoric acid, &c. Therefore, it must be concluded that thought is only a material function of the brain. (*b*) Because science has been able to measure the intellectual work of a man, as all the other forces of nature are measured. Therefore, they say again, it must be concluded that the intellect is a material force like all the others.

We answer. (*a*) The material production and consumption that happen in the intellectual work of man do not prove that thought is a material thing; because if the intelligence has need of the work of the senses, and these are developed in the organism, it is natural that there should be a consumption of that matter which is required for the functions of the organ. (*b*) What science measures in man is not thought, but sensation, or rather the

[1] From the *Giornale d' Italia* of those days.

organic labour that accompanies sensation, from which thought takes movement. (*c*) It is beyond question at the present day, even for modern science, that intellectual acts cannot be reduced to those of a physical or chemical order.[1] Therefore, the pretensions of materialism, which would make thought a material function, fall to the ground. (*d*) In point of fact, human knowledge does not result solely from the material work of the brain, but also from other inorganic functions, which the materialists do not at all consider, because they escape their empiric observations, but which are none the less true or real.

The sensists, on the other hand, admitting that thought is a thing distinct from matter and from the forces of matter, make it, however, dependent on a corporeal organism, or rather on the brain, and dependent in such a manner that intelligence is bound to the brain as sight is to the eye. Seeing that the perfection or the imperfection of the brain, its diseases, its lesions, &c., have an influence on thought—seeing that to the more or less perfect development of the brain that of intelligence corresponds in a proportionate degree, they conclude that thought, if not a material function of the brain, as the materialists say, must however be a vital function of the brain, and that thought is therefore intimately connected with the brain as visual power is connected with the eye. Hence, the pretended cerebro-mental bumps or localisations of which phrenologists speak.

We answer. In two ways it can be said that intelligence or thought depends on the brain: (*a*) intrinsically, as the seeing power with regard to the eye, so that intelligence may reside in the brain, and in and with the brain exercise its action; (*b*) extrinsically, inasmuch as intelligence has need of the brain, not to think, but to have the matter of its intellection, or the object of which our intellect makes use, in order to form its ideas.

Now it is in the second way that the brain concurs to the operation of the intelligence—that is, it concurs not inasmuch as the intelligence is a function (material or vital) of the brain, but inasmuch as without the brain the object necessary for the formation of our ideas would be wanting to the intellect. Because it is on things perceived by the senses that the intellect works in forming its ideas; and the senses, as everybody knows, have their headquarters in the brain. There sits the imagination, which serves proximately to the intellect.

The dependence of thought on a corporeal organism being thus understood, it is immediately understood that the brain is not the

[1] Professor Colucci, of the University of Naples, one of the most fiery opponents of De-Sarlo, wrote thus in the *Giornale d'Italia* on the 8th of May, 1905: "That there are spiritual activities which it is impossible to reduce to manifestations of physical energy, who denies?" And does not this suffice to prove that, therefore, intelligence is not a function of the brain, and that, if, notwithstanding, the brain is required for the work of intelligence, it is only as a condition—that is, for the work of phantasms in the operations of the intellect?

cause but an indispensable condition of the act of understanding. And this dependence, which does not at all compromise the spirituality of the soul, suffices to explain all the facts that the sensists oppose to us; because if the object of our intellection is supplied by the senses, it is natural that according to the greater or less perfection of the senses in general, and of the brain in particular, there should be a correspondent mode of conceiving more or less perfect on the part of the intelligence, precisely because it ought to avail itself of the data of the senses. And, for the same reason, it is natural that the intelligence should show, not in itself but in its operation, the disturbances that come to it from the senses. We ought not to forget that our intellect is indeed a spiritual faculty, but belonging to a soul that is united to a corporeal organism.

In fine, the neocritics, and, generally speaking, all agnostics, do not agree with the materialists, nor with the sensists, nor with the spiritualists. They grant certainly that use can and may be made of the introspective method in order to know the existence of psychical phenomena, but they deny that as a basis for the existence of these phenomena we have a right to conclude anything about the nature of the soul—that is, they deny that we can know whether the soul is material or immaterial, organic or inorganic. All this, they say, passes beyond the limits of our knowledge, which is necessarily confined within the circle of external and internal phenomena.[1]

We answer. Unless we wish to reduce psychology, as well as science in general, to a bare description of phenomena and their succession—unless we wish to admit that there are acts without an agent, manifestations without anything manifesting itself—it is evident that we must consider acts and phenomena as effects of that cause from which they proceed. And if this holds good for the operations of nature in general, much more ought it to hold good for psychical facts in particular, since each one of us feels by inner experience that we are the principle or cause of our own acts.

"The law," as A. Franchi writes very justly, "that makes us regard things as substance and qualities has its most solid and secure foundation in internal experience, in the consciousness of ourselves. The idea of a subject that subsists one and the same amid the multiplicity and variety of its states, active and passive, we obtain from the consciousness of our own being, if not much sooner, certainly much better, than from the observation of

1 "Psychology," wrote the lately deceased Senator Cantoni, "does not concern itself with the question of the existence and nature of the soul; but, recognising that internal phenomena exist, and that they are altogether different from other facts, it naturally attributes them to a particular principle or subject—that is, to the soul, whose inner nature, however, it abstains from investigating."—*Corso di Filosofia*, I., 9 (Milan, Hoepli, 1897).

things external to us. And in this consciousness, as an experimental fact, we directly apprehend the *I* concrete or real, a subject variously modified; and, as an experimental idea—that is, derived from the data of experience—we distinguish the permanent subject from its transitory modes, or the substance of the *I* from its qualities—from its acts of feeling, thinking, and wishing. With respect to ourselves, therefore, even more than with respect to other beings, the application of the idea of substance and qualities is perfectly legitimate, and it not only does not pass, but it can never pass beyond the sphere of possible experience; because the sphere of experience is contained within that of consciousness, and it is as impossible for the *I* to pass beyond the sphere of consciousness as to pass beyond itself." [1]

This fact suffices also to destroy the pretence, now common among all the positivists, that consciousness is nothing but a series of psychical phenomena. This would mean that the sensations, ideas, and volitions of which we are conscious are operations without anyone to operate, visions without anyone to see, qualities without a subject.

We shall only add, with regard to the question that concerns us, that if the act, as an effect, reveals the existence of the cause from which it is derived, the quality of the act naturally reveals the quality of the cause from which it proceeds. If, therefore, immaterial and spiritual acts exist within us, this means that there exists within us an immaterial and spiritual principle. And this is the human soul.

This is not the place to enter into details on every question; but when our adversaries, laying aside their prejudices, wish to examine facts dispassionately as they really happen, psychology will have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Because, willingly or unwillingly, it will end by admitting (*a*) that phenomena of the physical, vegetative, sensitive, and intellective orders cannot be reduced to one class; (*b*) that relations among the psychical, anatomical, physiological, and histological phenomena are reducible to a relation of correspondence, not of affiliation; (*c*) that unity of function and subordination of parts in man are an evident proof of the unity of the source or root from which the said phenomena come;[2] (*d*) that such source or root is truly no other than the human soul, the substantial principle of all man's acts; and (*e*) that the human soul can give rise to those phenomena, inasmuch as it is substantially united to a body, as a substantial form to matter.

[1] *Ultima Critica*, n. 253.

[2] "Una operatio animæ, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam; quod nullo modo contingeret nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum." One operation of the soul, when it is intense, impedes another: which would not at all happen if the principle of acts were not essentially one.—St. Thomas, I., q. 76, a. 3.

CHAPTER XVIII.

DETERMINISM AND LIBERTY.

After having vindicated the existence and the nature of the human soul, we must now speak of its powers or faculties. But as we are not going to make a philosophical treatise, we shall confine ourselves to say something of liberty, at the present day denied by unbelieving scientists.[1]

Liberty is that power which the will has to decide on willing or not willing—on willing one thing or willing another among the various objects which are presented to it, and which the intelligence judges under a desirable aspect. All those doctrines which deny the existence of human liberty, and teach that it is not in the power of the will to determine its acts, give rise to that system which is at present called determinism—a system admitted by the great majority of modern scientists, who do not recognise in man any activity but that which has its function in matter or in a corporeal organism, and therefore apply to our acts the causal process of the physical world. As, however, this error is maintained by many other schools not materialistic, and, on the other hand, human liberty is the subjective basis of all moral, religious, civil, and social order, there is need of a particular exposition and defence.

1. *In what the Question Consists.*—That man should be free with that external liberty which is called spontaneity, and which consists in the absence of all external coercion, is admitted by all. This liberty pertains to man as it pertains to the beast, or rather to all the forces of nature, when obstacles do not hinder their action. Do we not call free even the fall of anything heavy? The whole question, therefore, consists in knowing if man is or is not free with that internal or natural liberty which puts in our power the performance of an act, so that we can operate or not operate, operate in one way or operate in another.

Here, mark well. No one doubts that even in man there are some acts that are subject to peculiar and necessary laws, as are those of the physical, vegetative, and sensitive orders. But man is not merely a corporeal, vegetative, and sensitive being; he is above all rational and volitive. And as the will dominates more or less over the other powers, whose acts in so far as they can be called free, are subject to the command of the will, the whole question in its last analysis is reduced to the inquiry if the will is

[1] It is strange that at a time when nothing is spoken of but liberty, anyone should deny the very existence of liberty; more strange that this denial should come specially from that modern science which boasts of having proclaimed the right to all liberty; and most strange that, to defend liberty, we see her rising up who was always accused of being the greatest enemy of liberty—the Catholic Church.

truly free in its volitions—that is, if it is the will that determines itself to will or not to will, or rather that it is determined to its volitions like the other forces of nature. If it is in our power to make a volitive act, then we have free choice, responsibility, and morality in our operations; if it is not in our power, there is no use in talking about free choice, responsibility, or morality. The question being thus placed, let us hear what the determinists answer.

2. *Various Forms of Determinism.*—There are four forms under which determinism presents itself, intending to embrace under this title all the old and the new errors against liberty: physical or physiological determinism, intellectual or psychological determinism, metaphysical determinism, and theological determinism.

i. Physical or physiological determinism considers all our acts, comprising intellective and volitive, as functions of a corporeal organism, and says that our acts are therefore determined by those same internal and external causes to which our organism is subject; so that the food we eat, the air we breathe, the surroundings in which we live, are the determining causes of the human will.

It is an absolute law of nature, says Professor Henry Ferri, that every effect should be a necessary subsequent to its immediate precedent. And the very fact that in the universe nothing is created and nothing is destroyed, but everything is transformed by successive determinations, proves that there is no room for free choice. The human will cannot create new energies, besides those which already exist in the universe; and if it cannot create new energies, whence will come its act, if not from preceding determinations? Statistics are at hand to prove that—allowing for circumstances—individuals and peoples always act in the same way.

Thus we see that physical or physiological determinism denies free will, because it denies the existence of any activity in the soul distinct from matter, and considers the human will as the result of organic conditions.

ii. Intellectual or psychological determinism, on the other hand, admits the existence of the soul and of its powers, but says that the human will is necessarily determined to its acts by the prevalence of the motive or the greatness of the good that the intellect presents to it; so that man acts as he thinks, in the strictest sense of the word. And if it appears to us that he is free, this is because a thousand and a thousand microscopic motives that influence the will escape us—motives too small to be noticed, or to leave any impression on our consciousness. According to the influence exercised on us by these motives, the will necessarily goes one way or another, like a weight in a balance. Therefore, in presence of two goods perfectly equal, our will would find itself in the predicament of the man described by the poet who was ready to die of hunger before he could decide on which of two dishes to partake.

iii. Metaphysical determinism is very different. It denies free will because this will cannot be reconciled with the principle of causality in general. A free act, it says, means an act not determined by any cause; but an act not determined by any cause is the same as an effect without a cause; therefore, free choice cannot be admitted without destroying the principle of causality. In point of fact, it adds, nothing can pass from potentiality to act without first receiving a push that determines it to the passage. But the human will, before operating, is in a state of potentiality with regard to the act that it should perform. Therefore, the act cannot come from that state without a motion that determines the will to the act; and if the will is determined to its act, it is no longer free.

iv. In fine, theological determinism denies liberty because it says that all the acts of contingent beings, man included, are necessarily determined by God. And it presents itself in two ways: (*a*) the determination of our will is imagined as coming from a blind force that controls everything, such as fate among the ancients, and then we have fatalistic determinism; or (*b*) it is imagined as coming from an omniscient force, such as the divine will guided by infinite prescience, and then we have that determinism which the ancients called predestinationism. The followers of the latter system reason thus: whatever God has foreseen and predestinated must necessarily happen; but our acts are certainly included in the divine foreknowledge and predestination; therefore, these acts must necessarily happen.

3. *Apparent Liberty.*—Such, in short, are the reasons of the old and the new determinists, who, therefore, regard the consciousness that we have of our liberty as an illusion, coming from the complexity of causes that influence our will. To be truly certain of the liberty of our volitions, they say, we should know thoroughly our physical, psychological, metaphysical, and moral being; we should know all the intricacy and history of our acts; we should know the influence exercised on us by temper, character, surroundings, the thousand causes set in play at every act; in fine, we should know the secret and mysterious influence exercised on all our acts by the first cause. And since all this will never be possible for man, the pretended certainty of our liberty is not and cannot be anything but an illusion.

The irregularity of our operations, says Spencer, is only apparent. If we knew all the causes from which every single act proceeds, we should at once see that every one of them is the necessary result of the respective causes that have determined it. Thus, a heavenly body, a prey to various attractive forces, will go through movements so capricious and fantastic that it appears at perfect liberty in its course; while, in reality, every one of those movements is the necessary result of the forces that act on it. Say the same of our acts. As the drunken man, the hypnotised man, the madman, believes himself quite sane and is not, so

we all believe that we are free, but we are not, So much for Spencer.

We may reasonably add the answer given by Moleschott to Dr. Righi. At the International Congress on Criminal Anthropology held in Rome in 1885, Dr. Righi had opposed to the theory of physiological determinism the testimony of consciousness in favour of liberty. But Professor Moleschott, breaking out with the suddenness of a spring trap, answered: The testimony of consciousness in favour of liberty is of the same value as the testimony of the eye in favour of the sun's motion! He meant to say: As the eye is mistaken in testifying that the sun moves, so consciousness is mistaken in attesting the liberty of our volitions.

4. *The Determinists Confound Two Questions.*—From what we have set forth, it is easily seen that the determinists, ancient as well as modern, confound two questions altogether different, which should be kept distinct: the question of the existence of liberty, and the question of the manner in which it should be understood and explained.

All the denials of the determinists rest on a confusion of these two questions. Because they cannot reconcile human liberty with the principles of their system in regard to the physical or the metaphysical order, the psychological or the theological order, the natural or the supernatural order, they deny, without further discussion, the existence of liberty. Now, this is not logical, because in thousands of cases we know existence with the fullest certainty, without being able to give an explanation of it. In the same manner as a countryman knows that a seed is growing into a tree, and will in due time yield blossoms and fruit, but would find himself very much puzzled if he tried to explain the how and the why of this fact, so it is with us. We feel that we are free, we have a certainty of the existence of liberty, although its nature is not understood by all, nor may we be able to answer the arguments of those who deny it. The first question, therefore, that we ought to solve is the existence of liberty, showing that it is a certain and indubitable fact, about which there cannot possibly be any mistake or illusion.

5. *Liberty is True and Real.*—Here it is enough that we appeal to the internal testimony of conscience.

i. The soul perceives that it is moved, said Cicero; and it perceives at the same time that it is moved by its own, not by another force.[1] Everyone of us feels by inner experience that it is our will that determines on wishing or not wishing, on wishing one thing or wishing another; and feels at the same time that our will is not subject to any physical coercion, external or internal. We feel, indeed, that the will is internally invited or stimulated by this or that motive; but we also feel that it is the will that freely

[1] Sentit animus se moveri; quod cum sentit, illud simul una sentit, se sua vi, non aliena vi moveri.

bestows its consent, or denies the same. It is, indeed, true that violence is sometimes done us with regard to the external execution of our will; but it is also true that such violence or physical compulsion regards only external acts commanded by the will, not the internal volitions of the will. No amount of external compulsion can make us internally will that which we do not will.

ii. To say that consciousness can be mistaken or deceived about these facts is simply a misunderstanding of that in which psychological consciousness consists. The office of psychological consciousness is not that of judging, but merely of noticing internal facts as they occur. If, therefore, it makes us feel that our will is free in its volitions, the reason is because the will is really free. "To feel free and to be free are with us the same thing," says A. Franchi very justly, "as it is the same thing to feel glad and to be glad, to feel sorrowful and to be sorrowful, to feel doubtful and to be doubtful."[1]

iii. Nor is Spencer's comparison of any weight. If the will of man, answers Rossignoli, were in the condition of the heavenly body imagined by him, it would feel itself to be like a drunken man, who staggers from side to side, agitated by contrary forces, but unable to move in a direction different from that in which it is driven by the resultant of those forces; while interior consciousness shows us that the dynamics of our will are quite another thing.[2]

iv. Neither is any account to be made of Moleschott's remark about the mistake of the eye in observing a solar motion and that of consciousness in reviewing our internal acts. This is chiefly because in Moleschott's comparison there is question of external vision; and all know that the external senses, although they may be in themselves true when reporting external phenomena to us, can, however, be mistaken when they are not in due condition. Secondly, because the eye is not destined to perceive motion, but colour, or rather the thing coloured. Motion is one of those common things, as the ancients called them, to perceive which several senses are appointed; and whoever does not wish to be mistaken about them, requires a simultaneous concurrence of several senses and of the intelligence. It is not so with consciousness, which notices only the facts or phenomena that happen within us. Here there is no danger of mistake or illusion in treating of immediate perceptions—that is, of a knowledge of our own acts.

v. "And if to a few madmen, drunken men, and hypnotised men, it appears that consciousness gives them an illusion of being free, while their will is the slave of alcohol or of a dissolute fancy, this error," as Rossignoli again notes, "is not from consciousness, but from the senses and intelligence. In point of fact, while they hold that their consciousness is regular (and they hold it such

[1] *Ultima Critica*, n. 498.
[2] *Il determinismo*, &c., 1st ed., p. 38

because it is hindered in these cases from having those antagonistic ideas which correct illusion), they cannot see that by a necessary effect their will is in fetters, being without light to guide it. Consciousness reflects on the ideas that are presented to the mind, but it cannot attend to those which, from cerebral pathological causes, are not adapted to it. And hence the illusion."[1] But, even in these cases, consciousness recounts facts as they happen within us: if they happen in a disorderly manner, this does not depend on it.

vi. If we could doubt of the certainty of our consciousness with regard to internal facts, even physical certainty with regard to the external world would disappear. Because if the certainty of external facts springs from external experience, the certainty of external experience springs in its turn from the internal—that is, from the consciousness of our acts with regard to the external world. It is a fact, for example, that I am now reading this page. Behold the physical certainty of a fact external to me. But whence this certainty in me, if not from the consciousness I have of the act of seeing, which I exercise on the page? Therefore, if I could doubt of the truth of my consciousness, there would be an end even to physical certainty with regard to the external world.

vii. But there is a last consideration of fact that would alone suffice to overthrow all the batteries of the determinists. Willingly or unwillingly, we find by experience that three different kinds of operations occur in us: (*a*) operations that occur in us, but are not performed by us—for instance, a blow; (*b*) operations that occur in us, and are performed by us, but not freely—for instance, the circulation of the blood, the process of nutrition; and (*c*) operations that occur in us, and are freely performed by us—as are those which are accomplished with full knowledge of the mind and perfect deliberation of the will. Now, how can anyone doubt of the existence of liberty in presence of a fact proving the difference that exists between free and not-free acts, between those which happen without deliberation of the will and those which happen with full deliberation of the will? Behold the reason why the human race has always lived and always will live in this conviction. "Every tongue," writes Taparelli, "that names virtue and vice, merit and demerit, praise and blame, reward and punishment, conscientiousness and remorse; every law that is promulgated, every counsel that is asked, every regret that is expressed, every chastisement that is inflicted, every magistrate that is constituted—all, all speak in favour of human liberty, and show us what is the inmost feeling, not only of the multitude with regard to it, but even of the philosopher who is most obstinate in denying it."[2]

[1] *Op. cit.*
[2] *Saggio teoretico*, &c., n. 47.

6. *Three Prejudices of Determinism in Our Days.*—Passing now from a question of fact to one of principle or doctrine, we ought before all things to remove three prejudices common to all the determinists of the present day.

i. The first is that no free will exists in man, because no spiritual soul, distinct from matter and from organic functions, exists in him. This we answer by inverting the parts of the argument. The existence of free will being a fact, as we have demonstrated, the existence of a spiritual soul is also a fact.

ii. The second is that free will would be a discordance amid the universal constancy of the laws of nature. Now here there is no question of discordance or harmony. There is question of a fact; and it is an incontrovertible fact that man is free.

iii. The third is that a free act would imply a true creation from nothing—that is, the creation of some activity or energy that would be required for the placing of an act. But this is absurd: either because nothing can be created by the will, or because it is scientifically demonstrated that the energies of the universe may very well be transformed, though not increased or diminished in themselves. The movements of the will, like all the other movements of nature, enter, therefore, into the storehouse of preceding determination. Granting, however, that we could not answer this difficulty, the fact of liberty would be no less certain. But there is no need to have recourse to creation. The will is not a passive, but an active, power; it has therefore in itself what is required for the placing of an act, without creating it or receiving it from preceding determinations. The will, as a spiritual power, does not by its acts add new energies to those of the physical order, but only uses (in its acts commanded and corporal) those energies which already exist.

7. *Special Refutation of Each Form of Determinism.*—We will now give a short and precise answer to each of the systems set forth.

i. Theological determinism arises from a false idea of the divinity and of divine providence. From a false idea of the divinity comes fatalistic determinism, which makes the First Being a blind and unconscious force—an error that it is enough to mention, without there being any need to refute it. From a false idea of divine providence comes predestinationist determinism, which confounds infallibility with necessity. Predestination in God is never disjoined from prescience, and prescience is only an anticipated view of events. The future act will happen infallibly as foreseen, but not necessarily; in other words, it will not happen because it was foreseen, but it was foreseen because it will happen.

ii. Metaphysical determinism also rests on two equivocations. In the first place, it believes that a free act is the same as an act without a cause. And this is false. Because a free act does not mean an act undetermined by any cause, but undetermined

by any cause externa to the will. A free act has therefore its cause in the free determination of the will. In the second place, it believes that the will is not in act with regard to particular goods to which it is inclined. But this is also false. In the will we must distinguish a tendency towards good in general, and an actuation of this tendency towards particular goods. The tendency towards good in general is necessary to the will, as the desire of happiness is necessary, and constitutes what the ancients called *voluntas ut natura* (the will as nature); but the actuation of this tendency with regard to particular goods is not and cannot be necessary, because no limited good can have an irresistible attraction for the will: and here finds place what the ancients called *voluntas ut libertas* (the will as liberty). Now, as the will applies itself to this or that particular good in virtue of a tendency to good in general, it has no need of a new motion when it is urged towards particular goods.

iii. Psychological determinism puts a bad construction on a true fact. It is one thing to say that we determine to operate from a motive, another that we are determined to operate by that motive. The former is true, the latter false. To say that the will follows the intellect is to say that it cannot be carried towards any good unless that good is first known by the intellect; but not that the good known obliges the will to desire it. The intellect presents various goods, and the will makes a selection: that is all. It is therefore false that the will is like a balance, moved down on one side by the greater weight of a motive. The will is irresistibly attracted only by an unlimited good; limited goods may invite it, but they do not oblige it. And consequently it is false that the will cannot determine between two goods in all respects equal. As it is the same will that in its deliberations gives greater weight to one or another of the motives presented by the intellect, it is in its power to change the equilibrium of the motives, and to adjust matters so that two objects will no longer present themselves as equally desirable for its choice. The hypothesis of microscopic motives, which determine our will without leaving any trace on our consciousness, is ridiculous. And how can the determinists assert that such motives exist, if even they themselves have no consciousness of them?

iv. In fine, physical or physiological determinism has against it the facts already set forth in our general refutation. To avoid misunderstanding, let us only add:—

(*a*) Even free will has its limits. We are not to confound liberty with absolute independence, as the determinists do.

(*b*) We also admit that in some cases the liberty of willing is more or less diminished, either by habit or by passion; as, in like manner, we admit that in other cases it is totally extinct—for example, in madness and in irresistible passion.

(*c*) We recognise, moreover, that the external conditions of surroundings have a greater or less influence in inviting the will

to operate in one way rather than in another; and as the will usually turns whither occasional causes invite it, the reason is understood why, given external conditions almost equal, individuals and peoples generally act in the same way, as appears from statistics.

(*d*) However, outside of the abnormal cases of madness and irresistible passion, the will, in so far as it meets with internal and external stimulants, is never forced. And a proof of the fact is that, although the majority let themselves go with the stream, as is said, many resist. And this demonstrates that all could resist if they wished, the interior or exterior attraction in normal cases never being such as to necessitate the will. The saying, "Where there's a will, there's a way" has here its full application. "I wished, I always wished, I strongly wished," said Dante; and he came to that which he wished. This holds good with still greater reason in the moral order. Every man of virtue is only a man of strong and constant will. Observe St. Augustine while yet held fast in the snares of passion. What does he do to escape from them? He calls to mind those who had struggled before him against the same passions, and who conquered by the energy and the constancy of their will. Then he exclaims: *Si isti et illi, cur et non ego?*—if these and those knew how to triumph over their passions, why not I also? He willed it, and he became a saint. The saints are therefore the best refutation of all the sophisms of the determinists.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE END OF HUMAN LIFE.

The most ardent desire of our will, or rather of our whole being, is to be happy. Let any one of our acts be analysed, and it will be seen that this is always the last and secret end for which we operate. And if happiness is the end at which our being and operating aim, this means that it is the end of our life. Herein all agree.

But in what does happiness consist? Different schools take different views. Instead of entering into the labyrinth of the various opinions of ancients and moderns, we will show the principles connected with the question, and then we will turn to its solution.

i. Above all it is certain that happiness should consist in some good. Evil, as evil, is not and can not be desired by anyone: just because, instead of making us happy, it makes us unhappy.

ii. It is certain, in the second place, that good is what suits us, what perfects us, what satisfies our desires and wants.

iii. It is certain, in the third place, that only what agrees with our nature is a true and real good; otherwise, it is false or apparent.

iv. It is certain, in the fourth place, that the good to which we tend may be desired as a means to the attainment of another good—riches, for example, if they are sought on account of the ease and comfort that they procure us; or as a good ultimately and by itself desired—for example, the pleasant life in which the rich man spends his time. In the former case, the good has the character of a proximate end to human operations; in the latter, that of a last end. Because all those goods which man seeks in order to come into the possession of other goods, cannot constitute the last end of his operations. That the good to which the will ultimately tends should be such as to render the will perfectly happy, it is necessary that it should completely and constantly satisfy all the desires of the will.

So much being granted, it is easy to understand that the last end of human life cannot consist in material goods—be they external or internal.

i. Not in external material goods (riches): because these are sought only as a means for the attainment of other goods; therefore, they cannot be the end or the good ultimately desired.

ii. Not in internal material goods (health, strength, beauty, sensible pleasure): because these goods satisfy only the body, not the soul. They do not therefore content all human nature; and to make the last end of our life consist in them would be the same as to forget the noblest part of us, which is the spiritual soul, and to put ourselves on a level with beasts. Therefore, corporeal and sensible goods, that they may be worthy of us, ought to be desired subordinately to those of the soul.

iii. Finally, all that we shall now say to demonstrate that the last end of human life cannot be placed in immaterial goods attainable here below, will apply with much greater reason against material goods, let them be external or internal.

The last end of human life cannot consist in the immaterial goods of the present life—that is, in the immaterial goods that man can acquire in this life, be they external goods (as honour, glory, power), or be they internal goods (as wisdom, and even virtue, relatively to the advantages that they bring us in this present life, wherein the Stoics placed happiness):—

i. Because these goods are not common to all, while happiness should be common to all.

ii. Because they are not constant, even in him who possesses them, being subject to changes of fortune, whereas happiness implies a constant good.

iii. Because they do not completely satisfy the desires of man, whence all confess that in this life there is no perfect happiness.[1]

[1] "Everything attracts me, everything fascinates me; I regard myself as happy if I can obtain it. But scarcely have I put the goblet to my lips, when I let it fall in disappointment from my hand. Thus, my life passes away sadly, flying from flower to flower, from dream to dream, seeking I know not what that my soul desired, that would suffice for its happiness,

iv. Because all goods here below end with death, in whose presence all is "vanity of vanities," while the better part of us, which is the spiritual soul, survives the body, and therefore cannot be content with transitory perishable goods.

Our aspiration for perfect happiness is not an illusion. Some rationalists, not being able to disown the fact of our aspiration for perfect happiness, and, on the other hand, seeing that no one in this life can attain to it, said that this aspiration for perfect happiness is a complete illusion of our spirit. But we answer that their hypothesis is an illusion:—

i. Because the aspiration for perfect happiness comes from our very nature. Now nature, or rather God, who is the author of nature, never does anything in vain, or without an object. Therefore, this aspiration cannot be an illusion. It is repugnant that there should be a tendency towards what has no existence.

ii. Because, if we have a spiritual and immortal soul, we certainly cannot be satisfied with transitory perishable goods, and this aspiration presents itself therefore as a consequence of our nature.

iii. Because the boundlessness of the desire of happiness for the will proceeds from the boundlessness of the desire of knowledge for the mind. As our intellect is not made for this or that truth, but for truth (taken without limits), so our will is not made for this or that good, but for good (taken without limits).

iv. Because all the arguments that prove that there is not here below a perfect moral sanction, but it must be expected in the next life, also prove that our aspirations for perfect happiness cannot be an illusion. The illusion is to seek it in the present life.

The last end of human life consists therefore in a boundless good (which can only be God), not attainable in the present life, but in the next. As no finite good can be the object of the final aspiration of our will, we must conclude that this irresistible inclination of the will cannot be satisfied except by an infinite good. But outside of God there is no other infinite good, and God does not give Himself as a last end to men in this life; therefore, it is in the next that He does so. Accordingly, Vico defines man as "a finite knowledge, a finite will, a finite power, which tends to the infinite." Hence the famous words of St. Augustine: "Thou hast made us, O Lord, for Thyself, and our heart cannot rest until it rests in Thee!"

Hitherto, we have followed reason. Faith goes much farther. It points to a final possession of God in a supernatural manner,

and that I find nowhere. A great lady of the world, to whom God had granted all that constitutes the honour and the charm of life—an illustrious name, a splendid fortune, a husband worthy of her, beautiful children—said: *There is something within me that can never be satisfied.* What was it? The human heart. It may have many joys, but it can never be perfectly content."—Bouzand, *Il Cristianesimo*, &c., I., pp. 70–72.

and therefore not to be obtained without grace. But of this we shall not now treat in our remarks against unbelievers.

Let us therefore come to the conclusion. If we are destined for happiness in another world, even the present life ought to be directed to the future as a means to an end. It ought to be given to all those duties which are required for the attainment of the end: *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.*[1] It is a general duty incumbent on all to subordinate temporal to eternal well-being, because the present life is a preparation for the future. Hence, Jesus Christ insists so much in teaching a detachment of the affections from earthly goods. He means that we should so use present goods as not to make them our last end. If placed, therefore, in the alternative of losing either temporal or eternal goods, He wishes that we should not hesitate a moment in sacrificing the former for the latter, even at the cost of life. Therefore, He asks: *What doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul?*[2]

Some shallow spirits have accused Jesus Christ of being a despiser and hater of human life and its goods. But the accusation is foolish. Jesus Christ does not despise or hate human life or its goods. He wishes only that the present life should not be made an end in itself, because it is ordained for the future, and that we should not seek in worldly goods that happiness which is to be found only in eternal goods. Nothing can be more reasonable. "The feeling of life," writes Harnack, "can be found only in the world beyond, because the end of natural life is death." The accusation therefore can avail only in the mouths of unbelievers, who deny the future life, and consider the present life as an end in itself. But to adopt what they call "the modern idea of life," inspired by all those who condemn religious "asceticism," would be only a most beastly return to paganism, or rather to a form still more base, because paganism, well or ill, attached itself to *the beyond*, while these unbelievers would desire all the pleasures of a pagan life, without the supernatural fancies annexed. This is the grand ideal, which inspired almost all the literature of the past century.[3] But against such beastliness, we

[1] Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata.—*Matt.* xix. 17.

[2] Quid enim prodest homini si mundum universum lucretur, animæ vero suæ detrimentum patiatur?—*Matt.* xvi. 26.

[3] "Let us confess candidly," said Joseph Chiarini in a discourse prefixed to the works of Carducci, "we are no longer Christians; we are pagans; we wish to live, and to enjoy life; we wish to obey nature pointing out, for our welfare and delight, and for the welfare and delight of others, all the activity that it has placed in us, and thus guiding us to the end of our being. This, and nothing else, is the meaning of the complaints made by Schiller, Leopardi, Swinburne, Carducci. Yes, we are pagans. . . . Our paganism, the paganism of the *barbarous odes*, as Alberto Mario said, is not only the revenge of earth on heaven, not only the abolition of all the nasty mediævalism of Christianity . . . but the calm and fully satisfied possession of an earthly life. . . . *It is the Greek enjoyment, without the supernatural fancies annexed.*"

shall always have the protest of the soul naturally religious, because naturally rational: it makes all feel that *we are born for better things—ad majora nati sumus.*

Our destiny to absolute happiness in another world does not prevent us from attaining a relative happiness in this world, always improving more and more our individual and social condition. But this ought always to be without detriment of future happiness: we are to use temporal goods in such a manner that we may not lose the eternal.[1] And we shall not lose sight of eternal goods, for which we are destined, if in the use of temporal goods we attend to the rules of what is just and right—that is, to the moral laws. This implies the practice of virtue—the only true good that is not subject to the strokes of fortune—which brings man near to God—which gives peace and joy of soul in all the vicissitudes of life, because it gives a moral certainty of future happiness. It therefore constitutes that true relative happiness which all can have here below.

CHAPTER XX.

ABSURDITY OF AN INDEPENDENT MORALITY.

If God is the last end of human life, and the present life is directed to the future as a means to an end, we at once see how absurd is a morality independent of God—that is, a pretence to regulate our life (public as well as private) without any regard to God or to a future life. If it were demonstrated that no God or future life can exist, then only might one speak of an independent morality; but if, on the contrary, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are certain, as we have demonstrated, then there can no longer be mention of an independent morality.

What, in point of fact, is morality? It is that which gives rules for acting rightly. If, then, we are destined for a goal beyond this world, our conduct will be right when we conform ourselves to the laws that direct us towards this goal, or at least are not opposed to it.

But there is more. Take away religious morality, that which is dependent on God, and the foundation of all moral obligation among men is also taken away. That social living together is impossible without respect for the rights of others, or without observance of duties, especially towards authority, is a thing that has no need of demonstration. Now, all this is very well understood when the moral obligation is regarded as a command that comes ultimately from God, who wishes the maintenance of order,

[1] Sic transeamus per bona temporalia ut non amittamus æterna.

with respect for the rights of others and the practice of our own duties.

But if we deny God or prescind from Him, and seek elsewhere a foundation for moral obligation, then duty has no longer any binding force on our conscience. We say binding force on our conscience; because moral duty imposes itself in an imperative manner on our conscience, and makes us feel internally the obligation of acting in one way rather than in another, independently of all material advantages or disadvantages that may accrue from it. Now, no command of man can be imposed on our conscience in an obligatory manner, if that command is not regarded as ultimately grounded on the command of God, because no man, as man, has a natural right over another man. Therefore, if you take away religious morality, that which is dependent on God, you take away the foundation of every moral obligation that exists among men.

"We can see things as they are," wrote some years ago an author far from clerical; "morality, true morality has need of the Absolute; it finds its point of support only in God. . . . Duty is nothing if it does not imply eternal relations. . . . Accordingly, morality for me is nothing if it is not religious." [2]

The advocates of independent morality would have moral obligation rest:—

i. On Utility. (*a*) But utility has not by itself a binding force, everyone being able to renounce his own advantage, while conscience makes all feel the moral necessity of doing good and avoiding evil, even at the cost of life. (*b*) With the doctrine of utility, even the most wicked actions could be justified, for very often that which is wrong may be useful. (*c*) In the thoughts and in the words of the people, a distinction is always made between what is useful and what is proper.

ii. On Civil Laws. But (*a*) civil and social laws vary according to time and place, whereas moral principles are always the same. (*b*) The laws of men are good or bad according as they conform or do not conform to the moral law, which, therefore, they presuppose. (*c*) Human laws can regulate only external and public acts, while the moral law reaches to internal and private ones. (*d*) In fine, human laws do not command all good acts, nor forbid all bad ones, as does the moral law; whence it is said: *This man is right in law, but not in conscience.*

iii. On Public Opinion. But (*a*) even public opinion is changeable, while the moral law presents itself as unchangeable.

[1] St. Augustine therefore defined the moral law: Ratio vel voluntas Dei ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans. And even pagans placed in God the moral law of what is just and right. "Hanc video," said Cicero, "sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, neque hominum ingeniis fuisse excogitatam, legem (moralem) neque scitum esse aliquod populorum, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia."—*De Legib.* lib. II., c. iv.

[2] Schérer.

(*b*) Public opinion cannot have a binding force, it being a way of seeing or thinking among men, not a command that comes from God. (*c*) Besides, public opinion is subject to criticism, since we distinguish good opinions from bad ones. (*d*) In fine, we feel it a moral duty to oppose bad opinions; therefore, it is not on public opinion that a moral obligation can rest.

iv. On Instinct, Sympathy, Feeling. But (*a*) then all the passions would be lawful, while the moral law makes us feel the duty of keeping them under rein. (*b*) The very idea of the moral law would be taken away, because no one can feel himself bound by himself or by one of his faculties. (*c*) If conscience did not make us feel the obligation of keeping our passions in check, its remorse and its joy would be inexplicable.

v. On Conscience. Conscience does not create but supposes the moral law, which it applies to its acts, judging practically whether they are conformable or not to that law.

vi. On Reason. (*a*) Reason knows the moral law, but does not create it. (*b*) Reason, like conscience, may be called the *proximate rule* of human operations, inasmuch as it shows the good that we ought to do and the evil that we ought to avoid, but it is not the *ultimate rule*. (*c*) In point of fact, either reason is free to form its own dictates, and then all difference between good and evil, between virtue and vice, vanishes; or reason is obliged to judge good to be good, evil to be evil, and then it must recognise that the moral law is something independent of our reason, something that reason knows but does not create. And what this something is in itself we shall never understand, if we do not regard it as a command or a prohibition that comes ultimately from God.

As there is no motion in the physical order without a Supreme Mover, so there is no obligation in the moral order without a Supreme Ruler. Behold why Cicero said: *All things are moved by religion.*[1] He meant in the moral order.

CHAPTER XXI.

PROGRESS, LIBERTY, AND CIVILISATION.

We are now in a way to clear up the meaning of those three words, which have been and still are so much abused.

1. *Progress.*—(i.) To progress means, in its generic sense, to go forward: progress is therefore a movement. It is understood that we do not mean to speak only of local movement, but of any act or operation by which one advances. As in machines, the speed with which they hasten to the accomplishment of their work is progress; so, in life, the development of the living being

[1] Omnia religione moventur.

is progress; in intelligence, the free march of the mind towards truth is progress; in the will, a tendency towards good is progress.

ii. Now to what does every being tend in its operations? It tends to the attainment of that perfection which is wanting to it, or towards which it is in potentiality. This is seen most clearly in the growth of living beings. Therefore, progress is a movement towards perfection, or, in other words, it is a perfection of being. But although all progress is movement, yet not all movement is progress. There is a movement or a change for the better, and there is a movement or a change for the worse. Progress is only when a being tends to become better—that is, to become more perfect.

iii. But in what does the perfection of a being consist? In attaining the scope or the end for which it exists. Thus we say that a clock is perfect when it shows the time exactly, because this and no other is the scope or the end of its existence. Therefore, progress may in its last analysis be defined the movement of a being towards its end.

iv. Applying now these principles to man, it is evident that, to determine what is human progress—that is, the true and proper progress of man as such, we must keep in mind his nature and his end. Those who make him equal to a beast or nearly so, as the materialists, sensists, and evolutionists do; or exalt him so much that they confound him with the Divine Being, as the pantheists do; or simply deny God and the future life, as the atheists do; or, even without coming to these negations, teach that we can know nothing beyond what the senses perceive, as the positivists do—all those should by a logical necessity make every movement of our life converge to goods here below in an exclusive manner, and recognise no other progress than that which is material.

Intellectual progress, according to unbelievers, consists solely in an ever-increasing knowledge of matter, its forces, and its laws, from which the greatest advantages possible may be drawn for this life. Moral progress consists only in politeness, courtesy, urbanity. It makes no difference then if, in a civil manner, all the principles of honesty and shame are trampled under foot. Thus, intellectual progress and moral progress are often, in the modern dictionary, mere synonyms for liberation from Christian dogmas and morals.

The budding flowers of this intellectual and moral progress of modern thought, independent of God, are the propositions gathered up in the *Syllabus*,[1] which from a denial of God go on to a denial of every ethical social principle, even to complete anarchy. And because the Church has condemned these doctrines, people would now have us believe that she condemns in general all modern progress. But it is always the old sophism, by which

[1] The author refers to the *Syllabus* of Pope Pius IX., issued on Dec. 8, 1864.—*Trans.*

scientific material progress is confounded with moral progress. The truth is that the more society has advanced in the material scientific order, the more it has fallen in the moral order.

v. It is not much that one of the most authoritative representatives of this progress wrote: "Humanity travels, but it knows not whither." And it is indeed the tacit acknowledgment of all the unbelievers, so that Brunetière could appeal to "the bankruptcy of science," which, atheistically material, cannot give an answer to the wants of the soul, nor solve the great problems that regard our origin and our final destiny. Yet, if to progress means to go forward, and to go forward means to draw near to the goal that awaits us, then, to know indeed if humanity progresses, it is necessary before all things to know our destiny. Of what avail is any progress in industries, arts, or sciences, if the noblest part of us, which is the soul, does not know how to make one step on its own road, because it does not know its destiny?

vi. If the life of man is not finished here below—if man, willingly or unwillingly, has an immortal soul, as right reason demonstrates and humanity has always admitted—then, as the present life is ordained for the future, material progress should be subordinated to moral progress—that is, to those laws which direct the will, or rather our whole being, to its last end. Because if, as a corporeal, living, or animal being, man has wants, tendencies, and instincts for the satisfaction of which material progress suffices; as a rational, free, or spiritual being, he has wants, tendencies, and instincts for the satisfaction of which all the resources of nature do not suffice. It is therefore necessary, if progress is to be truly human, that it should imply a movement of the whole man towards his end; it is necessary that the vital movement of man in knowing and acting should proceed in such a manner as to harmonise with the two ends to which we advance, the well-being of the present life and that of the future life. "We are to use temporal goods in such a manner that we may not lose the eternal."

vii. Religion is accused of being opposed to progress. Yet even in the first page of Genesis we find those great words which point out all the possible progress that man can make with regard to matter: *Fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth* (*Gen.* i. 28). But observe the exactness of the expression. Man should rule over the earth, and not let himself be ruled by it.[1] Now, the progress to which the Church

[1] Material progress is therefore an ever-increasing dominion of man over inferior nature. Ives Guyot, in the *Journal des Economistes* of Dec. 15, 1899, put the question: "What is the criterion of progress?" And after a long review of opinions he concluded that progress is nothing but "an increase of man's power over things." This definition corresponds to a hair's breadth with the text of Genesis. It relates to material progress, but certainly not progress as to-day understood.

is averse is precisely that which makes the spirit serve matter, not that which makes matter serve the spirit.

2. *Liberty.*—(i.) We have defined progress as the movement of a being towards its end. Now it is known that in irrational beings this movement takes place in a necessary manner; but in rational beings, in a free manner. Human progress may therefore be defined the movement of man towards his end.

ii. To move freely towards an end does not mean to act without any law, as to go freely to a place does not mean to keep away from the road that leads to it. Man is free, but he is rational; or rather he is free because he is rational; and this means that in his particular acts he ought to regulate himself not by instinct, like the beast, but by reason, which points out the rules for coming to good and shunning evil.

iii. The everlasting equivocation of our adversaries is a confounding of physical or natural liberty, which consists in a dominion over our acts, with a moral liberty that consists in exemption from every law. Yes, man is physically free in his operations, inasmuch as his will is not constrained or determined to its acts by any physical coercion, internal or external; but he is morally obliged, if he would attain the good that he desires, to keep himself on the road that leads to it, and therefore to act in conformity with natural, divine, and human laws. Therefore, to be free does not mean to be independent—that is, not bound to moral, religious, or civil duties. It means only that the will, in fulfilling such duties, is not physically necessitated or determined by anyone.

iv. When, therefore, the Church is accused of being an enemy of liberty, in what sense do our adversaries take these words? Do they speak of physical or natural liberty? Then they are at least ridiculous; since the Church has always been the greatest advocate and guardian of this liberty. Therefore, that the charge may have any value, we must understand it in the sense that the Church is an enemy of moral liberty. In this case, the Church is not the only enemy of liberty; there are others—civil society itself, the state, the family, every authority that exists on earth. Because moral liberty, in so far as it means exemption from all law, means the abolition of all authority, and, consequently, the destruction of all social order, the establishment of complete and absolute anarchy. This is indeed the liberty that the Church reproves and condemns, as being the liberty of error and perdition.

3. *Civilisation.*—When human progress or perfection is considered no longer in itself or in particular individuals, but in the whole social body, it is called civilisation. "It is a fact," wrote Leo XIII. when yet Archbishop of Perugia, "that man in society tends to perfect himself from a triple point of view—physical well-being, moral relations with himself and others, and political conditions. Now these different degrees of progressive evolution, by which men assembled in society raise themselves up, constitute

civilisation. Such civilisation is incipient when the conditions by which man perfects himself in this triple relation are scarce; is advanced, when they are abundant; and would be complete, if ever they should all be fulfilled." (In the pastoral letter, *La Chiesa e la Civiltà*.)

Let us explain somewhat. (i.) Before all, civilisation is perfection. There are some who by civilisation understand graceful manners, refined sentiments, an exquisite taste, a gentle soul, a kind heart, a polite address, and the like. These things may indeed be signs of civilisation; but they are not its essence or its substance. The foundation or basis of civilisation is perfection, perfection in good; and good, in order to be such for man, ought never to oppose morality—that is, it ought never to injure the spiritual good for which the better part of man is destined.

ii. Civilisation is social perfection. The word comes from *civis*, which denotes one who lives in society. And social perfection is precisely that which results from the harmonious development of human progress in its triple aspect of material, intellectual, and moral progress, considered in the social body.

iii. That a society may be called truly civilised, it is necessary that progress should so pervade its institutions, its laws, its conduct, &c., that society as society may fairly be called perfect, and as such may make its influence felt on its members, moving and guiding them to the common social good. It is therefore evident that perfection requires, in the individual man as well as in society, that material progress should be subordinated to moral progress; also, because the end of civil society is not the mere well-being of the present life, but the common temporal good subordinated to the spiritual and eternal. And as society is not a mechanical aggregate, but a union of many individuals aspiring to one common end or good, it is likewise evident that the greater the force of this moral union the greater the social perfection.

iv. There are two distinct elements in civilisation: a material element—whence comes material civilisation, which consists in riches, in arts, in industries, in sciences that promote it; and a moral element—whence comes moral civilisation, which consists in good customs, wise laws, and all those arts, sciences, institutions, &c., which promote virtuous living and honest work. Perfect civilisation embraces both these elements, which correspond to the two parts constituting human nature—that is, the body and the soul—in such manner, however, that the material element is subordinated to the moral, as the body to the soul. If the moral element predominates, there is harmony, or society is happy with that happiness which is possible here below; if the material element predominates, society is in disorder or anarchy. Luxury, sensuality, a spirit of revolt, are the fruits of material civilisation: we need not go far to find them at the present day.

v. From all this it may be seen how erroneous are the ideas of moderns who make civilisation or social perfection consist only

in a scientific material progress, and in its application to the various branches of industry. Speaking of this civilisation, Taparelli justly exclaims: "Let commerce grow according to its talent, let steamers be multiplied, let mountains and gulfs be crossed by railways; they will succeed in bringing men together materially, but they will not unite or associate them morally." And there is worse. By a strange perversion of names and ideas, the word "civilisation" is often employed to signify that assemblage of institutions, doctrines, and principles which is the most complete denial of Christianity. Hence, modern civilisation is set against the ancient as the true against the false; and it is ascribed as an honour to the new civilisation that it has given a State separated from the Church and a Society independent of God. Few do not know what is the *Culturkampf* (War for Civilisation) undertaken by modern States against the Church.

vi. There is little need to remark that the Church always was and always will be an enemy to this kind of civilisation. But all true friends of civilisation and social order ought to remember how indebted they are to the Church; because, by opposing this false civilisation, she prevents the ruin into which society would fall. For the rest, twenty centuries of history are at hand to testify that the cause of civilisation is inseparably bound up with that of Christianity.

vii. Plato thanked the gods that he had been born a Greek and not a barbarian; born, too, in the land of Socrates and Euclid. How much more ought we to thank God that we have been born in the Catholic Church, and in the land where the Vicar of Jesus Christ has his see!

CHAPTER XXII

MEANING OF RELIGION

THE existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the final destiny of man (those important preliminaries) being admitted, the existence of religion follows as a necessary consequence—that is, the duty of recognising God as our first beginning and last end, professing practically our dependence on God during the whole course of our life.

Here we have the whole substance of religion: to recognise and to profess our dependence on God.

i. Man depends on God as an effect on a cause; and religion (from the Latin word *religare*, to bind again) consists in practically recognising this dependence, which unites the creature with the Creator. Even irrational creatures depend on God as effects on a cause, but they are not capable of recognising their dependence. Therefore, religion is proper only to rational creatures. It is not

a thing of instinct or sentiment, but of reason and will.[1] It is not the worship of an abstract and evanescent ideal, but a recognition of dependence that we owe to a Being supremely true and real, to *Him who is*, or is Being by essence.

ii. It is not enough, however, to know that we depend on God, but it is necessary that we should practically profess this dependence in the duties that follow from it—just as it is not enough for a son to know that he owes everything to his parents, but he should also honour and obey them. It is true that we are free; but to be free does not mean to be independent of God. It means that we should profess freely, or voluntarily, our dependence on Him. Herein precisely is to be found the essence of religion, which is not a forced but a free service, although a duty. What would be said of a son who, because free, would not honour or obey his parents? The case of man with respect to God is the same.

iii. Religion may therefore be defined that moral bond which unites man with God. We call it a "moral bond," not a "physical bond," to indicate that we ought voluntarily to recognise and profess our dependence on God. We say that it "unites man with God" because, recognising this dependence on God, the creature is morally joined to the Creator. The union is not, as we see, merely passive, inert, abstract, but active, concrete, living—accomplished by means of the most vital acts of man. In short, it is the intelligent and free union of the creature with the Creator.

Religion being thus understood, it may be considered:—(*a*) Subjectively—and it is that virtue by which man gives to God the worship due to Him. (*b*) Objectively—and it is the sum of the truths that ought to be known with regard to God (theoretical religion); or the sum of the duties that ought to be practised towards Him (practical religion); or the collection of truths, laws, and precepts, by means of which the living union of man with God is promoted, so that our thoughts, affections, and actions may be conformable to the relations that exist between the creature and the Creator.

If these truths and duties are pointed out to us by reason, independently of all divine revelation, we then have natural religion; if, instead, they are pointed out to us by divine revelation, we have supernatural religion.

The acts by which man recognises and professes his dependence on God, in fulfilment of his religious duties, constitute worship. It is divided into internal (acts of the mind and heart) and external (acts of the body). External worship may be subdivided into private and public.

The substance of worship resides chiefly in internal acts, without

[1] Sentiment pertains to religion inasmuch as it is moved by reason and the will, or rather serves to move reason and the will to God.

which external acts would be only hypocrisy. With internal worship, external is always required, and this for four reasons :—

i. Because we are subject to God not only as regards the soul, but also as regards the body. Therefore, we ought to honour God not only with acts of the soul, but also with acts of the body.

ii. Because internal acts naturally tend to expand into external ones, on account of the natural bond or connection that exists between soul and body.

iii. Because external worship is required as a help or incitement to internal worship. God not being an object that falls under our senses, and, on the other hand, sensible things being those which move us most, we have to render the majesty of God in some manner sensible by the splendour of external worship, so that the soul may rouse itself and more easily tend to God.

iv. Because religious worship is not only a private but a public and social duty, and, as such, cannot be fulfilled without external worship.

Accordingly, those who reject external worship, and say that the religion of the heart is enough, do not yet know the meaning of religion.

There are two ways of failing in religious duties—not fulfilling them, and fulfilling them badly. They are not fulfilled by the indifferent, the unbelieving, the impious, and the godless. They are fulfilled badly by idolatry, by superstition, and by hypocrisy.

CHAPTER XXIII

ORIGIN OF RELIGION.

If religion consists in recognising and professing our dependence on God, it certainly cannot have any other origin, on the part of man, than the knowledge of this dependence on God. And because this knowledge, in a more or less perfect degree, is a thing natural, or rather most natural to all, it cannot have been wanting to the first men. As, at the sight of the universe to-day, man, though he reflects little, cannot but understand that there exists a First Being on whom all things depend, so it was in the early times. Man, because naturally rational, is naturally religious. Therefore, humanity has never existed without religion. It would be easier, said Plutarch, to find a city without walls than a people without religion. Religion has therefore its origin with humanity, and is founded on a knowledge of the dependence that man has on God.

Nobody can deny that God, if He wished, could have Himself immediately instructed the first man or the first men about religious truths : a teaching that would have made much more easy, more certain, and more free from mixture of error, those same religious truths which are naturally accessible to man. It

is one thing to let a little boy form for himself, at the sight of the universe, an idea of God, and another to teach him directly who God is and how He should be honoured. What a far more clear and certain idea of God, and of obedience towards Him, will the child have in the latter case!

And nobody can deny that God, if He wished, could have destined man for a more noble state than that which was naturally due to him. A divine or revealed teaching would then have been absolutely necessary in order to know the new and higher destiny, and the means required to attain it. In other words, natural religion would no longer be sufficient, supernatural religion would be necessary.

Well, now, what we have pointed out by way of hypothesis is an historical fact, attested for us by the most ancient of books, the Bible. "God," says our Catechism, "revealed this religion to Adam and the early patriarchs, who succeeded one another, and who could easily transmit it, living together a very long life, until God had formed a people who would keep it till the coming of the Saviour Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God; who did not annul it, but fulfilled it, perfected it, and confided it to the care of the Church for all ages."

Religion, therefore, which began to exist with the beginning of humanity, was not only natural, but supernatural; it came not merely by the natural knowledge of reason, but by the immediate teaching of God.

i. A confirmation, though indirect, of what faith teaches may be found in the various religions, which, amid fables and myths, transmit to us an echo of the primitive revelation.

ii. Glossology assures us that the more we ascend to the origin of humanity, the more pure and perfect do we find religious beliefs; and, on the other hand, the more we descend through the ages, the more clouded and dim they become, until at last they can be seen only behind the veil of fables and myths.[1]

iii. Critical studies on the different religions lead to the conclusion that there must have been only one primitive religion, and this much more perfect than those which followed.

iv. And as all peoples come from the east, which was the cradle of humanity, so it is certain that the one primitive religion which glossology and the science of religion point out, is precisely that of which Genesis speaks.[2]

The first religious form professed by humanity was not, therefore, fetichism, nor polytheism, but monotheism. No critic of the present day who respects himself, denies this conclusion. There is question only, among those who do not admit revelation, of the manner in which the primitive monotheism is to be understood—

[1] See Max Müller in *Revue Critique*, Sept. 28, 1885.

[2] Let us not, however, confound the first revealed religion with Hebraism, as many do. Hebraism (the Hebrew Law) is certainly a revealed religion, but not the first revelation of God to man

that is, if it implies only the idea of a vague, indefinite power called forth in the minds of the first men by the great phenomena of nature (that which Max Müller named enotheism), or implies a clear and distinct idea of one personal God (monotheism properly so called).

A criticism of enotheism may be seen in De Broglie.[1] For us it will suffice to observe that in all religions, even the most absurd, there always appears, as a foundation, the idea of one supreme and only God, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked; and, since such idea passes as the traditional residue of the primitive religion, it naturally supports the Catholic thesis regarding the original monotheism, properly so called. Anyhow, monotheism or enotheism, we have enough to refute the false hypotheses of unbelievers about the origin of religion.

CHAPTER XXIV.

FALSE HYPOTHESES OF UNBELIEVERS ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION.

THE unbelieving scientists of our days no longer attribute the origin of religion to priests, to legislators, or to the fears with which the first men were struck on beholding the great phenomena of nature.

Neither do they admit that the beginnings of religion ought to be sought for in the deification and adoration of ancestors. This hypothesis, first brought forward by Evemero, a Greek philosopher, who said that "the gods were only men deified after their death"—propagated among unbelievers during past ages—and presented anew by Spencer in our days—is now universally abandoned by modern unbelievers themselves, because historical and critical studies have demonstrated that, before the worship of the dead or of ancestors, there already existed other religious forms.

But neither do they attribute the origin of religion to a primitive revelation, more or less obscured or changed by succeeding ages, and then in its altered form giving rise to all other religions. The unbelievers exclude *a priori* every supernatural element in the origin of religion.

Nor do they admit that the first religious form was monotheistic. This, they say, is a form too elevated, and could not have been the primitive one.

The primitive religion must have been much more simple and imperfect, which alone can be imagined as at first evolved from a sentiment of conscience, because it is here that we ought to seek for the origin of religion, whether it manifests a healthy or a morbid disposition of the soul.

[1] *Problemi e conclusioni della storia delle religione.*

Setting out from an evolutionist hypothesis, and, consequently, from the slow psychological evolution of man, they find here the origin and development of one religion and many religions. And behold the manner of doing so :—

i. When humanity was yet in its childhood, and found itself scarcely at the preamble of its knowledge, it did not yet know how to distinguish the internal facts of consciousness from the phenomena of the external world. It then attributed life, sense, and reason to everything it saw—that is, man attributed all phenomena to the immediate action of the will of beings analogous to himself, but believed by him to be superior in power.[1] Thus was found the first religious form that appeared in humanity—fetichism.

ii. Advancing then in his knowledge, he gradually reduced the number of personifications and deifications, limiting them to phenomena of the highest order, of which he could not yet render an account. Thus was found the second religious form—polytheism, in which only the great forces of nature were personified and deified.

iii. A further development of human knowledge showed that only one force controls and encompasses all nature, and thus monotheism was found.

iv. This force can be understood in two ways. Either it is conceived as distinct from the universe, and then we are still in that state of relative ignorance which is associated with the preceding religious forms; or it is conceived as immanent or not distinct from the universe, and then we have monism, which annuls all the preceding religious forms, and consecrates the worship of nature (naturalism) as the only subsisting reality.

v. Thus the idea of the supernatural, born in ignorance of the phenomena presented to human intelligence, gradually disappeared, according as nature revealed itself to man. Where science begins, there faith ends: the proof of which is the fact that all those who devote themselves to the study of nature withdraw from religion, or, if they still hold to it, it is only as a subjective form of sentiment—nothing more.

A few words in reply. Granting that religion initiated fetichism, and gradually rose to monotheism, it does not follow that it should afterwards turn to naturalism :—

i. Because, if nature is not from itself, no progress of human knowledge can ever banish the idea of our dependence on God.

ii. That man, in the infancy of his natural knowledge, attributed

[1] "Primitive man, in his profound ignorance and in his inability to abstract, could not explain phenomena except by means of proximate causes, conceived according to the simplest or grossest materialism—that is to say, having familiar organic forms. These causes he individualised, he personified. . . . The thunder, the lightning, the earthquake, made him believe in formidable, superior powers. He adored various scourges. He deified fire, the winds, &c., and then animals that inspired him with fear or horror."—Vianna De Lima.

immediately to God or to preternatural causes some phenomena that have their proximate and immediate cause in nature; and that scientific progress has corrected many false ideas on the mode of regarding nature, pointing out in nature itself the proximate and immediate causes of natural phenomena—nobody can deny. But to have discovered the proximate and immediate causes of natural phenomena—is this the same as to have discovered their independence of God? Because, for example, it has been discovered that the motion of planets is due to the force of attraction, can it therefore be concluded that the planets were set in motion by themselves? Evidently, this would be to reason, not with the head, but with the feet. Yet such is the reasoning of unbelievers when they say with Auguste Comte that "the heavens no longer declare the glory of God, but the glory of Hipparchus, Kepler, and Newton;" when they say with Senator Negri that the forces of nature "have taken the place of the divine will that wished to be the ruler of the world;" and, in fine, when they say with all atheists that "God is an hypothesis of which science has no longer any need."

iii. Only then would scientific progress be injurious to religion when it had succeeded in proving the eternity or the unproducibility of the elements that have their functions in the universe; but, on the contrary, science, after all its investigations, only sets forth in a clearer light this great truth, that everything in the world had a beginning, and that the cosmos supposes, as a consequence, a cause outside of it.

iv. Nay, far from injuring the idea of God, scientific progress admirably illustrates and perfects it. Have we not the stupendous revelations of the telescope and the microscope, which give us a much greater idea of the divine power and wisdom?

v. The incredulity of scientists must therefore come from quite a different source—nor can it ever be demonstrated that religion is a thing merely subjective or sentimental.[1] It being an expression of our dependence on God, there is no other way to make that conclusion lawful than by demonstrating that God does not exist. Now, this is a point at which no one will ever arrive.

But is the hypothesis of the evolutionists true with regard to the formation of religious ideas?

i. This hypothesis, as we have seen, does not correspond with history. It is certain that the primitive religion of the orientals, from whom all peoples and all religions have come, was monotheism. We know it not only from the Bible, but from all the monuments of antiquity, especially from the late discoveries of archæology, glossology, &c. Fetichism and polytheism are later forms, derived from a corruption of the primitive form. The

[1] In a recent book by Luigi Valli, the author would have us believe that all religions were born from a sentiment of the sorrows of this life, and that imagination found a remedy for them in a future life, which is therefore a thing quite fantastical and subjective.

very substance of the myths and fables of the different peoples demonstrates it.

ii. Nor does it avail to have recourse to savage tribes, who still profess fetichism or animism, in order to conclude that such must have been the primitive religion of humanity. Because the savage of to-day is not the primitive man nor one of the originals, as they suppose; he is man fallen and degraded. The plant, left to itself and in the same ground, at length degenerates. The domestic animal, driven out into the woods and deprived of its master's care, becomes wild. The same is the case with men. A tribe shut off from the people degenerates, first morally, and then physically, until it becomes savage. History has many examples. Where man does not progress, he retrogrades. And if to these observations of fact we add the traditions of peoples with regard to the past, we shall find a confirmation of the following words of Max Müller: The savage does not represent the germ or rudiment of civilisation, but rather a state of evident degradation—religious, social, and moral.[1]

iii. Neither is it true, as the evolutionists pretend, that religion shows the same phases as civilisation, and that as primitive civilisation presents itself in a rudimental state, so primitive religion must have been rudimental. If by civilisation is understood the moral perfection of a people, and nothing else, the assertion might pass; but then the conclusion to which our adversaries look would not follow. By civilisation they understand the sum of the intellectual, political, æsthetical, and social manifestations of a people solely intent on the improvement of the present life. And in this sense the assertion is false. The people of Israel, for example, did not reach the social, philosophical, æsthetical development of the people of Rome or Greece. Yet who would ever dare to say that the religion so pure of the chosen people, Biblical Mosaism, was inferior to Greek polytheism? And then what do all hypotheses avail against facts? Now it is a fact, admitted by glossology itself as we have seen, that the more we ascend towards the origin of humanity, the more pure and perfect religious ideas do we find. Therefore, the hypothesis of our adversaries has no foundation.

These facts likewise exclude the hypothesis of primitive

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, 1887.—Even according to transformism, the savage cannot be considered as a representative of the primitive man. "It is to sin against the comparative method," writes Lagrange, "and even against moderate transformism, to consider the savage as a faithful representative of primitive man. The social state of the savage, notwithstanding its incoherencies, is too complicated to be primitive. With it the rules regarding the impediments of marriage are often entangled, and in all cases less logical and less simple than those of canon law. Its religion, so poorly founded, is laden with minute rites that attest a long development. The savage is therefore at the end of an evolution, but of a decaying evolution. Civilisation does not issue from a savage life any more than a savage life from civilisation."—*Etudes*, &c.

naturalism, or the hypothesis that the first religious form was an adoration of nature. According to Professor Raphael Mariano, it was from this naturalistic worship that even the Hebrew religion took its rise.[1] And to prove that naturalism was really the first religion of humanity, he has recourse to the data of mythology. "The etymology of the names of the gods of the different religions," he says, "shows that they all originally indicate and signify things and phenomena of nature. The names *Zeus, Jove, Tiu, Zio* are etymologically identical with the Indian *Dyaus*, which denotes *Heaven;* and then *Theos* and *Deus* and *Divus* are the same as the Sanscrit *Deva*, which means *splendid, shining, luminous.* And Phaeton and Hercules, like Adonis and Osiris, and many others, are only solar Gods, whose doings are referred to a succession of days and the changes of the seasons in their relations with earthly and human life."

But against this hypothesis all the arguments will hold good that have been already adduced against fetichism and polytheism, from which naturalism does not substantially differ. Let us only add that mythology does not support the primitive naturalism. Our language with regard to God is always analogous—that is, we avail ourselves of visible things to denote the invisible. But to make use of sensible or natural things to signify God or the supernatural, is not to deify nature—unless this results from other facts than the mere etymology of a word.

As for the Hebrew religion in particular, we admit that Hebraism was not the first religion; yet it does not follow that naturalism was such. The first men were, according to Genesis, adorers of one only God, even before Hebraism, properly so called, was heard of. True, the rationalists would wish to find in the same Genesis some traces of animism or primitive polytheism, from which there would be an ascent to monotheism; and this by the different names given to God in the Bible, especially in the Pentateuch, and by the evident passage of Elohistic to Jahvistic worship. But nobody save one entirely unacquainted with Biblical studies dares any longer to recur to such an argument. A multitude of divine names does not at all prove a multitude of Gods, when all those names are referred to the same subject.

Even in Christian language, God is called the Eternal, the Lord, the Almighty, the Most High, &c. Shall we say that the number of Gods is therefore multiplied? The same remark applies to what is read in Genesis. All those names are referred to the same subject—God—as is evident to whoever reads the Bible

[1] "The religion of Israel itself does not escape from the law of growth or evolution, by which it made its first steps, setting out from humble beginnings—not at all a severance of naturalistic and polytheistic elements. . . . The religious tradition of Hebraism moves from naturalistic intuitions, which later on are transformed, and even rise to the form of a high monotheistic spiritualism."—*Intorno all' origine della religione.*

even superficially. That God first presents Himself with the name Elohim and then with that of Jahve, does not mean that worship changes in itself, when He is adored under both denominations.[1]

The testimony of Genesis is to-day supported, as we have seen, by the results of science. Therefore, willingly or not, science is in perfect accord with faith on the origin of religion.

CHAPTER XXV.

WHENCE THE MULTITUDE AND DIVERSITY OF RELIGIONS.

Primitive monotheism had two great evolutions, one progressive and the other regressive. Progressive evolution was the development of monotheism in the three most salient periods of its history—the Patriarchal period, the Mosaic period, and the Christian period—through successive revelations made by God. Regressive evolution was, on the other hand, a degeneration of monotheism among all peoples except the Hebrew-Christian—from which degeneration the numerous religions took their rise.

"Such is the general point of view of the history of religions," writes De Broglie, "that seems to us most conformable with historical facts. Setting out from the origin of humanity religious truth, preserved by a small number of men, separated itself from errors, which are only alterations of this truth. Truth and error are both developed during the course of ages. There exists a two-fold religious evolution: one, that of error, consisting in continual changes and revolutions, in advances and ruins, which succeed one another, or rather in states of decadence, which may endure for centuries, without there being any return towards good or the ideal; the other, that of the true religion, which is a slow but constant progress, or rather a series of new births and resurrections, uninterruptedly effected by progress.

"The Judaism of the latter ages is an improvement on the religion of Moses, as this was on the religion of the patriarchs. Christianity, a new effusion of the Holy Ghost, is an immense progress, and, as great doctors admit, there is still in the Church a progress in the knowledge of truth. There can likewise be, if Christians wish it, a progress in love and faith, and consequently a greater extension of virtue in the world." [2]

This is not the place to trace the origin of each religion and its particular evolutions throughout the ages. We shall only say something of the decay of primitive monotheism, whereby to explain the multiplicity and variety of religions.

"The idea of God," writes Polidori, "as an invisible Being, most perfect, distinct from the world (taught by God Himself

[1] See Vigouroux, *Manuale Biblico*, I., n. 253; Cornely, *Compendium*, p. 206.

[2] De Broglie, *Problemi*, &c., pp. 326-7.

to the first men), is not an idea of which we may find a type by experience. Therefore, if it is not cultivated by education and kept alive by tradition, it is easily lost sight of; certainly not without fault. Hence, men easily cheated about that primitive idea, decomposing it into various Gods. This was the first step to paganism—a division of Gods. A division such, however, that often with it stood the idea of a Supreme God, and often the various Gods were only one; as, for example, Jove, who is the Supreme God with Greeks and Romans; as the Sun with the Egyptians, who is Oro in the morning, Ra at noon, Tum in the evening, and Osiris at night. So with the Latins—Luna, Diana, Proserpina." [1]

And what were the courses taken from the decomposition of the idea of one only God? We shall summarise a reply from the same author. These courses were various:—

i. One was to regard the phenomena of nature as God. Hence came Sabeism, or the worship of the stars, and other such worships.

ii. Another was to deify the occult forces of nature. The gods thus imagined were represented by symbols; for example, the god Agni in India, which represented the principle of heat and vegetation. With this symbolism was perhaps connected the religion of fetichism, or the worships of stones, plants, and animals.

iii. A third was to venerate spirits as gods. These were invisible genii or powers, of good or evil omen, who were supposed to people the universe.

iv. Even the division of the human race into nations was a cause of the multiplication of Gods. Every nation wished to have its own God, whom it held superior to that of any other nation; and if it was conquered it attributed the misfortune to the enemy's God.

From the division and multitude of Gods a new step was made: (*a*) to anthropomorphism—by giving human nature, a human body, and human passions to the Gods; (*b*) to mythology—by inventing stories more or less immoral about the Gods; and (*c*) to idolatry—by a belief that statues and images were Gods, or at least animated by the divinity—thus identifying nature with God.[2]

Although disfigured in a thousand ways, yet the idea of the supernatural has always predominated among men.

Attempts to raise up paganism again were made by philosophers

[1] Polidori, *Corso di Religione*, Rome, 1901, p. 47.

[2] *Ibid*, pp. 48-9.—"The sensual nature of man, which inclines towards material things; servility towards the powerful of the world: an excess of affection towards departed relations and friends, whose memory was perpetuated by images; in fine, the wicked spirit, who endeavoured to deprive God of the worship due to Him—such were the immediate causes of attributing divine perfections to natural objects, to heroes, to images, and at last to demons. Thus were born the various forms of idolatry."—Wilmers

and the founders of false positive religions. But they profited little or nothing, either through the want of religious doctrines truly sound and certain, or through want of authority to impose them on minds and hearts. Christianity alone could lead the peoples anew to true monotheism, because it alone has doctrines truly certain, and sanctioned by an authority that comes from above.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THERE IS ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION.

He who scarcely understands what religion means readily understands that the true religion can be only one.

i. In point of fact, if religion consists in knowing and professing our dependence on God, as God is one, human nature one, our dependence on God one, so religion ought also to be one and only one.

ii. And truly, if God is the God of all, and we are His creatures, it is evident that we have all the same duties towards God; therefore, the same religion.

iii. This religion ought to give due worship to God; but due worship must be one and only one, that in which God is recognised as the first beginning and last end of all things; therefore, the same conclusion as before.

iv. It is impious to suppose that truth and error can be equally pleasing to God, or that it can be a matter of indifference to Him whether He is adored Himself or one of His creatures, whether one only God is adored or many, &c.

This unity is understood, however, with regard to the substance of religion, or as recognising the same truths and practising the same duties, not as to the mode of expressing worship externally in rites and ceremonies.

As, then, from the beginning God raised man to the supernatural order and gave him a revealed religion, so the only true religion that began to exist in the world was not the natural, but the supernatural. The natural religion was, however, always included in the supernatural, as the less is included in the greater.

Many are the religious revelations that God has made to man—the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, the Christian—but we have not therefore so many revealed religions. They are only various phases of the same religion, all culminating, as regards their last form, in the Christian Catholic religion. This last is not *a* religion, but *the* religion—that is, the only true religion.

Is, therefore, everything false that is contained in other religions?

We must distinguish. All that is false in which other religions are opposed to the only true one, which is the Christian Catholic;

not false, but incomplete is all that in which the other religions agree with the Christian Catholic, either because they are derived from reason and the primitive revelation (as pagan religions), or because they are derived even from the Christian Catholic religion (as non-Catholic sects).

Cannot, therefore, men of other religions be saved?

To be saved in virtue of that by which such religions oppose themselves to the Christian Catholic, which is the only true one—no; to be saved in virtue of that by which such religions agree with the Christian Catholic—yes, if there is (*a*) invincible ignorance of the only true religion, (*b*) a supernatural faith in God and in His providence, and (*c*) at least some act of charity at the hour of death.[1]

But in these cases men of other religions already belong, as regards the soul, to the religion of Christ, either by an implicit adhesion to revealed truths, or by a desire of doing whatever is necessary to be saved: in which desire is implicitly contained

[1] God having destined all mankind for Himself as their last supernatural end, no one can be saved without a supernatural knowledge of God, which can be obtained only by means of revelation, and without a consequent divine supernatural love, which can be had only by means of grace. But how are we to speak of revelation and grace outside the only revealed and supernatural religion? Some think that that part of faith necessary for salvation (namely, the existence of God and the divine sanction, admitted more or less clearly by unbelievers) may be considered as a remnant of the primitive revelation, transmitted from generation to generation. This, being joined to supernatural grace, which certainly God does not deny to unbelievers, can raise even them to the supernatural state, and make them worthy of supernatural happiness. But the doctrine more common, more clear, and more consonant to Catholic teaching is that of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas. When a man, he says, does on his side all that he can to know and accomplish what is good, we ought to hold for certain that God will come to his aid, either by internal inspirations or in other ways, and make known to him what is necessary to be saved, and will give him, at least at the point of death, the grace necessary to attain salvation.

Not a few modern apologists would wish that unbelievers who live honestly may be saved even without supernatural faith or grace, attaining that natural happiness which would have been proper to all mankind, if God had not destined us for a supernatural happiness. But this hypothesis, if regarded as one of fact, not of possibility, appears to us altogether improbable, because it is certain on the one hand that God destined all mankind for the supernatural, and on the other that "to him who does what lies in his power, God does not deny grace." Nor does it avail to make the comparison of children who die without baptism. They indeed, according to the common doctrine, are excluded from supernatural, but not from natural, beatitude. It does not avail, I say, because these children are incapable of the proper acts by which they might turn towards their end, and, departing out of this life, they do not carry with them any personal sin, but only original sin, which deprives them of the supernatural, but leaves intact all the rights of nature. Adults, instead, are capable of the proper acts by which they may direct themselves towards their end. Either, therefore, "they do what lies in their power" to direct themselves towards God as their last end, and then "God does not deny grace," by which they are raised to the supernatural; or they do not do "what lies in their power" to direct themselves to God, and then they become culpable, gravely culpable, in the sight of God, who justly denies supernatural grace.

the desire of belonging to the Church of Jesus Christ, if they really knew it as the only means of salvation. And thus it is true that everyone may be saved—may be saved in virtue of the Christian Catholic religion—out of which there is no salvation.

It is not true, therefore, that every religion is good. That religion alone is good which gives due worship to God and secures eternal salvation for man. But such is the only true religion revealed by God. Therefore, this alone is good.

It is not true that all religions ought to be respected. This means: "I do not believe any religion true; I regard them all as in some manner uncertain, or rather I do not care to concern myself about knowing which is the true religion."

A man may say: "From the moment that many religions exist, it is necessary that the followers of one should respect those of another." But it is one thing to respect the erring, another to respect errors (or false religions). The latter, and not the former, we reprove.

But ought not the opinions of all to be respected? And if, therefore, in the matter of religion, others think differently from us, ought we not to respect their opinions? He who speaks thus supposes that every religion is only an opinion—that is, a thing uncertain, a mode of feeling or thinking with individuals or peoples; and that no one has been able to demonstrate anything certain in the matter of religion, much less the existence of one only true religion. But this is false, as we have seen, and as we shall yet see more clearly in the sequel; and he who is in possession of the true religion, and knows beyond doubt that it is the only true one, certainly cannot consider other religions worthy of repect. It would be the same as to respect error. The expression, therefore, in order to have sense, must be changed to another—to respect the erring.

The same is to be said of another expression, "We must respect consciences." "It is true," writes a modern apologist, "that the heart of man is deep and hidden, so that no soul is sure of seeing all that is concealed in the folds of the conscience: God alone searches most clearly into its inmost lurking-places. Innumerable are the causes that influence us: character and disposition, education and habit, the society of those with whom we live, reading, external objects, with the thoughts and desires that spring from them; in fine, divine inspirations, and all the other aids that God gives us: who can tell how much is the responsibility of each one? Who can tell how far perfect liberty extends, or in what degree it is lessened, if not quite taken away? Only that God without whom nothing can exist, and on whose action all things depend, knows everything fully, even the least act that escapes our consciousness. He distinguishes most justly between that which hinders our liberty and that for which we must answer.

"In this sense, it is true, therefore, that we ought to respect

consciences—that is, it is not our business to judge them, to weigh their guilt, to say positively how far ignorance excuses them or bad faith condemns them. And this holds good chiefly as regards the religion in which anyone has been born and educated. Charity counsels us to excuse our brethren as much as possible; and even when sin is manifest, as in the case of an apostate from the Church, to look for some extenuating circumstances. But respect for consciences ought not to be turned into a denial of the truth, nor weaken the principles that ought to regulate life. Thus no consideration whatsoever should induce us to say that any religion outside of the Catholic is true, or has the virtue of saving him who professes it. . . . Finally, in another way it is said that we must respect consciences, inasmuch as they are not to be compelled by external violence to accept the truths of faith; because a religion is of no account if the will is not fixed in it and cannot be changed by force." [1]

CHAPTER XXVII.

RELIGION IS A DUTY FOR ALL.

This is a truth so evident that there would be no need to prove it if endeavours were not made to obscure it with a world of sophisms. To say that religion is a duty for all, means that all ought to recognise and acknowledge their dependence on God. Now nothing can be more just on the part of the individual, or on the part of society.

1. *On the part of the Individual:—*

i. Because every man is a creature; therefore, he depends on God. But a rational and free creature; therefore, he ought to recognise with all his mind and profess with all his will the dependence that he has on God.

ii. It is a dictate of nature that service is due to a superior, gratitude to a benefactor, love to a father, honour to a king. But God is, in the highest sense, our Superior, our Benefactor, our Father, our King. Therefore, to Him we owe service, gratitude, love, honour.

iii. It is a duty of every man to attain the end for which he was created. But the last end of man is God, and the only means of attaining it is the practice of religion. Therefore, religion is a duty for every man.

iv. Hence religion is not only a duty, or rather the greatest of all duties, but it is also our interest, or rather the greatest of all our interests. Because (*a*) it alone provides efficaciously for the eternal destinies of our soul; (*b*) it alone makes us know and relish, even in the present life, those truths and supernatural

[1] Mattiussi, *Lezioni di apologetica.*

goods which have formed saints, and inspired the greatest geniuses and the most generous souls that the world has ever seen ; (*c*) it alone supports us, in the warfare and in the sacrifices of the present life, with the hope of eternal goods ; (*d*) it alone gives us a proper sense of life and points out the true basis of what is just and honourable in the fulfilment of all our duties ; [1] (*e*) it is that which above all ennobles sentiment, fortifies the will, purifies character, and consecrates all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is good, in the individual, in the family, and in society.

2. *On the part of Society :—*

i. Because society is only an assemblage of individuals. If, therefore, each and every individual should recognise and profess his dependence on God, society, which is made up of individuals, should also do so.

ii. Because society, as society, is from God. God made man naturally social, and He wishes that social order should be maintained by the authority emanating from Him. Therefore, society, as society, should recognise and profess its dependence on God.

iii. Because civil society ought to tend to the common temporal good, subordinated to the common spiritual and eternal good of its members. This implies a government or social administration subordinated to those moral and religious rules by which the present life is directed to the future.

iv. Because without religion there is wanting to civil society the basis of all authority and all moral obligation, as we have seen (p. 61). Hence, Plato said : " Ignorance of the true God is the greatest of calamities for a State, and he who overthrows religion, overthrows the basis of all human society" (*Laws*, x.). And Machiavelli himself in his *Treatise of the Prince* left written : " Where there is religion, every good is presupposed ; where it is wanting, every evil is presupposed. It is impossible that he who commands should be served as one who despises God. The Romans were great as long as they had the fear of God." On this subject the saying of Montesquieu is famous. Speaking of the Christian religion, he said : " A wonderful thing ! The Christian religion, which seems to have nothing in view but the happiness of the future life, makes the happiness of the present " (*De l'esprit des lois*, l. XXIV., c. 3).

v. The State, therefore, cannot hold itself indifferent with regard to religion. " There is no need to say that it has not the qualities to interfere in matters of worship and dogma, or to settle questions of theology. But no more has it the qualities to settle literary, scientific, philosophic, artistic questions ; and yet it

[1] " Religion is not only a living in God and with God, but also, and precisely for this reason, a revelation of the meaning and the responsibility of life. He who has lost religion discovers that without it he searches in vain for the meaning of life. He finds that without it the individual and humanity wander to no end and go to ruin." So says Harnack himself in his book on the Essence of Christianity, p. 42.

believes itself bound to protect, to encourage, to assist, to have taught at its expense, literature, the sciences, philosophy, and the fine arts. It would consider itself dishonest if it did not do so. Has it, therefore, less interest not to let religious ideas perish within its bosom? Are the noble virtues that such ideas awake in the human heart—charity, resignation, filial piety, faith in eternal justice—are they, therefore, a minor force, things less worthy of respect than the study of chemistry, physics, comparative grammar, logic, painting, sculpture?" [1]

The maxim, "Religion matters little, it is enough to be honest," is therefore radically absurd and impious. To be honest, it is necessary to begin by fulfilling one's duty towards God. This cannot be done without knowing the duty; and there will be no use in knowing the duty without practising it.[2]

It is not true that religion is only "a private affair." It is a private and a public affair at the same time; or, rather, it is the great affair, to which all the other affairs of the present life ought to be subservient. Is not man bound to recognise and to profess his dependence on God and on the divine laws in all his conduct, private or public, internal or external? And if this is true of religion in general, will it not be still more true of the Christian religion, which has laws and precepts for all the social life? As it is evident that God made us to know His will, His laws, His commands, we cannot prescind in our life from these laws or commands. Can a citizen withdraw from the civil laws? Similarly, we cannot withdraw in our life, whether private or public, from moral and religious laws.

It is not true that religion is at most necessary for the people, but not for the educated or governing classes. Religion is necessary for all, because all ought to recognise and to profess their dependence on God, and to live according to the moral and religious dictates of the divine law. To consider religion as only an instrument of education for the people, and to believe that instruction more or less scientific can be substituted for it in the

[1] M. Franck, Member of the Institute of France, *Des rapports de la Religion et de l'Etat. Introd.*

A modern writer asks the question, "Is an unbeliever who lives honestly to be preferred to a believer who lives dishonestly?" The question is ill put; because the believer (we mean the Christian Catholic believer) cannot be dishonest as a believer but inasmuch as he goes contrary to his belief, and the unbeliever cannot be honest as an unbeliever but inasmuch as he goes contrary to his unbelief, and practically follows the rules of justice and honesty, which certainly are not commanded by his unbelief. In other words, neither the dishonesty of the former arises from his belief, nor the honesty of the latter from his unbelief. The comparison is therefore reduced to a question of fact—namely, "Which is better, honesty or dishonesty?" As for the question of law, or the cause of the fact, it is evident that the practice of the true religion cannot allow anything but just and honest living, while the practice of unbelief leads to the banishment of all justice and honesty.—See *Ultima Critica*, by A. Franchi, Vol. II., n. 307.

upper classes, is to suppose that God and the future life are not true things for all. But if God and the future life exist for all, religion is likewise necessary for all.

It is not true, consequently, that religion is a means to keep the people enslaved for the benefit of the upper classes. Religion requires only that all should recognise and profess their dependence on God, subordinating the interests of the present life to those of the future. But it hinders none from vindicating their own rights, provided those of others are respected. If religion were fully recognised and practised in society, all rights would likewise be recognised and protected, as all duties would be guaranteed.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OBLIGATION OF KNOWING WHICH IS THE TRUE RELIGION.

If religion is obligatory on all, and there is only one true religion, it is a duty on all to ascertain which is the true one among the many that exist.

To be indifferent about religion is a thing injurious to God and ruinous to man :—

i. *Injurious to God.*—Because it either denies all worship to God (absolute indifferentism), or it supposes that a true and a false worship can be equally pleasing to God (relative indifferentism).

ii. *Ruinous to Man.*—Because it is on the practice of religious duties that the final destiny of man depends. To show how irrational is the conduct of the indifferent man with regard to religion, let us quote the words that Pascal puts on his lips :—

"I know not who has placed me in this world, nor what this world is, nor what I am myself ; I am in a fearful ignorance about each one of these things. . . . All that I know is that I must die, but what is still more hidden from me is this death, which I cannot escape. As I know not whence I come, so I know not whither I go : this alone is known to me, that, when I leave this world, I shall fall for ever into nothingness or into the hands of an offended God, without knowing which of these two eternal conditions will be mine. Behold how my state is full of weakness, darkness, and wretchedness.

"And from all this I conclude that I ought to pass all the days of my life without thinking of what is to happen to me in the future, and that I have only to follow my inclinations, without reflecting further or disquieting myself—doing all that is needed to be condemned to eternal misery, in case that what people tell me is true. Possibly I might find some ray of light in my doubts, but I do not care to take the trouble. . . . I wish to make trial of the most tremendous event without anxiety or fear, and to go

quietly to death in the uncertainty of my future destiny" (*Thoughts*, c. 1).

Certainly, Divine Providence never fails even those who are outside the true religion, when this does not happen knowingly and willingly. St. Paul informs us that God judges everyone according to his knowledge and conscience (Rom. ii., 12–14). Hence, it is certain that He will never condemn those who have lived according to their knowledge and conscience. But he who remains knowingly and willingly outside the true religion—that is, he who, being able to know the true religion, does not concern himself about it, or, having known it, does not embrace it, he certainly cannot hope in Divine Providence, because he does not act according to his knowledge or according to his conscience.

The duty, however, of searching out which is the true religion regards only those who are ignorant or doubtful of the true religion, not those who are already in peaceful possession of the truth.

CHAPTER XXIX.

IF IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A REVIEW OF ALL RELIGIONS, IN ORDER TO KNOW WHICH IS THE TRUE ONE.

The various religions existing on the face of the earth may be reduced to two classes: those which are called "natural," and those which are called "revealed."

The name "natural religion" is given to the knowledge of religious truths regarding God, the soul, the future life—and consequently the duties that arise from them—obtained by means of our reason.

The name "revealed religion" is given to the knowledge of religious truths, and the consequent duties that arise from them, obtained by means of some one miraculously sent by God to reveal them to mankind.

Will it therefore be necessary to make a review of all the different religions—those which are said to be "natural" and those which are said to be "revealed"—in order to know which is the true one?

If this were so, the greater part of mankind would find it impossible to know the true religion. Therefore, things go otherwise. In point of fact, as regards natural or not-revealed religions, two observations suffice.

i. It is a fact historically certain that men, left to themselves, have known very few religious truths—and even these wrapped up in errors and uncertainties—so that the greatest masters of antiquity have disagreed on the most essential questions.[1] Nor

[1] With the exception of the Hebrew people, among whom God always kept His word alive, we see all the peoples of antiquity gradually withdrawing from the primitive revelation, and plunging into the most monstrous

would these defects of pagan antiquity have disappeared with progress and civilisation, because they are defects that come from a cause inherent to our nature, which is the same at all times, as the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas, shows.[1] Therefore, without a special aid on the part of God men are morally powerless to know for certain and without mixture of error all religious truths even of the natural order. And since Divine Providence never fails in necessary things, this powerlessness is an indirect argument that makes us suspect the existence of any such revelation.[2]

ii. Even though all men were united to know all natural religion, and to know it with full certainty and without mixture of error, it is certain, nevertheless, that this would cease to be the true religion, if God Himself revealed and taught the religion that men should practise. So much the more as God could destine man for an end far more elevated than that which by nature suffices for him, and supply him with the means necessary to attain it. In this case, a divine revelation would be not only morally but absolutely necessary, that man might know the new end for which he was destined, and the means of which he should make use to attain it.

It remains, therefore, to see if this religion truly exists. If it exists, we need no longer concern ourselves about others. It alone is the only true one.

Now, two general facts convince us that such a revealed religion exists: (*a*) the moral inability of the human race to know all religious truths of the natural order itself without a divine revelation, and (*b*) the general conviction of peoples that God has really made this revelation.

But as many religions are said to be "revealed," and nearly all the founders of positive religions (Zoroaster, Confucius, Mahomet, &c.) boasted that they were messengers of God, and pretended that they had divine revelations, it remains for us to know which, in fact, is the true one. Since not all religions that

errors with regard to religion. And even at the present day, in places where Christianity has not yet spread, or from which it has been banished, we find the same phenomenon. As much may be said of the wise men that lived without revelation. What aberrations, even in the philosophic schools, about the most important problems of religion and morals! Nearly all maintained the eternity of the world, or at least of matter. Some made God corporeal; others made Him spiritual, but subject to fate. Not a few made Him the soul of the universe, and others directly denied the existence of God or of a future life. And do we not see modern thinkers, who wish to settle the greatest problems of life independently of faith, renew the errors of the ancients?

[1] Contra Gent., lib. I., c. 4.

[2] I have said "makes us suspect": because from the moral powerlessness of man to know all natural religion, it would only follow that a further intervention of God would be necessary, which might very well happen within the limits of the natural order. But, since, in fact, this natural provision does not exist, we may justly conclude that God must have assisted the moral powerlessness of our reason in a supernatural manner.

are called " revealed " can be such, some being opposed to others, while it is certain that God cannot reveal contrary things. We require, therefore, some criteria or signs to judge which is the religion revealed by God.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE CRITERIA OR SIGNS BY WHICH WE MAY KNOW IF A REVEALED RELIGION EXISTS.

Man could not believe in a divine religion if he were not first certain that God has spoken, nor could God require faith from man if He did not first make known to him with certainty that He has truly spoken. Proofs are therefore necessary. It is absurd to suppose that God spoke, and then took no care that His word should be known and believed, or did not give man the means necessary to know for certain what is truly the word of God. If, therefore, anyone would present himself as an envoy from God to found a religion, he should first of all show his credentials, with signs proving him to have been truly sent by God for this purpose.

These proofs, certifying that God has spoken to men, are called motives of credibility. They are of two kinds.

Some are of a character rather negative, and they show us that the religion to which such signs are wanting cannot be revealed. These are: that the things revealed should be conformable, or at least not repugnant, to the dictates of reason—should not be unworthy of God—should not be historically false; and that he who says he has been sent by God should be of edifying morals, such as become a messenger of the Lord. A religion that would fail in these requisites, and contain something absurd or immoral, certainly could not be revealed by God.

It is, however, easy to understand that this criterion is not adapted for all, and is not by itself sufficient even for the learned. (*a*) *Not adapted for all:* because few are capable of perceiving a conformity or a repugnance between religious teachings and the dictates of reason. (*b*) *Not by itself sufficient even for the learned:* because the conformity or the repugnance between a religious doctrine and the principles of our reason proves at most that this doctrine may have been revealed, not that it has actually been so, since it may have come from teaching purely human and natural. By this criterion, moreover, supernatural mysteries would be excluded or compromised.

Other criteria, of a positive character, are therefore needed, which may not only show us that a religious doctrine has no repugnance with the principles of reason, but that in fact it has been truly revealed. These positive criteria may be internal or external. (*a*) *Internal*—are those taken from the sublimity, ex-

cellence, or transcendency of the revealed doctrines. This characteristic cannot be wanting to revealed doctrines, but all are not capable of perceiving it. (*b*) *External*—are those supernatural and sensible facts that accompany the divine revelation, as a proof or testimony of its divine origin. These are miracles and prophecies, by means of which God assures us that the doctrine in confirmation of which they are given is truly His, or divinely revealed.

Only these last criteria, as everyone sees, are accessible to all, and prove with certainty that the doctrine offering them is truly divine, and therefore revealed. Because, as miracles and prophecies cannot come from any other source than God, if there is a religion confirmed by true miracles and true prophecies, it must be divine, or divinely revealed.[1]

These criteria besides, more than all others, correspond to the exigencies of criticism itself. If revelation exists, it is a fact, and as such ought to be proved by historical evidence and arguments of fact. As an extraordinary and supernatural fact, it ought to be proved by other facts likewise extraordinary and supernatural. And such precisely are miracles and prophecies.[2]

Applying now these criteria or signs, it is at once seen that outside the Hebrew-Christian religion, which begins with the first man, no other religion can be called "revealed" :—

i. Because not one of the founders of other religions presents positive external signs (miracles and prophecies), historically certain and unquestionable, proving his mission from God.

[1] "Oportuit aliquibus indiciis confirmari praedicantium sermonem quibus manifeste ostenderetur hujusmodi sermonem processisse a Deo dum praedicantes talia operarentur (sanando infirmos et alias virtutes operando) quae non posset facere nisi Deus. Unde Dominus, discipulos ad praedicandum mittens, dixit: *Infirmos curate, mortuous suscitate, leprosos mundate, dæmones ejicite* (Matt. x. 8) *et dicitur: Illi autem profecti, praedicaverunt ubique, Domino cooperante, et sermonem confirmante, sequentibus signis* (Marc. xvi. 20)."—S. Thomas, C. G., lib. III., cap. 154.

[2] This doctrine, although it is Catholic, no longer pleases certain apologists, especially those of voluntarism and psychological immanence, who deny to human reason the power of demonstrating with certainty the existence of God and the fact of revelation. They would wish instead to demonstrate the divinity of our religion only from the psychological side, showing that it corresponds to all the wants of the soul. But this is a mistaken doctrine. The agreement of the Christian religion with the wants of the soul is indeed an indication of its divine origin, but only when the existence of God and the historical fact of revelation are already demonstrated; because then, relying on our idea of the divine wisdom, which does all things in an orderly way, we can consider that correspondence as a sign of truth. But for him who holds that the existence of God and the historical fact of revelation are neither demonstrated nor demonstrable, that agreement is of little account: it expresses only the subjective phenomenon of a religion conformable to our nature, without knowing whether this religion is true or false. On this point it will be useful to recall a canon of the Vatican Council: "If anyone shall say that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore men ought to be led to faith by internal experience or private inspiration alone, let him be anathema."—On Faith, can. 3.

ii. Because the doctrines professed by other religions want even negative criteria and signs—teaching many things contrary to the dictates of reason, to moral laws, to the dignity of God—as may be seen in the religions of Mahomet, Buddha, Confucius, &c.

iii. Because all these religions are opposed to the Christian religion ; and, it being once proved that this religion is divine, and that Jesus Christ was truly sent by God, or rather was the natural Son of God, it is thereby demonstrated that this is the only religion revealed by God.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE PREJUDICES OF UNBELIEVERS.

But on this point the unbelievers raise a question prejudicial to the criteria and signs given by us for knowing the revealed religion.

i. Some deny even the possibility of revelations, miracles, or prophecies. They refuse all inquiry on the question of fact, simply because they hold supernatural facts themselves impossible. "Among us," writes Harnack, "it is beyond discussion that whatever happens in space or in time obeys the general laws of motion, and that, consequently, miracles, if they are regarded as an infraction of the natural law, are impossible." "Without doubt," he adds, "wonderful facts have happened and will always happen, but true miracles—no, never."

ii. Others, instead, do not deny the possibility, but the demonstrability, of these facts. Admitting even the reality of supernatural facts, they say, we shall now have to verify and establish them. To do so, we should be acquainted with all the forces and laws of nature. "But who," says Harnack, "has known how to fix limits for the possible and the real ? Who can tell how far the action of soul on soul reaches, or of soul on body ? No one." Therefore, we shall always find ourselves in the impossibility of distinguishing supernatural facts from natural ones. That fact which we believe to be supernatural or miraculous, may be a natural effect of natural forces hidden from us.

iii. In fine, there are others who do not deny the possibility or the demonstrability of supernatural facts, but only their existence. They say that the supernatural is not historically admissible because it has not been proved by any fact ; that such facts as have been believed up to the present have not been able to stand the test of criticism ; that if there is anything inexplicable about them it will be cleared up in time, as has happened in so many other cases ; that, in short, we ought to hold for certain that everything over and above what is natural is only that legendary element which criticism should eliminate, if we want to find historical truth and the reality of facts.[1]

[1] "To have a little order and clearness (in errors about the miraculous), because they are very numerous and confused, they might be distributed

As we see, the criticism of the unbelievers is reduced to a systematic and *a priori* denial of the supernatural.

i. The existence of any supernatural effect is disregarded, as a basis for the prejudice that no effects are possible outside of those which nature gives. This is the thought of those who hypocritically say: "We do not deny that supernatural facts are possible; we only deny that they exist." As also of those who say: "We do not deny the possibility or the existence of supernatural facts; we only deny that they can be verified, or distinguished from natural ones."

We have said that such language is hypocritical; because the men who use it are precisely those who, in presence of facts evidently superior to all the forces and laws of nature, lay down the maxim that we ought "to reduce those facts to their natural proportions," and consider as legendary everything in which they exceed the natural order. And this means that they reject *a priori* all supernatural facts, without any examination of their historical certainty, because they do not believe them even possible.

ii. Impossibility is the logical consequence of their principles. Not admitting God, or not recognising Him as distinct from the universe, they should necessarily deny the possibility of supernatural facts. If a cause superior to all nature does not exist, we certainly cannot imagine effects superior to nature.

Having already demonstrated against unbelievers the existence of God, we might now pay no attention to their sophisms; because once the existence of God is admitted, the possibility of revelations, miracles, or prophecies can no longer be denied. We might even cut short all their paralogisms, and come to the question of fact, showing the existence of supernatural facts: if they exist, they were certainly possible. But that it may not be said that we shun their arguments, we will touch on each question briefly, so as to reply to their sophisms.

iii. Once for all we ought, however, to take notice that the question of miracles, or of the supernatural, is not an indifferent thing, as Harnack says, but a thing of supreme and decisive importance. We examine if he who said that he was sent by God, or rather that he was God Himself, has or has not proved that he was such, by works that God alone could perform.

"It is of great importance not to forget," says Harnack, "that Jesus never gave to His own miracles that decisive value which

into four groups. For some the miracle is only a lie or an imposture. For others it is only a silly story, due to the popular imagination. For others, again, it would be an illusion caused by a disturbance in the nervous system: there are individual and collective hallucinations—pretended testimonies of things believed to have been seen or heard, but which were neither seen nor heard. For others, in fine, the miracle would be a wonderful fact, but all the while natural, due to causes that are not known by the learned of to-day, but will be discovered by the learned of to-morrow."—Farges, *L'idée de Dieu*, &c., pp. 533-4.

the evangelist Mark and others attribute to them. . . . His opinion on this point must have been quite different from that of His evangelists."

Now, this language in the mouth of a critic like Harnack is, to say the least of it, strange. "We know the thought of Jesus," as Polidori justly observes, "from what the evangelists relate: because His words and thoughts were not consigned to a phonograph, nor transmitted to us independently of the evangelists. How, then, can any one appeal to the opinion of Jesus, as differing from the writers of His words? And then Jesus appeals again and again to His miracles, as works that prove His mission from God. If He said once to His enemies, *Unless you see signs and wonders you believe not*, it was only to reproach them with their excessive pretensions and insatiable demands, because they always required new proofs, and made no account of those already given."[1]

And now for a brief answer to each point.

CHAPTER XXXII.

REVELATION.

The immediate manifestation of any truth made by God to man is called a divine revelation.

Whoever admits the existence of God certainly cannot deny the possibility of revelation, because he cannot deny to God that which is possible to man. But man can communicate his thoughts and wishes to others. Therefore, much more God, who has all nature in His power, and can act immediately on our mind.

"That God, a pure spirit," writes A. Franchi, "has a mode of communicating His thought to man, the various schools and sects of atheists may deny, but whoever admits the existence of God, the Creator and Legislator of the whole world, will have no difficulty in admitting it. God, a most simple and most pure spirit, can give thought and speech to man; He can establish psychological laws by which man thinks, and physiological laws by which man speaks; and can He not avail Himself of these same laws to manifest mentally or vocally to man whatever He wishes to reveal? All modes and means of action and communication between sensitive or intellective natures—internal and external, direct and indirect, immediate and mediate, physical and metaphysical—are ordained and regulated by God. Of all, therefore, He can avail Himself when He wishes and as He wishes, to communicate with man. He can do so internally, for example, by raising ideas in the intellect or images in the imagination (inspirations, visions); and He can do so externally, for example,

[1] *La Nuova Apologia*, &c., Rome, 1905, p. 292

by producing visible figures or audible sounds (apparitions, admonitions, &c.)." [1]

Our opponents say :—" Revelation, whether immediate (that which God makes immediately to prophets and apostles), or mediate (that which comes to us through other men), can never be certain. Not the former : because man can palm off as divine revelations the dreams of his fancy, his illusions, perhaps even his hypnotic or demoniacal suggestions. Not the latter : because knowledge that is transmitted from one to another, even though true in its origin, is always altered in such manner as to end in a foolish story."

But the answer is easy. If man can reveal with certainty his thoughts to another, either immediately or mediately, much more can God do so ; for He has all nature at His disposal, and certainly He is in no want of means to assure those to whom He directly communicates His thoughts, or those to whom they will come indirectly. Both kinds of revelation, when God is their author, always bear the seal of the divinity—that is, they are accompanied by supernatural facts ; and this suffices to certify that we have the words of God, not those of men.

There is no need, then, to make much account of the pretended inconvenience of revelation on the part of God, as if He abased Himself too much by speaking to man.

Nor is there any need to regard a pretended repugnance on the part of man, " because any submission to revealed dogma would be an abdication of the sacred rights of reason." If reason is made for truth, it does not abdicate, but exercises its rights, by welcoming truth, wherever found. And if it is not repugnant for one man to be instructed by another, much less is it to be instructed by God.[2] Rather, considering the powerlessness that we have mentioned above, this revealed instruction becomes necessary and obligatory for all.

" But God," it is said, " has given reason to man in order that it may serve him in acquiring a knowledge of the truth. This, therefore, ought to be his guide. Nor can God substitute His own reason for that of man, without contradicting Himself."

And we answer that man does make use of reason even in acquiring a knowledge of revealed truth. But it is one thing to employ reason in acquiring a knowledge of the true, another to limit this knowledge to the truths found by it. Poor we, in the latter case : we should be for ever babies ! Always, therefore, our reason is the guide or the proximate rule of our operations ; but not always does that which it finds serve as a guide or a rule.

[1] *Ultima Critica*, n. 670.

[2] " Deplorable blindness ! If a man instructs me, he will have gratitude from me as from a son . . . and so much the greater shall I esteem the benefit as the subjects on which he instructs me are more abstruse. Only with God is ignorance an honour for me, knowledge a humiliation, instruction an outrage ! "—Taparelli, *Saggio*, &c., n. 241.

And as there is no contradiction between the reason of a master and that of his scholar, because one helps the other, so it is with the divine and the human reason in the matter of revelation.

A word, however, that in revelation sounds more harsh to unbelievers is "mystery."

Now we say that revelation may be impugned in any one of three ways: because mysteries do not exist, or because they cannot be revealed, or because their revelation would be useless and inconvenient.

i. To say that in God there are no mysteries—that is, secrets which man cannot know unless God reveals them—is an absurdity. If there are so many mysteries in nature, which is a work of God, why should there be none in God, who immensely exceeds all created works?

ii. To say that God cannot reveal mysteries, because, they being truths superior to human reason, He cannot make man understand them, is an equivocation. It is one matter to know the existence of a thing, another to know how it exists. Now revelation makes known to us the *existence*, not the *how*, of a mystery. "The deists,"[1] as Taparelli very justly observes, "confound the incomprehensibility of the mystery with the incomprehensibility of the terms. A peasant, to whom a geometrician proposes the celebrated theorem of Pythagoras, will not understand *how*, in a right-angled triangle, the squares of the sides containing the right angle are equal to the square of the hypotenuse, but he will understand very well the meaning of *equal* and the meaning of *square*. Thus, when the mystery of the *Trinity* is proposed to us, we know very well what *one* is, what *three* is, what *nature* is, what *person* is, because we continually make use of these words. The only thing incomprehensible to us is *a unity of nature* joined with *a trinity of persons*. But this incomprehensibility of the mystery, and the many objections with which unbelievers attack it, show that they understand the words. Otherwise, will they know what they are talking about, when they try to prove the mystery an impossibility?"[2]

iii. Granted, therefore, the destiny of man for the supernatural order, the revelation of mysteries is not only useful and convenient, but necessary. No one can tend towards that of which he knows nothing. If, therefore, God destined man for a supernatural end, He should make it known to him. Hence, mysteries.

[1] "The deists admit a supreme, infinite, personal Being, the organiser of the universe, but who does not act in this world except by means of general laws established at the beginning, and from which He can never exempt Himself, either because He has not the power to do so, or because the perfection of His wisdom forbids it."—De Broglie, *Religion*, &c., p. 75.

[2] *Op. cit.*, n. 240.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

MIRACLES.

We give the name "miracle" to any fact or sensible occurrence that exceeds all the forces and laws of created nature, and that, when we consider all the circumstances in which it happens, manifestly reveals an immediate and extraordinary intervention of the divine power.

There are many scientists of the present day who treat the word "miracle" with a contemptuous smile, unless it is employed to signify only a natural effect. Yet, admitting the existence of God, the possibility of miracles must be granted :—

i. Because nobody can deny that God has a power superior to that of all nature. Therefore, He can produce effects of which natural forces are not capable.

ii. Nobody can deny that the forces and laws of nature depend on God, who originated them. Therefore, He can interrupt the course of natural forces, or suspend the constancy of their laws, thus performing a miracle.[1]

iii. Nor does He thereby contradict Himself, as if the miracle implied a change of the decree by which the divine will had established the constancy of natural laws; because with that very act by which God from all eternity had established the constancy of physical laws, He had also established particular exceptions that would occur. The miracle therefore does not change, but fulfils the divine decree.

iv. Nor can it be said that it goes against His wisdom, as if He showed by a miracle that His work had need of being retouched. God has no need of retouching His work, but of showing that He is absolute Master of His work. "Scarcely any man," says St Augustine, "now considers the stupendous wonders contained in a little grain of seed. Well, the mercy of God holds miracles in reserve, to be performed at an opportune time outside the common order of nature, so that those for whom daily wonders have lost all value may feel themselves moved, on seeing things not greater, but unusual. It is indeed a greater miracle to govern the whole world than to feed five thousand persons with five loaves. Yet nobody wonders at the former, while the latter is greatly wondered at, not because it is greater, but because it is rarer." [2]

[1] "There is no artisan that has not the faculty of modifying his work; no legislator that has not the power of derogating from his law: should not the same freedom be allowed to God, who is the Author and Ruler of the universe?" (*Ultima Critica*, n. 698). Accordingly, Rousseau himself, in reply to the question, "Can God perform miracles—that is, derogate from the laws that He has Himself established?" says, "Such a question, seriously proposed, would be impious, if it were not absurd. To punish him who would answer it negatively would be doing him too much honour. It would be enough to silence him."—*Lettres de la Montague*, let. 111.

[2] Tract. XXIV. in Joan.

Others say :—" The possibility of a miracle is admitted. But the possibility is one thing, the existence another. What is properly the question in our days is not at all the possibility of miracles, but the impossibility of verifying or proving them. Because no one, it is said, can ever with certainty distinguish supernatural from natural facts."

Of the existence of supernatural facts, we shall treat in the sequel (Chapter XXXV.). Here we say only that to verify the existence of a miracle two things ought to be known : its historical truth—that is, that the fact really occurred ; and its supernatural character—that is, that the fact undoubtedly exceeds all the forces and laws of nature. Now, both we can know with certainty. Therefore, miracles, if they actually exist, are knowable.

i. As for the historical truth of the miracle, it, being a sensible fact, can be verified as all other facts are verified—that is to say, either by means of our senses, if we were immediate witnesses of it, or by the testimony of others who were witnesses of it. This testimony, if it holds good for facts in general, ought to hold good with greater reason for extraordinary facts, which engage much more the attention of spectators, and make them diligent in observing the least circumstances.

ii. As for the supernatural character of the fact, there are cases in which the slightest reflection proves with full evidence that the verified phenomenon exceeds all the laws of nature, for example, in the cure of the man born blind ; while there are others in which it is evident that the phenomenon was not produced by the use of any force, for example, the resurrection of Lazarus. In these cases we need not be scientists to assert that the fact is of divine origin. We have said " in these cases," because we do not pretend that all facts that pass for miracles are really such.

We admit also that many times it becomes very difficult to form a safe judgment on certain facts, whether they are true miracles or not. It is then that the rules of theology intervene, above all those masterly ones drawn up by Benedict XIV. in his celebrated work *De Beatificatione Sanctorum*, to guide our judgment. It is then also that we must have recourse, as Rénan wished, to the most competent scientists and the most experienced critics. But if we are concerned with the miracles of the Gospel, or with others recognised as true by the Church, there can be no thought of doubt.

Let us hear, however, the chief difficulties of our opponents[1]:—

1. A miraculous fact cannot be distinguished from a natural

[1] A professor of the Sorbonne, Gabriel Séailles, published in 1903 a work entitled *Les affirmations de la conscience moderne*, in which, as a representative of the unbelieving world, he affirms that dogmas are dead and will never rise again, because they are founded on a science now grown old, and even dead—that of a will creating and operating in the world with laws and with exceptions thereto (miracles). But Sortais lately answered him with

one, unless all the forces and laws of nature are first known. Otherwise, the presumed miracle might be an effect of natural forces hidden from us. How many facts that once were believed miraculous are to-day explained naturally! Thus it will happen hereafter with all those which have not yet found a sufficient explanation.

i. It is quite true that we are ignorant of the precise limits that natural forces can reach, but we know with certainty a point that they cannot reach; for example, to raise a dead man to life. And this suffices to distinguish miraculous facts from natural ones.

ii. In many cases a miracle is produced solely by a command of the will; and then it is evident that there is no employment of any natural force.

iii. And even though we admit with unbelievers that miracles ought to be attributed to occult forces of nature, the miracle will not be denied, but displaced; because it would be necessary to grant to the miracle-worker, who often does not know the alphabet, such knowledge of the forces and laws of nature as was never given to any mortal.

iv. Moreover, it is certain that every natural force, in order to act, should be applied and determined to that particular effect which is to be obtained. Now how is that to be done, if there is question of occult forces? How, if the wonder-worker uses only the command of His will?

v. Even without knowing all the forces and laws of nature, "when a law is established as essential to the nature of anything,

another work, *La Providence et le miracle devant la science moderne* (Saint Amand, Tip. Bussiére, 1905), in which he refutes all the statements of his adversary. Séailles appeals to the "new science," and Sortais shows him (since science does not exist outside the circle of scientists) that all the founders of modern, natural sciences, according to their various branches, were believers—Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Leibnitz, Laplace, Newton, Volta, Faraday, Pasteur, and others. Driven out of that corner, Séailles, passing from physical sciences to metaphysics, asserts the impossibility of a miracle, considering the strict laws that govern the world. And then Sortais proves to him, with statistics in hand, how even in that he does not represent very well the unbelieving metaphysicians, because if some of them, and very few, affirm a miracle to be impossible, others in greater number say only that it cannot be verified. Taking his stand next on the ground of his adversary, who denies the possibility of a miracle, "because, granting the possibility that laws change, science would cease," Sortais shows the frivolousness of this argument. A miracle, he argues, precisely because it is a derogation from the physical order, supposes the constancy of that order; nor is the derogation continual and from all the forces and laws of nature, but momentary, and with respect to particular effects: which does not at all injure science. Thus, if, at the voice of a thaumaturgus, a sick man recovers his health, or a dead man comes forth from his tomb, the law is not at all taken away hereby that nature should follow its ordinary course, and men remain subject to sickness and death. In fine, against the last difficulty of Séailles, that "a miracle is unworthy of the wisdom of God, being a violation of law," Sortais demonstrates that a miracle is the execution of a law superior to ordinary laws, and enters therefore into the integral order of the world, conformably to the thought of St. Augustine already pointed out by us.

there is no longer any reason to fear that a contrary law will ever be substituted for it. Otherwise, it would be supposed that nature could contradict itself—that is, destroy itself. As no scientist will ever come to doubt that in nature there can be any latent or occult law contrary to the laws of mechanics, no one will hesitate to assert, conformably to all the laws of nature, that every body has extension, weight, divisibility, &c., and to declare that if a body should cease, for example, to be subject to the law of gravity, this would be a fact outside and above and against all natural laws." [1]

vi. Rightly, therefore, does Monsabrè argue thus against the opponents of the miraculous :—" You find out unknown laws, because a miracle seems to you an irregularity, because it disturbs the universal order, and because, you say, antinomies must not be admitted in the harmonious work of the Creator. But do you not see that you yourselves cause these antinomies, that you introduce confusion among laws, and that nature thus becomes an abyss of contradictions ? Because, a miracle being in opposition to a series of universal and constant phenomena, evidently the law that governs these phenomena will be in contradiction with that which regulates the miracle. The world, like Rebecca, will have war in its womb. Then, no longer any confidence in what we call established laws, because they can prove false between to-day and to-morrow. Who can tell but that the sun, whose light we have every day, will not give it to-morrow, in virtue of some unknown law ? Who can tell if the bread that we eat to-day as nutritious may not, in virtue of some unknown law, become poisonous to-morrow ? Say the same of all laws and all phenomena. Confidence is banished from our heart, and we walk with continual anxiety, as in a wild region, where at every turn we meet the notice : *Caution, Traps set here for Wolves !*" [2]

vii. Behold why criticism and progress have caused false miracles to disappear—those which were believed true by the uneducated—but not the miracles wrought by Jesus Christ and His Saints.

2. All pretended miracles are to-day explained by magnetism, hypnotism, and spiritism.

Passing over the point that spiritism is not a natural but a preternatural fact,[3] we observe that in these cases there is always question of phenomena (*a*) limited to a certain order of things, (*b*) obtained through some determinate agency, and (*c*) often contrary to the moral order.

It is quite the opposite with miracles wrought by Christ and His Saints. Has it ever been heard of that hypnotism or spiritism succeeded in raising a man from the dead ?

[1] Franchi, *Ultima Critica*, n. 698.
[2] *Introduzione al dogma cattolico*, III., 97-98.
[3] See Prof. Antonelli, *Lo Spiritismo*, and Dr. Lapponi, *Ipnotismo*, &c.

3. According to Christian theology, even the devils can perform miracles. Therefore, miracles are not an exclusive sign of the divine interference, nor, in the concrete, will it ever be given us to know with certainty whether a miraculous fact comes from God or from the devil.

i. The devils cannot perform true miracles, because in their operations on corporeal nature they must conform to the forces and laws of nature. They can, however, do things that have all the external appearance of miracles.

ii. In these cases we have always moral criteria to distinguish true from false miracles.[1]

iii. For the rest, even the power of the devil is subject to Divine Providence, and we cannot fear that God will permit the devil to delude us in all those cases in which we do not know how to distinguish true from false miracles.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

PROPHECIES.

By prophecy is meant a certain prediction of a future free event that cannot be known in its causes, and is therefore unknown to all created intelligences; for example, the birth of Christ predicted many ages before in a precise manner with regard to time, place, persons, &c. Prophecy, therefore, should not be confounded with conjecture; nor the certain prediction of future free events with the certain prediction of events necessarily to happen, as, for example, the prediction of an eclipse.

It is evident that the predictions of an astronomer who announces an eclipse, or of a statesman who foresees a political change, are not prophecies, being deduced from natural causes, which can be known by man.

The mere definition shows that prophecy is also a kind of miracle (intellectual). God has given it as one of the chief and most authentic signs of divine revelation. Like the miracle, it serves admirably to distinguish and manifest the divinity of revelation; and it is also suited to all minds.

As for the possibility of prophecies, we may repeat the argument already made with regard to miracles—that is to say, granted the existence of God, the possibility of prophecy is also granted. No one can deny to God a foreknowledge of any future act, since He beholds at a single glance the past and the future, as we do the present. Hence, there is no people that has not attributed foreknowledge to God. But what God knows He can reveal, and the revelation of the free future is precisely what is called prophecy. Therefore, prophecy is possible.

[1] See Lépicier, *Del miracolo*, &c, Rome, 1901, pp. 186 *et seq.*

Of three things we ought to be certain, in order to know the existence of a prophecy :—

1. That the future event was really predicted, and was predicted in a clear and precise manner, with all the circumstances of time, place, &c., so that the prediction cannot be interpreted differently, or applied to any other event whatsoever.

2. That such event has really been accomplished in the manner predicted.

3. That such event, predicted and accomplished, was not naturally knowable, and has not happened by chance.

i. Now, the prediction of an event, if it exists, is a sensible fact, which can be ascertained like all other facts. For example, the prophecy of Daniel on the dispersion of the Hebrew people after the death of Christ is an historical fact registered in the books of this prophet, and everyone can be certain thereof by simply reading it.

ii. In the same manner, we can ascertain the accomplishment of the prophecy. If it exists, it is an historical fact like all the others. History and experience, for example, attest the accomplishment of the aforesaid prophecy of Daniel.

iii. Similarly, we can ascertain if the event predicted and accomplished was naturally knowable or not beforehand, considering the nature of events predicted and accomplished. Thus, the dispersion of the Hebrew people, foretold five hundred years before it happened, particularised in the most minute circumstances, and fully verified under our eyes, is a fact that could not be known by any created intelligence.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE EXISTENCE OF SUPERNATURAL FACTS IS UNDENIABLE.

Hitherto we have been engaged only in negative work. We have defended the possibility and the knowableness of supernatural facts. But do these facts really exist ?

There are many persons (as we have seen in Chap. XXXI.) who, although admitting their possibility and their knowableness, deny their existence. Now, it is to these that we direct our answer in the present and following chapters.

Before all we set out with a general observation. He who takes a look over the Old and the New Testament, or even over the History of the Church, cannot be mistaken about the existence of facts historically certain and undoubtedly supernatural.

The same hypotheses, put forward by unbelievers with a view of eliminating the supernatural, which presses by way of fact—hypotheses, which are multiplied every moment, and which contradict one another in turn, without ever attaining their purpose—are an indirect proof of it.

Even without entering into particular details, we have before us a fact so great and so unquestionable that it alone suffices to destroy all the sophisms of unbelievers. We mean the relation between the two Testaments.

It is well known that the Messianic prophecies are the foundation of Christianity, and the most splendid argument of its divine origin. If anyone undertakes to examine, even historically, the two Testaments, it is impossible that he should not be struck by two facts—namely, the fact of the Messianic idea, which prevails throughout the ancient world, and around which are clustered all the events of the Hebrew nation, and the fact of the Christian idea, which animates the Messianic kingdom, and prevails in the modern world. We have there the promise of the Messias, determined in its most minute circumstances of time, place, tribe, family, as well as an anticipated history of the life and works of the Messias; here we have the completion and execution of all that was there predicted from age to age. Thus Christianity, which exactly fulfils all the Messianic prophecies, shows the truth and the divinity of those predictions; and the Messianic prophecies, which have their fulfilment in Christianity, show the truth and the divinity of Christianity itself.

Hence those celebrated words of Bossuet:—"Let not the wicked hope to escape from God, because He lays on His Scripture such an impress and character of divine truth that nobody can ever deny it. This impress, this character, is the intimate relation that exists between the two Testaments. Nobody can deny that the Old Testament was written some ages before the New. Well, both have the same design and the same result: one foretells what the other shows fulfilled."[1]

This fact, unique in the history of peoples and religions, will constitute for all time the most crushing proof against incredulity. The enemies of the supernatural may forge sophisms as long as they will not believe the miracles of Moses, or those of Christ and His apostles. No matter; they will never be able to deny the existence of that promise and those prophecies, made centuries before Christianity appeared, and fully verified in Christianity itself. Let them take their stand before all the critics of the world: nobody can forget these facts, as nobody can explain them naturally.

Is there anything similar in all the other religions that are not Christian? And does not this alone suffice to demonstrate that Christianity is a fact essentially supernatural?

We do not intend hereby to entrench ourselves in the past, admitting the time for miracles to have ended, as our adversaries foolishly boast.

Certainly in the first days of the Church miracles were more numerous, because there was then question of founding a new

[1] *Universal History*, II., c. 3.

religion, and of convincing the ferocious persecutors of Christianity that that religion was truly divine which they wished to stifle in blood.[1]

But miracles have not ceased, even in our days, as the most antichristian criticism may test for itself in the processes of the Saints.[2]

It should suffice to remind unbelievers of the miracle of St. Januarius and the miracles of Lourdes, which happen before their eyes, and which are acknowledged by scientists themselves as critically unquestionable.

Everyone knows in what the miracle of St. Januarius consists, and how uselessly unbelievers have racked their brains to give a natural explanation of it. Dumas (the father), who in 1831 was present at the miracle, thus wrote from Naples to a Paris newspaper: "There is truly a miracle! The priests did not touch the vial, unless to carry it from the altar to be kissed by the bystanders, who kept their eyes fixed on it. The melting followed at the moment when the priest, having laid the vial on the table, retired from it about ten steps. Now let doubt rise up to deny and science to contradict. This is the fact that takes place in the sight of all, without mystery, without imposture, without contradiction. The philosophy of the eighteenth century and modern chemistry do not know what to say. Voltaire and Lavoisier wished to have a bite at that vial, but they found their teeth broken by it. . . . But might there not be a secret among the canons about the treasure, handed down from generation to generation, from the fourth century to us? This keeping of the secret would be more miraculous than the miracle itself. I, for my part, prefer to believe in the miracle, and I declare that I do believe in it."[3]

[1] "Haec (miracula) necessaria in exordio Ecclesiæ fuere. Ut enim fides cresceret, miraculis fuerat nutrienda, quia et nos cum arbusta plantamus, tamdiu eis aquam infundimus, quousque ea in terra convaluisse videamus; et si semel radicem fixerint, a rigando cessamus."—S. Greg. Mag., *Hom.* 29 *in Evang.*, n. 4.

[2] Daubenton, in his Life of St. Francis Regis, relates that, while the process of this Saint's canonisation was going on in Rome, a Prelate presented a paper on it to a Protestant. The latter read therein the miracles adduced, and, handing back the manuscript, said: "That is a Saint indeed! If all the miracles of the Roman Church were proved like those which I have just now read, I should not hesitate to become a Catholic." "Well, know this," replied the Prelate, "if other proofs cannot be adduced, Francis Regis will never be promoted to the honours of our altars." The Abbé Moigno, in his fine work, *Les Splendeurs de la Foi*, gives at full length the act of canonisation of St. Joseph Labre with a view to show how severely criticised in Rome are the miracles attributed to a Saint.

[3] The miracle of the boiling up of the blood of St. Januarius usually occurs three times a year—in May, in September, and in December. In May it begins on the first Saturday of the month, and is repeated for seven consecutive days. In September it occurs on the nineteenth day, the anniversary of the Saint's martyrdom, and is repeated till the twenty-sixth. In December it happens on the sixteenth day. At the same time, to make the phenomenon more remarkable, a stone that is preserved at

As for the miracles of Lourdes :—

1. It is known that Monsieur Emilius Artus offered a reward of 10,000 francs to anyone who, before a commission of scientists of the Institute of France, would succeed in proving false five of the miracles of Lourdes, related by Henry Lasserre. But no one up to the present has made the venture.

2. To anyone pretending to explain all the cures wrought at Lourdes by means of suggestion and imagination, Monsieur Bélean, of Marseilles, has opposed since 1895 the following challenge, addressed to Professor Bernheim of Nancy :—" Sir, In a scientific study lately published by you, I read that you, by suggestion, cure at Nancy the very same ailments that are cured at Lourdes. If so, I submit the following fact for your consideration. On the 14th of February, 1867, Peter Ruder seriously injured his leg by a fall from a tree. The bone was broken nine centimetres[1] below the knee, and, mark well, after eight years it was not yet whole. On the contrary, the two parts were three centimetres distant from each other, under a wound in a state of continual suppuration. Notwithstanding all this, Peter Ruder had himself taken to Lourdes on the 7th of April, 1875 ; and there the Blessed Virgin instantly cured him, solidifying the bone and cicatrising the wound. This is the simple statement that I oppose to your scientific declaration, for maintaining which it would be necessary that you should prove to me one of two things : either that the cure of Ruder was an ' invention,' or that you can produce similar cures in your hospital at Nancy. If you succeed in proving your assertion before the honourable tribunal that I proposed to Zola, I declare myself ready to pay any sum whatsoever that you please to fix, up to 100,000 francs. Let me know, therefore, the amount on which you decide, in order that I may lodge it as soon as possible with the notary, Monsieur Benet of Marseilles. I await your reply."

But no reply ever came, as no reply had come from Zola, challenged by him to prove the lies scattered about regarding the sojourn of Bernadetta at Batres.

3. Everybody knows that at Lourdes their is a medical office

Pozzuoli, spotted with the blood of the martyr, grows warm to a bright redness, as if by a current of sympathy. Is it a natural phenomenon ? Some deny even the fact, but without grounds, because all those who go to Naples on the days when the blood boils, can easily see it. Among the witnesses are recorded many princes and queens, who have left precious souvenirs at the shrine of the Saint. When, therefore, we read among the testimonies such names as those of Pico della Mirandola, Giambattista Vico, and the geologist Antonio Stoppani, we cannot do less than remain thoughtful. Has positive science been able to give a definitive sentence ? In 1902 a spectral analysis was made, various witnesses being present, among whom was Professor Januarius, of the University of Naples, and the spectral characteristic of blood was obtained. What next ?" . . . So speaks the *Corriere della sera*, referring to some recent remarks of Professor Peter Stoppani on the miracle of St. Januarius.

[1] The centimetre is equal to about two-fifths of an inch English.—*Trans.*

of verification and proof, instituted by Boissarie, and with which the most eminent medical men are connected. Nor is any cure that happens ever proclaimed miraculous until after it has been acknowledged such by competent authority.

4. It is precisely these men of science who have vindicated the supernatural character of those facts against the falsehoods, the travesties, and the ridiculous explanations of Zola in his disgraceful novel on Lourdes.[1]

CHAPTER XXXVI.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL VALUE OF THE DOCUMENTS ON WHICH WE RELY.

Revelations, miracles, and prophecies are specially contained in the writings of the *Bible*—a word of Greek origin meaning *book*, to denote that the Bible is the book of books. It consists of two principal parts.

The first contains the writings of the Old Testament,[2] in which we have the revelation made by God to the Patriarchs, to Moses, and to the Prophets, and also the history of the chosen people. In this revelation there are three things specially noteworthy: the creation of the world, the fall of man from the state in which God had placed him, and the promise of the future

[1] See Boissarie, *Les grandes Guérisons de Lourdes*, Paris, 1900. Also von Hostenberghe, Royer, and Deschamps, *Guérison d'une fracture*. This last book, which treats of the instantaneous cure of Peter Ruder, was translated into Italian by Dr. Costa, with a preface by Dr. Vandoni, Director of the Hospital "Amadeo Savoia" in Turin. Now, Dr. Vandoni in his preface speaks thus:—"There is no person who can with reason believe that anatomical lesions so serious as those attested in this work can be spontaneously and instantaneously cured in virtue of natural laws alone. Even abstracting from many scientific reasons, here set forth in a masterly style, such a belief would be in opposition to common sense. Nature proceeds by degrees, and the reconstruction of a tissue implies successive passages, for which a period of time proportioned to the effect is always required. This element is of indispensable necessity in the application of a natural law. Instantaneous reproduction of a tissue is inadmissible. Such being the fact, another element should enter as cause into these and similar cases: an element superior to natural laws—that is to say, a supernatural element."

[2] A testament is that last act of the will by which we dispose of our goods. In an analogous sense, the Scripture calls Testament that act of the will by which God disposes of His goods in our favour. Now, there are two acts of general disposal, so to speak, and therefore two testaments made by God in favour of man. The first regards the Hebrew people; the second, the Christian people. The first was concluded by the ministry of Moses and inaugurated with the blood of animals sacrificed; the second was concluded by the work of Christ and sealed with His blood. The first was temporary and transitory—that is, its scope was to keep the Hebrews together (for God had confided to them the Messianic prophecies) until the coming of the Messias. The second, instead, is definitive; and, therefore, it is called the New or Last Testament. In a metonymical sense, the word Testament is used to denote writings that contain an act of the will; hence the books of the Old and the New Testament

Messias or Redeemer, who would repair the misfortunes of humanity, and establish a spiritual universal kingdom on earth. The second contains the writings of the New Testament, in which we have the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies in the person of Christ, the redemption wrought by Him, and the foundation of the Church—that spiritual universal kingdom foretold by the prophets.

Now, unbelievers, considering that if they once admitted the authenticity and truthfulness of these documents, they should also admit the supernatural facts contained in them, bethought themselves of denying all their value :—

i. The books of the Old Testament would be only rhapsodies, or collections of popular traditions. The facts of which these books speak would be only legends, composed by degrees as the traditions passed from mouth to mouth and from generation to generation.

ii. The same with regard to the books of the New Testament. The Gospels would be written a long time after Christ, when the teachings and works of Jesus were altered and magnified by popular imagination. Thus the person, the doctrines, and the acts of Christ were gradually surrounded by an aureola of the divinity.

" And to arrive at these conclusions, what should not be done ? To annihilate that little volume of the Gospels, there were accumulated, during the century, in Germany, France, and England, writings of every kind, from volumes in folio to the smallest pamphlets and to newspapers spread about by the poisonous wind of our days. Immense libraries would scarcely be able to contain them. Never was there a contest so long, so furious. And why ? Because it was hoped that in crushing this little book a mortal blow would be struck at religion itself. The New Testament relates the origin of Christianity—the life, sufferings, and death of its Divine Founder—the organisation of the Church—the last and complete manifestation of dogmatic truth. . . . To destroy at one stroke these troublesome prescriptions and these dogmas supposed divine, would it not suffice to prove that the book in which they are registered is only a crude product of popular imagination, a tissue of fables ? Such is the end of rationalistic exegesis." [1]

But it is a system entirely designed in hatred of religion.

i. That we may avoid equivocation, let us distinguish two kinds of value in the writings of the Bible : one divine, which is derived from their being divinely inspired, and the other human, which is derived from their being historically and critically worthy of belief. We say to our adversaries :—" As you admit the historical value of books that go under the names of Tacitus, Plutarch, Thucydides, and other such authors, so you ought to admit the

[1] Fontaine, *Il Nuovo Testamento*, &c., Siena, pp. 5–6. 1894.

historical authority of the books of the Old and the New Testament; indeed, for greater reasons, because the proofs that demonstrate the authenticity of these documents are far stronger and graver than can be offered for the others. The very fact that no book more than the Bible has been subjected to the sifting of criticism, suffices to demonstrate it."

ii. Naturally, this is not the place to descend to particular questions regarding each book. That is the duty of biblical criticism; while we cannot do more than give a general glance, first at the books of the New Testament, especially the four Gospels, and then at those of the Old Testament, especially the Pentateuch.

iii. Let us begin with the New Testament, because, being the fulfilment of the Old, the authority of the former will serve as a basis for that of the latter.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL VALUE OF THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

That an historical document may be authoritative, it must be authentic, genuine, and veracious. It is authentic, when it really belongs to the author or the time attributed to it; it is genuine, if it comes to us such as it issued from the hands of the writer, without substantial change or addition; and it is veracious, if the author knew the truth of facts and set them forth without mistake. Now, such are precisely the books of the New Testament, especially the Four Gospels.

1. *Authenticity.*—The authenticity of a book is proved in the same manner as the legitimacy of a possession—that is, by the testimony of documents that go back to the epoch and the author of the book. If, ascending from our age to the first age of the vulgar era we find a constant and concordant testimony of Christianity with regard to the writings of the New Testament, confirmed even by its enemies, we ought to hold for certain that these writings are really authentic. Now, that from our time to the fourth century this concordant and universal testimony exists, at least on the part of Christians, no one doubts. The whole question is therefore reduced to the early centuries. And here it suffices to record:—

i. The testimony of the immediate disciples of the apostles.—St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius the Martyr, St. Polycarp, St. Papia, and others, who were immediate disciples of the apostles, quote the Four Gospels, and attribute them to the very authors whose names they bear. Therefore, at that time they existed and were recognised as authentic.

ii. The testimony of writers of the second and third centuries.—St. Justin, martyr and apologist († 166)[1], attests that the Gospels were read in religious assemblies on Sunday, and speaks of it as a universal practice, established for a long time (*Apologia*, 1, n. 67). The author of the canon or list of sacred books (compiled between 160 and 170) discovered by Muratori in the Ambrosian Library, and published by him in the *Antiquitates Italicae*, speaks explicitly of the Four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, with the names of their authors, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.[2] St. Ireneus, Bishop of Lyons († 202), a disciple of St. Polycarp (who in his turn was an immediate disciple of St. John), and a man most studious of Christian memories, says: "The certainty of the Gospels is so great that even heretics render testimony to it. The Ebionites rely on Matthew, the Cerinthians on Mark, the Marcionites on Luke, Valentinus on John" (*Adversus haeres.*, l. III., c. 11). Tatian († 170) in his *Diatessaron* gives us a concordance of the Four Gospels. Other testimonies are given us by Clement of Alexandria († 217), Tertullian († 240), Origen († 254), and especially the historian Eusebius († 340), who was a diligent collector of Christian literature.

iii. The testimonies of heretics, Jews, and pagans in the first centuries.—If indeed the sacred books had not been authentic the enemies of the Church and of the Christian religion would very soon have revealed the imposture. Instead, not one of the heretics, Jews, or pagans of the first centuries threw any doubt on the authenticity of those books. They quote from them, and refer to them with the names of their authors. They seek only to distort their doctrine, as was usual with the heretics, or to deny the supernatural character of the facts related therein, as was usual with Jews and Gentiles.

iv. The conformity of these writings with the age and the conditions of the times to which they belong.—It is a rule of critical science that whenever the ethnological, historical, chronological, geographical, and philological data of a book are found in perfect harmony with a determinate and well-known epoch, it

[1] The cross before 166 denotes that the Saint died in this year.—*Trans.*

[2] Another most important document, recently discovered, is "The Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles": a work lost for a long time, and found at Constantinople in 1883 by Theophilus Briennius, schismatical metropolitan of Sierra in Macedonia. Some critics attribute it to the apostolic times; even among Protestants, no one regards it as later than 120 of our era. Now, this work is only a compendium of the three Synoptics (no trace of the Gospel of St. John appears, because probably this "Doctrine" was written before it), woven with the same phrases and the same sentences. Therefore, at that time the three Synoptics existed.

[As the three Gospels of SS. Matthew, Mark, and Luke give a synopsis or general view of Our Saviour's public life in Galilee, they are called the *Synoptic* Gospels. St. John's Gospel is more concerned with His life in Judea. Another difference is that the first three Gospels treat more of Christ as Man, and the fourth more of Him as God.—*Trans.*]

may with certainty be affirmed that the book really belongs to that epoch, and to the author whose name it bears. Now such are the writings of the New Testament. The language in which they were written is that which was then spoken. The culture of the writers exactly corresponds to their state and condition. The historical, geographical, and ethnographical data that appear are all proper to the time and the nation in which they wrote: for example, there is mention of Greek and Roman coins, which were current among the Jews as well as old Hebrew money; there is mention of the geographical division of Palestine, as it was made by the Romans and by the dynasty of Herod; there is mention of the state of the Hebrews, who, with their sects and parties, truly groaned under Roman domination. These and other characteristics relating to the epoch, to persons, and to places, which are easily met in the books of the New Testament, let us see that they are not forged documents, or of a later period, but authentic writings of the apostolic age.

v. The impossibility of forging those books.—They could not be forged in the time of the apostles, who would have protested against such a deed; nor after their death, because the Church, and Christians, so attached to the doctrine preached by the apostles that they gave their lives to maintain it, would have risen up unanimously against such inventions. How could writings that were the code of a living society be forged? How invent doctrines so sublime that no man ever knew how to imagine the like, and that produced such wonderful effects in the world?

vi. The vigilance of the Church in guarding authentic writings and rejecting apocryphal ones.—Some writers of the first centuries, to accredit their stories about the life and the works of Jesus, spread abroad their writings as Gospels compiled by this or that apostle. But the Church, which watched most carefully over the defence of the holy books, soon put the faithful on their guard—rejecting those books from the canon.[1]

[1] Rènan himself, referring to the apocryphal Gospels, speaks thus:—"It is doing an injury to Christian literature to compare these trivial compositions with the masterpieces of Mark, Luke, and Matthew. The apocryphal Gospels are the Purana* of Christianity: they have as their basis the canonical Gospels. . . . As for the narrative, it is impossible to imagine anything more miserable, more contemptible. It is the tedious babbling of an old godmother; it has the tone of a literature like that of nurses. . . . The true Jesus passes on and frightens them" (*L'Eglise Chrètienne*, 1879, pp. 505–7). We must not, however, confound, as some Protestants do, the apocryphal books of the Bible with the deuterocanonical books. The former never appeared in any canon authorised by the Church. The latter, instead, were from the beginning included in the canon by the Synagogue as well as by the Church; afterwards they were brought into doubt and became uncertain, but were at length fully verified and approved. The decree of Pope Gelasius, which is the most ancient canon of the Church, also placed the deuterocanonicals on the list of sacred books.

* A religious poetical work among the Hindoos.—*Trans.*

With reason, therefore, did St. Augustine conclude: "If the books that the Church points out to us and preserves as apostolic, because they have been transmitted to her by the apostles themselves and have always been received by peoples in the most enthusiastic manner, do not exclude all doubt with regard to their origin, there is no book whose authenticity may not be doubted" (*Contra Faust.*).

2. *Genuineness.*—(i.) The very fact that the Church always guards the four Gospels with jealous care, and uses them as her code, renders any substantial falsification of them totally impossible. Granting even that some impostor had succeeded in falsifying a few copies of the Gospels without being observed, yet no one would ever have been able to falsify unobserved those copies which the Church was using and which she transmitted to us. We know, as a matter of fact, that there were false or apocryphal Gospels compiled (about forty in number), but we know likewise that the Church soon warned the faithful against them, and they were never admitted into the canon.

ii. The fact is that the most ancient codices and the most ancient versions agree among themselves, and with the copies that we have before our eyes.

iii. The fact stands that evangelical quotations, made by the Fathers and by ecclesiastical writers of the first centuries, agree perfectly with our texts. So much so that a French author, the Abbé Gainet, published a book, "The Bible without the Bible," in which he reconstructs the whole doctrine of the Gospels from quotations made by the Fathers and by ecclesiastical writers of the first centuries.

iv. The fact stands that the pretended corruptions could not be imagined during the apostolic age, nor afterwards. Not during the apostolic age, on account of the tenacity of the apostles in maintaining unaltered the doctrine that they preached; nor afterwards, on account of the extreme care of the Church in preserving incorrupt the deposit of faith.

v. Therefore, another hypothesis also falls to the ground—that of those rationalists who suppose that from the beginning there was only one Gospel, which in the course of time, subjected to various changes, gave rise to the other three.

3. *Veracity.*—(i.) The writers of the New Testament could not be mistaken; because they relate what they themselves saw and heard, or learned from others who were witnesses of the facts. Thus, Matthew and John were ocular and auricular witnesses. Mark was disciple and secretary of St. Peter, and wrote down what he heard from him and what was fully approved by him. In fine, Luke was the companion of St. Paul; both were in close relations with the apostles who lived in the school of Christ; and, as if this were not enough, Luke assures us (i. 1–3) that he has diligently investigated all things from the beginning among those who were eye-witnesses of them.

ii. They were not mistaken, nor could they be mistaken; because there was question of public facts, performed in the light of day, before friends and enemies.

iii. They did not wish to be mistaken; because, besides the thousand proofs that might be drawn from their moral character, the fact stands out that they gave their lives to confirm the truth of what they had written.

iv. They could not be mistaken, even if they wished it; because they relate public matters, within the knowledge of all, before many who have been spectators of them, and in the face of ferocious enemies who have every interest to discover a lie.

What other documents can be imagined whose truth may be proved in so many ways?

The following words from De Broglie may serve as an epilogue to what has been said:—"The facts of which the Gospel presents us with a view did not happen, like the pompous displays of ancient religions, in a half-heroic, half-barbarous age, on some deserted or unknown shore. Jesus Christ lived, preached, founded His Church, and sacrificed His life in the midst of civil society, in the capital city of a Roman province, visited on the eve by Pompey and described on the morrow by Tacitus. The biography of Jesus does not come to us from the mouths of rhapsodists, gradually inflated by enthusiasm and popular credulity. Four accounts, simple in their form, concise and concordant in their statements, supplied by eye-witnesses, in language perfectly intelligible—behold the documents on which the history of Jesus Christ is established! A harmony of ancient attestations, prompt diffusion, resemblance in the codices scattered throughout the world, conformity of the record with chronology—behold the titles by which the evangelical writings take their place among the most authentic monuments of the past! The certainty of facts rests on no other foundations; the criticism of testimonies cannot require more. We ask for the Gospel this alone, that it may not be deprived of the common rights of history and science."[1]

At present the most independent criticism recognises the authenticity of the Gospel: it is satisfied to refute or explain supernatural facts in its own way. Polidori thus sums up briefly the course of rationalistic criticism:—"The book of the Gospels has been subjected in these latter years to a criticism truly merciless. In the beginning the evangelical narratives were called impostures (Lessing + 1781); then miracles were reduced to myths or fables (Paulus + 1851); afterwards an attempt was made to show that all was a beautiful legend formed in a little time (Straus + 1874 and Rènan + 1892). Seeing, however, that these methods were irrational, a return was made to history. And this historical school looks for guidance to Professor Harnack of Berlin and to Zahn of Erlangen. The members of this school

[1] *La Chiesa*, &c., Tom. I., disc. prelim.

have spoken the last word of the rationalists. They have now made a step backwards,[1] and recognise the Gospel as true history, in regard to the substance of the facts, and the writers as veridical men. But they differ from us on three points—(*a*) With regard to the names of the writers of the Gospels. They admit, however, that the Gospels come from the first Christian generation, according to the preaching of those whose names they bear, (*b*) With regard to the date of composition, which they place between 65 and 93 for the Synoptics and between 90 and 110 for the fourth Gospel. (*c*) With regard to the supernatural things therein related, which are either not admitted at all or are explained naturally by the rationalists. In this last point we see their prejudice, their spirit of contradiction, since they select from the Gospels only what pleases them." [2]

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL VALUE OF THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Granting the historical and critical value of the books of the New Testament, that of the books of the Old is implicitly demonstrated :—

i. Because the New gives us the fulfilment of what was predicted in the Old.

ii. Because the historians of the New Testament quote from the books of the Old as documents of unquestionable authenticity, genuineness, and veracity.

iii. Because the argument of prescription that we have employed for the books of the New Testament, holds good also for those of the Old. There is question of books that have always formed the code of civil and religious life in the Hebrew nation ; books always guarded with the utmost care and with religious respect ; books, therefore, that could not be forged or altered. Any falsification of them would be as impossible as it would be in our days to falsify an Act of Parliament.

But it is chiefly against the first five books of the Bible, the Pentateuch, written by Moses, that unbelievers direct all their batteries : perhaps because they know that when the foundation is destroyed, the whole building soon falls to the ground—that is, the value of the first five books being denied, away goes the value of the others. Here, a few observations will suffice [3] :—

[1] In point of fact, Harnack writes thus : "We, when criticising the sources of primitive Christianity, undoubtedly find ourselves in a retrograde movement towards tradition."—*Chronology*, &c., c. x.

[2] *Corso di Religione*, 3 ed., Rome, 1906, p. 63.

[3] Modern criticism holds that the Pentateuch consists of four chief documents ; and therefore it does not admit one single author of the Pentateuch, but only compilers, among whom there was a final one, and it denies that this could be Moses. Moreover, giving the literary question of the

1. *The Pentateuch is authentic.*—(i.) Because after the departure out of Egypt, the Hebrew nation had always these books in hand and always asserted that they were the work of Moses.

ii. Because in the Psalms, in the books of the Prophets, and in the books of the New Testament, the work of the Pentateuch is attributed to Moses.

iii. Because if a corruption had happened, the two texts in use with the Jews and Samaritans, enemies to each other, would have been different, while instead they are identical.

iv. Because three centuries before Christ the Pentateuch was translated into Greek at Alexandria, and from the first times of Christianity many versions of it were made in different languages; yet all the codices and all the versions of the Pentateuch are substantially identical.

v. Because even profane writers of the Hebrew nation, as Philo, Josephus Flavius, and others, as well as Talmudists and Rabbis, attribute it to Moses.

vi. Because the Samaritans, so averse to the Jews, preserved the Pentateuch and attributed it to Moses: a sign therefore that it already existed before the separation of the ten tribes (about a thousand years before Christ), and that up to that time it was attributed to Moses.

vii. Because, in fine, the recent archæological discoveries have confirmed many of the facts related in the Pentateuch of which the rationalists had availed themselves to impugn its veracity.[1]

composition of the work a secondary place after the historical question, it holds that the material contained in the Pentateuch does not come from one epoch, but from the various stages through which the civil and religious history of Israel passed, so that the Pentateuch appears as a reflex of all Israelitic history. These ideas were beginning to make some head even in the Catholic camp. The recent decision of the Biblical Commission, so hateful to the new critics, has set matters right. As is evident, we do not enter into full particulars of the question. Whoever desires to have a more minute account can read Vigouroux, *Manuale Biblico*, Vol. I., from n. 232 to n. 261, or, better still, *L'histoire de l'ancien Testament*, by G. B. Pelt, Vol. I., c. xxvii.

[1] Hitherto one of the reasons brought forward by rationalists against the authenticity of the Pentateuch was "the want of historical documents that would guarantee the truth of the things therein related." Now that the documents are come and the narratives of the Pentateuch are fully confirmed, they change their tone and say: "The work of Moses has nothing supernatural, nor even original; he took it all from others." This is the thesis nowadays maintained by Professor Delitsch in his dissertation on *Babel und Bibel* (Babylon and the Bible), which caused such a stir even among us. Let us say something of what it treats. In 1901 there was discovered, in the ruins of the acropolis of Susa, the ancient capital of the Elamites, a stela—that is, a stone of diorite containing a summary of the laws of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, and contemporary of Abraham. This stone is now in the museum of the Louvre, and it was the Dominican Father Scheil who first gave an interpretation of it. The code of Hammurabi contains laws certainly more ancient than itself. Yet, between this legislation and the Mosaic there are many undeniable affinities. Hence, the war-horse of modern rationalists, some of whom go so far as to assert that "the

At the present day, it would be ridiculous to impugn the authenticity of the Pentateuch under the pretext that in the time of Moses the art of writing, as Voltaire said, was not known. The recent discoveries show this art to have been known in Egypt at least two centuries before Moses.

2. *The Pentateuch was preserved genuine and incorrupt in its substantial parts.*—(i.) Because a book that contained all the regulations of worship, all the laws and minute rules of life of the Hebrew people—a book that was like an inviolable code of the rights and duties of citizens, priests, and magistrates—could not be corrupted with impunity or without a protest from the whole nation.

ii. Because if a corruption had happened, the two texts of the Pentateuch used by the Jews and Samaritans, enemies to each other, would have been different, whereas they are identical.

iii. Because three centuries before Christ the Pentateuch was translated into Greek at Alexandria, and from the first times of Christianity many versions of it were made in different languages; yet all the codices and versions of the Pentateuch are substantially identical.

3. *The Pentateuch is veracious.*—That is, if Moses could neither mistake nor be mistaken in what he wrote. But so it was.

i. Because, outside Genesis, the Pentateuch relates facts of which Moses himself was a witness.

ii. Because, if those facts had not really occurred, Moses would[1] not have been able to impose on his people, in the name of God, a law so severe and so contrary to their idolatrous material tendencies, and to impose it after a consideration of the tremendous miracles that the people had been called to witness, if they had seen nothing whatever.

whole Mosaic legislation, especially the decalogue, is nothing but a very bad copy of the decree of the famous King Hammurabi." But time and calm reflection have caused this enthusiasm to subside. Critics to-day assure us that for the most part these laws regard civil affairs, and that the undeniable affinity which exists with regard to civil and social affairs between the two codes is explained, not at all by admitting the derivation of one from the other, but inasmuch as both come from patriarchal institutions—that is, from that most ancient age when Babylonians, Hebrews, and so many other peoples, formed only one nation, or were tribes of the same nation. For the various interpretations, see *Civiltà Cattolica*, April 18, 1903, and February 4, 1905 (p. 335); *Rivista Storico-critica* of February, 1905, pp. 80, *et seq.*; *Babilonia e la Bibbia*, by Dr. Mioni in *Scienza e Fede*, n. 58, Pustet; *La Bibbia prebabelica*, &c., of January–February, 1906; *Scuola Cattolica*, July, 1906, pp. 70–75.

[1] The defenders of the most perfect copies of Scripture do not deny that, through the negligence of copyists, a wrong name, a wrong date, or a wrong number may have occasionally crept in. This cannot appear strange to anyone who considers the multitude of transcribers, and the various ways in which the alphabets of different languages were formed. But such faults here and there do not affect the substance in any notable part or degree. Some copies are much more perfect than others. There was no error in the original Sacred Text as God inspired it.—*Trans.*

iii. Because the things related in Genesis, Moses could know, either by an immediate revelation from God, or by the oral tradition of the Patriarchs, going back to the first divine revelation. The very fact that in the cosmogony of Moses we meet with none of those monstrous falsehoods which disgrace the cosmogonies of other peoples, even the most cultured, such as the Hindoos and Egyptians—the fact that, while science has demonstrated the groundlessness of all other ancient cosmogonies, it has not been able to give the lie to the Mosaic cosmogony—the fact, moreover, of the perfect agreement of the data of science with the data of Genesis, at least as regards the succession and gradation of beings—all suffice to make us conclude with Ampere: "Either Moses was equal in natural science to the moderns, or he was inspired."

The character of our work does not permit us to enter into a particular defence against every attack made by unbelievers. There is one, however, that we cannot pass over in silence, because it directly concerns what we have to say in the following chapters.

David Castelli, in his work "Prophecy in the Bible," throws doubt on the existence of Abraham, and consequently on the value of the Messianic prophecies made to him and his descendants. "All that is referred to this first patriarch of the Hebrew nation," he says, "has too little of the historic character. It is not yet well known whether he really existed, or was rather an ethnographic type; so that Hebrew prophecy cannot certainly trace its origin to him."

In point of fact, the German critical rationalistic school holds that the names of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Esau, and their children, are only personifications of tribes, immigrations, struggles, divisions, and reunions, such as are to be found again in the lives of legendary heroes, corresponding to the scriptural names. So say Wellhausen, Graf, Reuss, and Kuenn; also, Steuernagel in his recent book on the immigrations of the Israelite tribes.

Well, nothing more arbitrary than all this; and, to be silent on every other argument, it suffices only to consider the late discoveries made in Egypt and other places inhabited by the patriarchs, to have the most solemn refutation of it. (See *La Bible et les decouvertes modernes*, t. 1, pp. 458–472, and *Les livres saints et la critique rationaliste*, t. IV., pp. 298–310, by Vigouroux.)

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROMISE AND EXPECTATION OF THE MESSIAS.

Having vindicated the historical authority of the Bible, let us see what is the chief matter contained in it.

The great idea round which the two Testaments revolve is that of the Messias.[1] In the Old, we see the promise and expectation : in the New, the fulfilment and accomplishment.

1. The Messias or Christ was announced for the first time in the terrestrial paradise. In the act by which God inflicted a deserved punishment on guilty man, He promised that a woman, born of his race, would give birth to a Son who should crush the head of the serpent—that is, of the devil, who had made use of the serpent in tempting Eve[2] (*Gen.* iii. 15). What this Son will be, when He will come, and how He will crush the serpent's head, God declares in succeeding prophecies. Meanwhile, Adam welcomes the promise, and transmits it to his descendants.

2. Later, God promises Abraham that he will become the father of a great people, and that all nations will be blessed and saved by a Son who will be born of him (*Gen.* xxii. 18). The same He repeats afterwards to Isaac, the son of Abraham (*Gen.* xxvi. 4), and to Jacob, the son of Isaac (*Gen.* xxviii. 14). Two things are here determined with regard to the Messias :—

i. The people of whom He will be born. Hence, the Apostle St. Paul observes that, according to the very words of Scripture, these promises were made to Abraham and his seed, or the descendants of Abraham. " To Abraham were the promises and to his seed. He saith not, *And to his seeds*, as to many : but as of one, *And to thy seed*, which is Christ " (*Galat.* iii. 16).

ii. The scope of His coming. Because it is said that in Him all nations shall be blessed.

[1] *Messias* or *Messia* is a Hebrew word identical with the Greek word *Christ*, which means anointed or sacred : a name that in the Old Testament was given to kings, priests, and prophets, because they were initiated in their dignity by means of an unction of oil. Investiture and the grant of power were sensibly expressed by pouring oil on the head of the elect, and at the same time he was made to understand that he should be wholly devoted to the duties of his office. The word Messias or Christ, however, has one meaning when employed in an adjective sense, another when employed in a substantive sense. In the former case, it is applied to all those persons who share in the dignity of king, priest, or prophet ; in the latter, it is applied only to him who is, by antonomasia, the king, the priest, and the prophet—or not to him who shares, but to him who is by himself king, priest, and prophet. Now, the Messias promised in the Scriptures is precisely He who should be at the same time king, priest, and prophet, not by participation or in an adjective sense, but by excellence or in a substantive sense, therefore above all other kings, priests, and prophets. Wherefore, the Psalmist, speaking of Him, said that God had anointed Him with the oil of gladness above all those who were called anointed or Christs (*Ps.* xliv. 8).

Here, accordingly, the reference is not to material but to spiritual unction, which consists in the union of the divinity with the humanity, by which unction and union He was constituted above every other king, priest, and prophet. Let us add, in fine, that the name Messias or Christ does not differ substantially from the name Jesus, which means Saviour, or more exactly, God Saviour.

[2] With the rationalists, the state of Adam in the earthly paradise and his fall are only myths. We shall see in Chap. XLIX. if such a notion has any truth in it.

Here we see the character and mission of Him who will one day say to the apostles, "Go, teach all nations," of Him who will die for all, of Him who will protest so loudly against the national pride of the Jews.

3. Later still, a new prophecy determines the time and the tribe of the Messias. Jacob, from whom He should come who would be a blessing for the nations, has twelve sons, from whom the twelve tribes will descend. On the bed of death he receives a warning from God to bequeath the promise to one of them, to Juda, who was the fourth-born of the twelve. And Jacob, in the act of blessing his sons, having come to Juda, says: "The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent, and He shall be the expectation of nations" (*Gen.* xlix. 10). Therefore, the Messias (*a*) will be born of the tribe of Juda when (*b*) the sceptre of power will fall from it.

4. With Moses the patriarchal period ends, and that of the written law begins. He should give, in the name of God, a code of laws to govern the chosen people. But among the fundamental articles of the divine statutes, he places before all others that of recognising and obeying another Legislator, much greater than himself, whom God will raise up from the midst of His people (*Deuteronomy* xviii. 15). The Hebrew legislation was therefore, as Moses declares, temporary and transitory: it should cease at the coming of the Messias, the greatest of all legislators. And this means that the Messias should institute a new alliance, a new legislation, no longer transitory but definitive, as will be more clearly indicated by other prophets.

5. Afterwards, God makes known to King David, a descendant of the tribe of Juda, that the Messias will be born of him; that He will save the world by His passion and death; that He will descend into hell, rise again from the dead, and will ascend glorious to the right hand of God the Father, whence He will come to judge the world. The prophet-king, seeing His glories and His ignominies, predicts them in the Psalms.[1] He sees His eternal generation in the splendours of the divinity, and His extreme abasement in His passion and death; whose most minute circumstances he foretells—the betrayal and abandonment by His own, the false testimonies against Him, the insults and contumelies with which He will be overwhelmed, &c.

The Messias, therefore, should come (*a*) from the patriarch Abraham; (*b*) from the tribe of Juda; and (*c*) from the family of David.

6. After David, Isaias and the other prophets completed the portrait of the Messias, anticipating His history.

[1] He announces the glories of the Messias in Psalms 2, 44, 71, 109; and His sufferings and humiliations in Psalms 15, 21, 39, 40, 68. Psalm 21 is placed on the very lips of the Messias.

i. Isaias[1] predicts that He will be born of a Virgin of the house of David (vii. 14 and xi. 1); that He will be the "Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace" (ix. 6); that "the Spirit of the Lord will rest upon Him," with the most precious gifts (xi. 2); that He will give sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, agility to the lame, and perform other miracles (xxxv. 5); that He will raise up a spiritual and universal kingdom, instead of the old covenant, altogether national, which will be abolished (ii. 2–6). Even the precursor is added, who should announce Him (xl. 3), as well as the blindness and rebellion of the Hebrew people, of which he says: *And the vision of all* (*that is, all the prophecies*) *shall be unto you as the words of a book that is sealed* (xxix. 11).

ii. Jeremias predicts the future Messias as a descendant of the house of David, not by the work of man but of God, and proclaims, in astonishment, the great prodigy that a woman will become a mother by the power of the Most High, *Creavit Dominus novum super terram : femina circumdabit virum* (xxxi. 22). He presents the son of this woman as the Son of God Himself, since he calls Him by the name *Jehova*, a name exclusively reserved to God, *Et hoc est nomen quod vocabunt eum : Dominus* (in Hebrew, *Jehova*) *justus noster* (xxiii. 6). He predicts the slaughter of the innocents, which will occur in Bethlehem by reason of His birth (xxxi. 15); and announces the new covenant that will be inaugurated, pointing out the characteristics of this new alliance in opposition to the old (xxxi. 31–34).

iii. The precise epoch of the coming of the Messias is fixed by Daniel, and the events that will accompany it are described at the same time. He predicts that very soon the Hebrews, then slaves in Babylon, will be set free and allowed to return into their own country; that after seventy weeks of years (490 years) from the day on which the decree of returning to their own country will be granted, the Christ will come and will be put to death; that the temple and the holy city will be destroyed by a foreign army, and that the Hebrew people themselves will be scattered for ever over the face of the earth (xxii. 24–26).

iv. Micheas afterwards predicts the place in which the Messias will be born: "And thou, Bethlehem Ephrata, art a little one among the thousands of Juda: out of thee shall He come forth unto Me that is to be the ruler in Israel: and His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (v. 2).

v. Aggeus (ii. 8) and Malachias (iii. 1) add that the Messias will visit the temple rebuilt under Zorobabel, so that the glory of this temple will be greater than that of the former one.

Here the Messianic prophecies cease, at a distance of about 400 years from Christ, because all was predicted, and nothing was expected but the accomplishment.

[1] Isaias is the greatest of the prophets, because it is he who has most fully and clearly predicted the Messias. See Manual by Vigouroux.

Such is briefly the Messianic promise as we find it in the books of the Old Testament.

There may be discussion, as in fact there is discussion, even among Catholics, on the precise date of each prophecy, on the particular meaning of this or that prediction with regard to the circumstances that accompany it. In such a great distance of times, diversity of languages, complexity of events, this is only natural: [1] so it happens with all ancient documents, even the most authentic of history. But to deny the fact of the Messianic promise, especially if the Messianic prophecies are considered in all their complexity; to deny that the Messianic prophecies preceded Christianity at least by some centuries; to deny the historical truth of these prophecies, such as they are found in the sacred books of the Old Testament, and to have recourse to interpolation: all that will fail with any unbeliever who attempts it.

Without calling to examination here the various hypotheses of the rationalists, let it suffice to mention one single fact that cuts short all their sophisms. "Three hundred years before Christ, there was a Greek version made of all the books of the Old Testament. It was made in Egypt, and was called the Alexandrine. This Greek version spread through all the countries where there were Hebrews (they were in all the East, and not a few also in the West), and wherever the Greek language was known. In that version, used by Hellenist and non-Hellenist Hebrews, as well as by Christians, the prophecies appear precisely as they are in the Hebrew text. To change all these Hebrew and Greek copies was impossible. Therefore, we have an absolute certainty that the prophecies of which we treat existed as they exist to-day, at least three hundred years before Christ." [2]

[1] There are difficulties of the original language, which we know imperfectly, of forms, of figures, of images familiar to eastern peoples; difficulties that arise from a want of knowledge of places, and of historical and popular records, to which allusion is made; difficulties of customs, traditions, beliefs, facts, long misrepresented or forgotten. . . . The prophecies, written at various times and places, and under different circumstances, were put together after many years, as if they were only one book written consecutively. The historical part is mixed with the prophetical, and the typical; the future is declared with the present and the past, the exhortation with the threat, and so on. Moreover, the prophet spoke directly to the people among whom he lived. He illustrated by voice or gesture whatever he said, or it was made clear by the special conditions in which prophet and people found themselves. But now, after so many centuries, with us, educated on other lines and by other methods, what was then easily understood becomes obscure. Accordingly, I do not deny that the meaning of many prophecies may be involved, obscure, uncertain, and therefore the proof deduced from them uncertain. But many of them are most clear; and these ought not to be rejected, or to have their value lessened, on account of the obscure ones. Then (and here I beg the reader to pay good attention), when I put forward the argument of prophecies, I do not consider them separately one by one; I take them altogether, and, considered as a body, the proof is unanswerable.—Mgr Bonomelli, *Gesù Cristo*, &c., pp. 172–3, Milan, 1898.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 166. The Alexandrine translation—that of the Septuagint or Seventy—was truly providential; because, after the coming of the Saviour,

Behold how St. Augustine argued against the unbelievers of his time :—" When we wish to show pagans that Christ was foretold, we present those writings to them. And lest perchance they, hardened against the faith, should say that we Christians composed them . . . we prove to them that all those writings in which Christ was foretold are in the hands of the Jews ; all those writings the Jews have. Into what disgrace therefore are the Jews fallen ! The Jew carries about the codex in which the Christian believes. They are become our porters, like slaves who carry books after their masters, so that while the former are ready to faint from their load, the latter derive much benefit from reading." [1]

But the most clear and decisive argument, which ought to close the mouths of all unbelievers, is the general expectation of the peoples before Christ. All were awaiting an extraordinary envoy from Heaven : we must therefore suppose a divine promise.

As for the Hebrews, the matter is so evident that it needs no demonstration. " It is an undeniable fact that at the time when Christ came the whole nation was expecting, with ardent desire, the arrival of the Messias : we have a proof of it, not only in the Gospels, which speak of the Magi coming from the East to see and adore Him, of Simeon, of the embassy sent by the Sanhedrim to inquire of John if he was the Christ, but also in the fact that several persons arose in the Jewish nation who gave themselves out as the Messias. Among these was Teuda Galileo, who drew a crowd of followers after him in the desert, where he was killed. Then came Barcocheba, who made a great alarm and perished with his associates. Indeed false Christs swarmed at this period like ants. Why ? Because there was a general expectation of the Messias, and wicked knaves abused the confidence of the people by pretending to be such. Now whence did the people and the Synagogue derive this conviction of the coming of the Messias ? Undoubtedly from the sacred books, and from the traditions of their ancestors ; and they expressly say so. Therefore, the Messianic idea was not a fanciful creation, but a certain fact, a deep conviction, ancient, general, rooted in the heart of the whole nation, which lived by it and for it. How lively in all Israel was this expectation of the Messias is made clear by its history after Christ. From that time to our days, Israel has grappled with this hope ; and persecutions, dispersions, endless misfortunes have not been able to tear such hope from its heart. Can any more peremptory proof be given of the Messianic idea in the Hebrew people ? It was the soul of the nation." [2]

the Jews, out of hatred, would have hidden their books, or given them forth changed, or thrown suspicion on the fidelity of translators. But, before the said event, the holy books were placed beyond the reach of Jewish alterations. We may, therefore, believe and say with St. Augustine that the making of this version was an occurrence truly providential for us.

[1] Enarr, in ps. 56, n. 9.

[2] Bonomelli, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–5.

Hence, neither Christ nor His Apostles had ever to dispute with the Hebrews about the promise, but only about the verification of the Messianic prophecies in Jesus Christ. St. Paul, writing to the Hebrews themselves, asserted, without fear of contradiction, that all the patriarchs and just of the Old Testament had died in the faith of the Messias to come (*Heb.* xi. 13).

But even among other peoples this same expectation existed, either in a vague, confused manner, which scarcely preserved the echo of the primitive revelation,[1] or in a somewhat clear manner, which to the echo of the primitive revelation added that of the Messianic predictions made to the Hebrews.

For God Himself disposed that "Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans should successively become masters of Judea, in order that they might hear all the great voices of the past and the future, the truth of origins and of promises" (Deschamps, *Appello e Sfida*). Hence, Suetonius (*In Vespas.* iv. 3) and Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 13) bear witness to a general, ancient, steady conviction that, according to the Sacred Books, the East would rise again, and that a conqueror of the world would come forth from Judea. Even the Latin poet Virgil alludes to it in his fourth eclogue.

Humboldt also, as well as the latest authorities in German heterodox criticism, confirm the universality of this tradition. The modern sentimental deist B. Constant has shown (*De la religion*, l. x., c. 7, t. iv.) traditions on the God Mediator among the Chinese, Persians, Indians, and Scandinavians, and (l. xi., c. 6, t. iv.) the firm belief of the Scythians, Chinese, Thibetians, Indians, and Mexicans that the said Mediator would be born of a Virgin. The rationalist historian of to-day, Clavel (*Histoire de religions*, Introduct.), has also written: "The belief in this Mediator, in this Messias, was general throughout antiquity: the Indians called Him *Crichna*, the Chinese *Kioun-tse*, the Persians *Sosiosh*, the Chaldeans *Dhouvanai*, the Egyptians *Pronthom-phanèes*." Voltaire himself was forced to write: "All the nations always felt the need of a Wise Man" (*Addition à l'Histoire*). "The sacred and mythological traditions of times before the Christian era," says Volney (*Les Ruines*, p. 226), "had throughout all Asia the belief of a great Mediator to come, of a Last Judgment, of a Saviour, of a King, of a God, of a Conqueror, of a Legislator, who would bring back the golden age to earth and deliver men from evil." [2]

CHAPTER XL.

JESUS CHRIST IS THE PROMISED AND EXPECTED MESSIAS.

As the Old Testament was founded on the promise and expectation of the Messias, so the New is founded on the fulfilment and veri-

[1] Monsabrè, *Introduzione*, &c., I., 158, *et seq.*, and *Esposizione*, &c., VI., 212, *et seq.*

[2] Bottau, *Il cattolicesmo*, &c., Vol. I., p. 261, n. 1–2.

fication of the Messianic prophecies in Jesus Christ. To have the most complete and decisive proof thereof, we need only take the Gospels in hand and follow step by step the events that they relate for us, observing at the same time the agreement that the Evangelists point out between these events and the Messianic prophecies. We shall confine ourselves to the most remarkable points.

1. *Time.*—It had been foretold that Christ would come when the sceptre of power should no longer be in the hands of Juda, when the seventy weeks of Daniel should be at an end, and while the temple of Jerusalem should still stand.

Now, Jesus came precisely when the Jewish nation had lost its autonomy, and the sceptre of power had passed into the hands of Herod (an Idumean by origin and made King by the Romans), who sought to put to death the same Jesus lately born, because he feared to find in Him a lawful heir-presumptive to the throne of David. The Jews themselves declared it: *We have no King but Cesar* (*John* xix. 15).

He came while the temple of Jerusalem was still standing. He visited it, and made it illustrious by His instructions and His miracles.

He came at the end of the seventy weeks of Daniel: so that the Jews themselves, when John the Baptist had scarcely begun to preach, questioned him if he was the expected Messias, precisely because it was known that the seventy weeks of Daniel were drawing to a close, and no one was surprised to hear the Baptist announcing that the kingdom of God was at hand. Then the foreign domination, whose yoke they bore, made the end of the seventy weeks still more certain.

2. *Birth.*—It had been foretold that the Messias would, by the divine power, be born of a Virgin, descended from the house of David,[1] from the tribe of Juda, from Abraham. And we know from the Gospels that Jesus was conceived of the Virgin Mary by the operation of the Holy Ghost, and that, through His Mother, He traced His origin from the family of David, the tribe of Juda, and the patriarch Abraham.[2]

[1] The dispersion of the Hebrew people having taken place after the death of Christ, the generations of the various tribes and families were also confused, so that it is now impossible to recognise the descendants of the house of David. Even for this reason, therefore, the Hebrews of to-day ought to renounce the hope of a future Messias. They try to escape from the argument by saying that the prophecies with regard to the time of the coming of the Messias are conditional, and that through the fault of the people His coming has been deferred to an indefinite time. If this were so, the prophecies would no longer be a sign for knowing the Messias, but a deceit. We need not say that the pretended conditions are purely imaginary—only the subterfuges of later inventions. As the promise of the Messias was absolute, so the data of the time and the family in which He should come were absolute.

[2] For a critical defence of this point, see my little work, *Il concepimento verginale di Gesù e la critica moderna*, Monza, 1906.

3. *Place and Circumstances.*—It had been foretold that the Messias would be born in Bethlehem, and that even in His cradle He would receive the adoration of Eastern kings, who would bring Him their gifts (*Ps.* lxxi. 10; *Isa.* lx. 6), but that on account of Him the infants of Bethlehem would be slain. And so in fact it happened. Jesus was born in Bethlehem; He was adored by the Magi, who offered Him gold, frankincense, and myrrh; He was the cause why king Herod ordered the slaughter of the innocents.

4. *Life.*—It had been foretold that the Messias would be announced by a precursor; that He would preach His gospel to the poor, work miracles, suffer, and die, without, however, being subject to the corruption of the grave, but would rise again from it, and would ascend to the right hand of God the Father in Heaven. And was not all this fulfilled to the letter in Jesus Christ?

5. *Mission.*—It had been foretold that the Messias would be a blessing for all nations; would found a new kingdom, spiritual and universal; would take away the sins and iniquities of mankind. And do we not see all this fulfilled in the Church, established by Jesus Christ, a truly spiritual and universal kingdom, in which all the peoples who make part of it find heavenly blessings, and in which are the means for cancelling all sins and iniquities?

6. *Other Circumstances.*—It had been foretold that the Hebrew people would rebel against the Messias, and that, in punishment of their rebellion, God would destroy the city and temple of Jerusalem, and would scatter that people over the face of the earth. And here also have we not before our eyes the sad facts that prove the fulfilment of these prophecies?

Thus everything in the life and death of Jesus Christ agrees perfectly with the ancient oracles. *To Him all the prophets give testimony* (*Acts* x. 43). And when so many lights shine on our eyes from all sides, who will not be struck by them? Who will not recognise in Jesus the Saviour divinely promised and divinely sent?

Divinely Promised.—Because God alone could make those predictions of future free events—so distant, so various, so complex—yet foretold in the most precise manner as regards time, place, persons, all circumstances. It would be enough to consider, on one hand, the unity of design that appears in all the Messianic prophecies, and, on the other, the multitude of prophets—so different with regard to time, place, character, habits, &c.—in order to understand that, without a divine revelation, the Messianic prophecies are a real absurdity.

Divinely Sent.—Because no one would seriously maintain that the Messianic prophecies have had their fulfilment in Jesus Christ only by chance, and have only been adapted to Him by His followers, without His having been truly the Envoy of God. To say nothing of the physical impossibility of adapting to Him

many prophecies, such as those of time, birth, place, &c., if they did not verify themselves in Jesus Christ,[1] everyone can see that, in treating of events so complex and so varied, the words "chance" and "adaptation" are simply ridiculous. God alone, who holds all events in His hand and governs them with that providence which *reacheth from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly*, could give fulfilment to all the Messianic prophecies in Jesus Christ. The conclusion therefore stands: Christianity, which exactly verifies all the Messianic prophecies, shows the truth and the divinity of those predictions; and the Messianic prophecies, which had their fulfilment in Christianity, show the truth and the divinity of Christianity itself.

CHAPTER XLI.

RATIONALISM AND THE MESSIANIC PROPHECIES.

All that is left for unbelievers is either to deny the reality of the Messianic prophecies, or to deny their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth.

But it is impossible to deny the reality of the Messianic prophecies. (*a*) Because their existence is an historical fact registered in the books of the Old Testament, written many ages before Christianity. (*b*) Because the Messianic prophecies are so intertwined with the events of the time in which the prophets lived that it is impossible to deny the authenticity of the former without denying the historical truth of the latter, which serve as a basis for them.[2] (*c*) Because the Hebrew people have always lived and still live in expectation of a Messias to come. (*d*) Because even among the Gentiles, as we know from Tacitus, Suetonius, and Virgil, the conviction of the divine promise had become general. (*e*) Because, in fine, neither Christ nor His apostles had ever to dispute on the reality of this promise or on the prophecies regarding it. We know rather that at the time when Christ came, the Jews sent a deputation to His precursor, St. John the Baptist, inquiring if he was the expected Messias or if they were to look for another.

These arguments show how ridiculous is the accusation that Christians manipulated the books of the Old Testament, so as to

[1] "Was He (Christ) able to model His destiny according to the evangelical testimonies? Could He, in particular, prepare a death for Himself corresponding to the testimony of Isaias? Could He give Himself a precursor such as the prophets announced? Was it He, therefore, who armed the hands of His enemies and induced the soldiers to divide His garments?"—De Broglie, *Questions bibliques*, p. 369, Paris, 1897.

[2] It would suffice to recall only the prophecy of Daniel. And this combination of prophecies with the historical events of the time is the most admirable answer to the arguments of the rationalists, who deny the authenticity of the prophecies, and often even the historical existence of the prophets, regarding them only as legendary heroes.

introduce the Messianic prophecies, or at least changed them in such a way as to adapt them to Christ.[1]

We have said a *ridiculous* accusation; because if a general expectation of the Messias existed before Christianity, a promise made by God must also have existed. And then, is it not true that the Christians received those books from the Hebrews, and that our codices actually agree with those which are still in their hands? Is it not true that all the documents in which are recorded the Messianic prophecies were translated into Greek three hundred years before Christ, and have been scattered over the civilised world since that time? If the Messianic prophecies were translated, therefore they previously existed. To supplant them, or to introduce the prophecies to which we now appeal, it would have been necessary that the Christians should change at the same time the Hebrew text and the Greek version; it would have been necessary to have as accomplices all the dispersed Jews and all the Gentiles who possessed copies; it would have been necessary that this immense multitude of men, so far removed from one another, should join in the conspiracy, and keep the secret so exactly that not the least suspicion of it should remain. In short, if we may be pardoned an absurdity, there would have been need of an impossibility.

In like manner we may see how vain are the efforts of rationalists when they wish to "naturalise" those prophecies, and make

[1] The rationalists recognise the existence of "prophetism" in the Old Testament—that is, the intervention, in the history of Israel, of extraordinary men, men of great intelligence and rare perspicacity, but refuse to see therein anything superhuman. They therefore divide the prophecies into two classes—authentic and non-authentic. Non-authentic are those, too clear and precise, which regard events very distant, or too much above the capacity of man to be naturally explained. These, they say, were written after the fact, *post eventum*; like the revelation of the future history of Rome to the epoch of Augustus, which Virgil puts on the lips of Æneas in Tartarus. On the other hand, those are authentic which refer to near events that the sagacity of the prophets enabled them to foresee and to foretell, as men of great political or social intuition do at the present day. Thus, the rationalists turn an historical question into a metaphysical one, and reject *a priori* the supernatural, because they judge it impossible. Now here the question is not of possibility, but of fact, and criticism ought not to take things otherwise than they are. And these things in the Old Testament are presented to us in such a way that the most honest and candid rationalists have not been able to deny them. "There is a thing that obstinately resists materialistic analysis, every system of natural development, every form of that evolutionism which is so much in vogue at present, and it is prophecy." So says Professor Kautsch, one of the most authoritative representatives of the German independent school, in a conference held in October, 1902, of which Minocchi gives an account in *Studi religiosi* (Florence, 1902, p. 459). And Kuenen himself, one of the most celebrated oracles of the rationalists, writes thus: "It seems that here the objections of critics have no weight. Even if the prophecies were not written by those whose names they bear, even if they were of a date more recent than that which is believed, yet it is true that in the chronological order they precede the constitution of Christianity and the birth of the Saviour."—Kuenen, *Prophets and Prophecy of Isaiah*, p. 449.

us believe that the whole substance of the promise and expectation of the Messias consisted in the mere desire of an oppressed people, who sighed for better days through the aid of some temporal liberator.

If it were so, we ought to find among all peoples materially or politically oppressed the same prophecies that we have in the sacred books of the Old Testament. If it were so, the Hebrew people would not have expected any Messias in the time of their greatest freedom and glory, under David and Solomon, while, on the contrary, it was at this time that the most splendid prophecies were made of the future Messias. If it were so, the future Messias would not have been pointed out as a definite person, who should be born at such a time, in such a place, of such a tribe and family, as in fact the Messianic prophecies present Him. If it were so, the Messianic prophecies would not have assigned a mission entirely spiritual—that of bringing a remedy for the sins of mankind, of sanctifying our souls, of placing us anew in the friendship of God. And it is evident that all this could not even have been imagined, if God had not revealed it: so much the more as there is question of events not only free, but predicted many ages before their accomplishment.

The other part of the dilemma remains: to say that these prophecies had not their fulfilment in Christ.

But that is false, most false, because facts are at hand to belie all the negations of unbelievers. It is enough to look through the Old and New Testaments in order to see their perfect harmony. And is not the Church itself, which has stood before us for twenty centuries, the incarnation of the Messianic kingdom, such as was predicted by the prophets?

The exceptional gravity and importance of these facts could not escape the rationalists. But the prejudices of their system and the denial of the supernatural have driven them to make a last effort. They have said that the Messianic prophecies had not in Christ their fulfilment in the sense understood by the ancient prophets of Israel, but only in that transferred and spiritual sense in which they have been elaborated in the conscience of later generations. At first, they say, there was only a temporal Messias expected, a great conqueror, who would subdue all other nations under the Hebrew people. But afterwards, this hope being disappointed by the frequent disasters and captivities of the Hebrew people, the idea of a temporal liberator and conqueror gave place to that of a moral or spiritual liberator.[1] Jesus, they add, took advantage of this idea; and his followers, occupied with the thought that the Messias would unite in himself all the grandeurs described by the prophets, and that his glory would

[1] Harnack speaks thus:—"The idea of the Messias had been slowly transformed, and had assumed characteristics altogether new; from the political religious idea that it was in its origin it had become a spiritual religious idea."—*Essenza*, &c., p. 138.

surpass that of the most illustrious personages, attributed to him in a spiritual sense whatever they found most marvellous in the records of the patriarchs and the oracles of the prophets.

"The Messianic predictions," says Sabatier, "are all Hebrewish. They regard the Hebrew people, not the Christian Church, to which they were applied. The Hebrews, following their own exegesis, could not behold in Jesus of Nazareth the Messias whom they expected, because they could not believe in him without renouncing the political and national hopes that their books had given them. The Messianic prophecies, therefore, in so far as they have an historical and a grammatical sense, have never been fulfilled. They have not been realised in the life, the teaching, and the death of Jesus, unless when taken in a sense that they certainly had not in the minds of those who first pronounced them." [1]

Now, all this is exactly the opposite of the truth. The transformation in the Messianic idea at the time of Christ did not consist in changing the character of the Messias from temporal to spiritual, but *vice versa* in corrupting the idea of a spiritual Messias into that of a temporal Messias, as we shall immediately see in the rebellion of the Hebrew people. For the rest, a glance at the Messianic prophecies will suffice. The prophets show us in the Messias Him who should carry our sins on His shoulders, who should reconcile mankind with God, who should bring blessings to all nations. Is there any idea here of a temporal or national Messias?

CHAPTER XLII.

THE REBELLION OF THE HEBREW PEOPLE

We have arrived at the great fact round which all the rationalists finally entrench themselves—the rebellion of the Hebrew people. "If the Messianic prophecies," they say, "were so great and so clear, when taken altogether; if the Hebrews kept and venerated them as gifts of God, and so anxiously expected their fulfilment; if these prophecies agree so perfectly with Christ that there can be no doubt of His being the promised Messias—how is it that the Hebrews did not know Him, that they rejected Him? Is not the very fact that the Hebrew people, who were the depositary of the Messianic prophecies, did not recognise in Jesus of Nazareth the expected Messias, a most evident sign that the person and work of Jesus do not correspond to the Messianic predictions, and that it is only by an inversion of their meaning that Christians have been able to adapt them to Jesus Christ?"

Yet this fact, which so much afflicted the apostle St. Paul, who

[1] *Esquisse d'une philosophie*, &c., pp. 92–3.

desired even to become an anathema for his brethren (*Rom.* ix. 3), if well considered, is a new confirmation of the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies in Jesus Christ.

It was foretold by the prophets that, at the time of Christ, the Hebrew people would be rebellious against their Saviour, and that, in punishment of their rebellion, God would scatter them over the face of the earth. And as it was foretold, so it happened. Therefore, this fact is one of the most convincing proofs that Jesus Christ was the expected Messias.

It seems even that Divine Providence, by scattering this people among all the nations of the earth, while they always continue in their obstinacy, meant to offer to men of all places and all times a living and speaking testimony of the Messianic prophecies and their verification in Jesus Christ. "We no longer see," says Bossuet, "any remains of the ancient Assyrians, the ancient Greeks, or the ancient Romans. Every trace of them is lost; they are confounded with other peoples. The Jews, instead, after being a prey to those nations, have survived them. God preserves them, notwithstanding their dispersion in foreign lands, to supply the Church with an undeniable proof of the divinity of the Old Testament, by declaring to the world the immolation of the Saviour, and by placing before the eyes of all the most astonishing monument of heavenly justice." [1]

As, however, the blindness of the Hebrew people did not happen because it was foretold, but it was foretold because God foresaw that it would happen, the question is obvious: What was the cause of such perversity, or why were the Hebrews unwilling to recognise in Jesus the promised and expected Messias?

The general answer given to this question is that the Hebrews of the last times understood in a material and temporal sense what the prophets had foretold in a moral and spiritual sense of the Messias and His kingdom, so that at the time of Christ their only expectation was that of a great conqueror. Some suppose that the revolt of the Jews under Vespasian occurred exactly on this account, that the time having arrived in which all the prophecies of the Messias should have their fulfilment, they hoped to become conquerors by his aid in a war against the Romans. How they came to distort the meaning of the prophecies in such a way, contrary to what their forefathers had always admitted, is a secret with God. But the following facts may explain the human side of things:—

i. The prophets had given a two-fold portrait of the Messias: they described Him as the lowliest and the greatest of men. They referred not only to His first coming, but also to His second. Hence, an occasion of error. The Hebrews stopped at the magnificent view of the Messias, and applied to His first coming what the prophets had foretold of the second. This, however, does not

[1] *Discourse on Universal History.*

suffice; because their forefathers did not think so. There must be some other intervening motives.

ii. From the last Messianic prediction to Christ, four hundred years rolled by without the voice of any prophet being heard. This long silence chilled the faith of many, and they were forgetful of the great promises of God. Meanwhile, there arose two powerful sects—the Pharisees and the Sadducees (the rationalists and the materialists of those days)—who, having become masters of the law, corrupted little by little the meaning of the prophecies—that is to say, explained all the Messianic prophecies in a material and temporal sense, and thus brought the people gradually to the conviction that the future Messias should be a great conqueror, who would restore the kingdom of Israel to its former splendour and subject all other nations to it. This idea easily spread at a time when the Jewish nation groaned under the yoke of the Romans, and could think of nothing but the hour of deliverance. Even the apostles of Christ showed themselves influenced by this idea in the beginning of their apostleship; for they said to Jesus: *Lord, wilt Thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel* (*Acts* i. 6).

iii. These and similar facts helped to form that veil before their eyes, as the apostle St. Paul says (II. *Cor.* iii. 14–15), by reason of which they read and did not understand what the Scripture contains, thus verifying the prophecy of Isaias: *The vision of all shall be unto you as the words of a book that is sealed.* (*Is.* xxix. 11).

iv. This, however, is to be understood of the generality of the Hebrew people, not of particular individuals. Because many of these, such as Gamaliel, Nicodemus, Joseph of Arimathea, Lazarus, and others among the higher classes, recognised in Jesus Christ the true Messias; then, many of the people, among whom Jesus Christ chose His disciples and apostles; also, those who were converted to Christianity in succeeding times.

It is therefore indifference, prejudice, and passion, inherited from their forefathers, that still hold the Jews fast in their obstinacy, while this same obstinacy is a fact that shows to all the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies in Jesus Christ.

But these prophecies, others say, might have been more clear, and then all danger of a wrong understanding of them would have been taken away. Why were they not more explicit, more definite?

"Because God is the Master of His gifts, and it belongs to Him, not to us, to determine the measure of them. When His word can be understood, it is enough for us; and we should be rash and impertinent if we tried to impose on Him the obligation of greater light. If the difficulty had any weight, we might complain to God that He has not given us the sight of the eagle or the strength of the lion; and though we should suppose, for the sake of hypothesis, that He had given us such, we might then

ask why He had not given us the power to see things far and near as they are seen with the telescope and the microscope, or why He had not given us the bulk of an elephant, and so on.

"Are the prophecies clear enough? Yes: they sufficed for many others, they ought also to suffice for us; and the possibility of their being more clear is not, and never will be, a reason to justify us in rejecting them. For the rest, it must not be forgotten that the rationalists take one thing for another. When a prophecy is clear, they say: *It is too clear to have been made beforehand.* When it is obscure, they say: *It is so obscure that it proves nothing.* How satisfy such people, who ask for darkness when there is light, and light when there is darkness?" [1]

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE PROMISED MESSIAS SHOULD BE THE SON OF GOD MADE MAN.

THE promised Messias should not, however, be only an envoy of God, like Moses and the other prophets of the Old Testament, but Man and God at the same time, or rather the only Son of God made Man.

That He ought to be a Man-God appears clearly:—

i. From the mission that the prophets assign to Christ or the Messias.—He should come to redeem the human race from sin and to reconcile it with God; or, as the prophet Daniel says, He should come "that transgression may be finished, and sin may have an end, and iniquity may be abolished, and everlasting justice may be brought" (ix. 24). But to accomplish this mission the work of a Man-God was required: *Man*, that He might be able to merit; *God*, that His acts might be of infinite value, to repair the infinite malice of sin.[2]

ii. From the names by which the prophets pointed out the Messias.—Isaias calls Him "Emmanuel," which means "God with us"; the "Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come" (vii. 14, and ix. 6). Daniel calls Him "the Saint of Saints" (ix. 24); and the name proper to God, not communicable to any creature, the name *Jehova*, which expresses eternal, necessary, independent existence—in short, the Divine Being—is attributed by the prophets to the Messias (see *Isaias* xli. 16, and *Jeremias* xxxiii. 16).

That He ought to be the Son of God made Man follows:—

i. From the two-fold generation, eternal and temporal, that the prophets attribute to Him.—They describe not only His

[1] Mgr. Bonomelli, *Gesu Christo Dio-Uomo*, pp. 176–7.

[2] Homo purus satisfacere non poterat pro toto genere humano; Deus autem satisfacere non debebat; ergo oportebat Deum et hominem esse Christum.—S. Thom., p. 3, q. 1, a. 2.

temporal generation in the womb of a Virgin descended from the house of David: "Behold a Virgin shall conceive" (*Is.* vii. 14), but also His eternal generation in the bosom of God: "With Thee is the principality in the day of Thy strength, in the brightness of the saints; from the womb before the day-star I begot Thee" (*Ps.* cix. 3).

ii. Because to the Hebrews who had perverted the meaning of the prophecies, and maintained that the Christ or Messias should be only a descendant of the house of David, Jesus put a very conclusive question one day as related by St. Matthew:—"What think you of Christ? whose Son is He? They say to Him: David's. He saith to them: How then doth David in spirit call Him Lord, saying: *The Lord said to my Lord, sit on my right hand, until I make Thy enemies Thy footstool!* If David then call Him Lord, how is He his son? And no one was able to answer Him a word: neither durst any man from that day forth ask Him any more questions" (xxii. 42–46).

CHAPTER XLIV.

JESUS IS PROCLAIMED THE SON OF GOD.

The only one in the world, Jesus is proclaimed the Son of God, precisely because He was the promised and expected Messias. He declares:—

i. *His Origin from His Heavenly Father.*—"I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world: again I leave the world, and I go to the Father" (*St. John* xvi. 28).

ii. *The Identity of His Nature with that of His Heavenly Father.*—"I and the Father are one" (*St. John* x. 30).

iii. *His Eternal Existence, like that of the Father.*—"Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am" (*St. John* viii. 58). That is, "As Son of God, I am before Abraham and before all things." He does not say "I was," but "I am," thus to denote the constant immovable eternity of His being, as God said to Moses, "I am who am." Therefore, in the same chapter of St. John (verse 25), Jesus, being asked "Who art thou?" answers, "The beginning, who also speak unto you"—that is, "I, who speak to you, am God, the beginning of all things."[1] "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (*St. John* xiv. 6). In the same Gospel of St. John (xvii. 5) we read: "And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with Thee."

iv. *The Identity of His Operations with those of His Father.*—"What things soever He (the Father) doth, these the Son also

[1] Others interpret the passage differently; but this is not the place to enter into a critical discussion of the words.

doth in like manner. . . . For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will" (*St. John* v. 19, 21).

v. *His Absolute Power over all Things, like that of His Father.*—"All things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine" (*St. John* xvi. 15). Hence, He declares Himself *Lord of the Sabbath*, and dispenses from its observance (*St. Matt.* xii. 8); *Supreme Legislator*, and gives new precepts and commands, under penalty of eternal ruin for him who does not observe them; *Supreme Sanctifier of Souls*, and remits sins, which, as the very enemies of Christ declare, God alone can forgive (*St. Luke* v. 21, *et seq.*).

vi. *His Right of Being Adored, as well as the Father.*—"That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father. He who honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father who hath sent Him" (*St. John* v. 23).

The Hebrews understood well the meaning of these declarations; and the great crime with which they charged Him, and for which they delivered Him to death, was that "He made Himself the Son of God" (*St. John* xix. 7). But Jesus does not withdraw this assertion even before the tribunals. On the contrary, He repeats it to the High Priest and the Roman Governor. He seals it with His life; foretelling, however, that He will triumph over death, and that He will one day come to judge His crucifiers themselves, into whose hands He is now delivered by the will of His Father.

It is therefore false, most false, that Jesus is the Son of God only in a moral sense, as the rationalists pretend—that is, in the sense of a person dear and acceptable to God—in the same manner as the just of the Old and the New Testament are called the sons of God.[1]

i. As appears from the testimonies brought forward, and from the manner in which they were understood by the hearers of Christ, Jesus proclaimed Himself the Son of God in a proper and natural sense—that is, inasmuch as He has the very nature of God, and proceeds from Him by true generation as Son from Father, with this difference that all other men are not generated but created by God, who is therefore their Father only in a moral sense.

ii. It is true that the rationalists do not admit the authenticity of the Gospel of St. John, and therefore deny any value to this testimony. But it is also true that the plan of denying whatever is not convenient is not sound criticism.[2] In the present case they gain nothing whatever by it. (*a*) Because independent criticism itself, which derives the fourth Gospel not from St.

[1] "Christ is the son of God, but so are all men, or they can be in various degrees. . . . The divine sonship in the Old Testament was attributed to persons who had no pretensions to be equal with God. The word *son* in Semitic languages and in the New Testament has the widest meanings." So speaks Rénan.

[2] See Polidori, *L'autore del quarto Evangelo*, &c., 3rd ed., Rome, 1906.

John, but from the preaching of St. John, as Harnack would have it, places its compilation about the end of the first century. Therefore, up to that time Christians recognised Jesus as the natural Son of God. Now, how is this fact to be explained, if we do not admit that such doctrine was taught them by the first preachers of the Gospel, and consequently by Jesus Christ Himself? (*b*) For the rest, even prescinding from the Fourth Gospel, the divinity of Christ and His being the natural Son of God result equally from the three Synoptics, either when they point Him out explicitly by the name of the "Son of God,"[1] or when, speaking of Him, they express themselves in such a manner as to place Him above all creatures visible and invisible—recognising powers and prerogatives in Him that belong exclusively to God.[2]

iii. The great argument of the rationalists is that in the Gospels the title of Son of God is attributed to Jesus in the same sense as that of Messias. But the title of Messias, they say, in the minds of the contemporaries of Christ, did not mean God: it meant only him whom God had sent "from the house of David" to govern His people. Therefore, even for Christ, the title of Son of God means only a moral sonship, in so far as it is above that of other men.

Now, we do not deny the fact, but we deny the conclusion; because the chief question between Christ and His contemporaries was whether the Messias should be only man or also God—only a son of the family of David or the very Son of God. The prophets had announced Him as a Man-God, or rather as the Son of God made man; and Christ often invited His contemporaries to reflect on these prophecies.[3] Sometimes He even explained them Himself, thus confounding His enemies, as He did, according to St. Matthew, on an occasion to which we have already referred (p. 130). But, for the most part, inveterate prejudices had so overturned the meaning of the prophecies that they could no longer regard the Messias as anything but a temporal conqueror. And behold, the rationalists conclude that, therefore, Jesus was not the true Son of God, just because His contemporaries called Him Son of God in the sense of Messias! Not only so, but they conclude that, when Jesus proclaimed Himself the Son of God, He did so in the sense understood by His contemporaries. Can anything show more insincerity or bad faith?

The greater is the necessity of distinguishing in the testimonies of those contemporaries. When Nathanael says to Christ in the early days of His public ministry: "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel" (*John* i. 49), we may well suppose

[1] See Matthew xiv. 33, and xvi. 16; Mark i. 1, and ix. 16; Luke i. 32, 35.

[2] See Palmieri, *Se e come i sinottici*, &c., Prato, 1903; also Vigouroux, *Manuale biblico*, v. 3, n. 464–7.

[3] Search the Scriptures. . . . The same are they that give testimony of Me.—*St. John* v. 39.

that he did not entertain the idea of the natural Son of God, identical in nature with the Father, and that therefore he intended only to recognise Christ as the Messias in the sense admitted by his fellow-countrymen. But when, later, we see Jesus asking the apostles about what men think of Him; when we see Him renewing the question to the apostles about what they themselves think of Him; when at last we hear Peter answering Him, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God," and Jesus declaring that he (Peter) has not received this knowledge from flesh and blood, but from His Father who is in Heaven (*Matt.* xvi. 16, 17)—then there is no longer any room for doubt that the words "Son of God" are taken in their proper and natural sense. And if even Peter makes the title of Son of God follow that of Christ or Messias, it is because he means that the promised Messias should be truly the Son of God made man. Justly, therefore, does Father Rose invert the terms of the rationalist thesis, and say: "Jesus is the Messias because He is the Son of God. The title of Messias is only an aspect of His divine nature." [1]

Why, then, retort the rationalists, does Jesus in the Gospel call Himself nearly always "the Son of Man?"

Because this name really expresses what the Son of God became in His incarnation, and it is one of the titles by which King David and the prophet Daniel pointed out the future Messias.[2] He is not, however, the son of this or that man, but the Son of Man in an antonomastic sense, inasmuch as He took human nature. Thus reference is made indirectly to His supernatural conception, and to the two natures, divine and human, which are found in Him.

He uses, therefore, this title nearly always in the Gospel, not only through humility,[3] but also for many and grave reasons of prudence and charity. Granting the common prejudices that were entertained about the Messias, granting also the harm in a political sense that was then done through the very title of Messias by the dominant parties (we have an echo of it in the crafty question put to Christ about paying tribute to Cesar), it was convenient that Jesus should present Himself under a title that, while being Messianic, would not upset all their ideas, and thus precipitate

[1] *Études sur les Evangiles*, 3rd ed., p. 198, Paris, 1905.

[2] *Psalm* lxxix. 16-18; *Daniel* vii. 13–14 and x. 16.

[3] Vigouroux writes thus:—"This title of Son of Man was more suitable on the lips of the Saviour than on those of His disciples. On His side, it was above all a sign of modesty and humility; and therefore Our Lord is the only one who makes use of it during His life. Although this name is repeated about eighty times altogether in the Gospels (and about an equal number of times in each of the four), yet it is always Himself who applies it to Himself. After His death, it is given Him only twice—once by St. Stephen (*Acts* vii. 55), and again by St. John (*Apoc.* i. 13), and in both cases it is to mark the difference between the state of humiliation of the Man-God on earth and His state of glory and power in Heaven."—*Manuale Biblico*, v. iii., n. 464.

the sad events that were to follow.[1] However, He gradually makes it understood that this Son of Man is really the Messias and the Son of God, since He attributes to Him the power of forgiving sins (*Mark* ii. 10), the power of judging all mankind (*Matt.* xxiv. 30), and other like prerogatives, which certainly cannot belong to a mere man. And when the Messianic idea has sufficiently penetrated into the minds of the people, He declares His divinity, and His Sonship to the Eternal Father, in the most explicit manner. But it is then precisely that all the passions of the Sanhedrists break loose, to stir up the people against Him for the grievous crime of having declared Himself the Son of God.

This is the reality of things. It is necessary to shut one's eyes against the light in order to draw the following conclusions from them :—(*a*) That Jesus Christ had not from the beginning a consciousness of His Messianic office. (*b*) That He never proclaimed Himself the Son of God in a true and natural sense, but it was His followers who attributed to Him the saying, " I am the Son of God." [2] (*c*) That, in fine, the only divine Sonship that Christ attributed to Himself consisted entirely in a knowledge of the paternal goodness of God, to which Jesus Christ sought to recall all mankind.[3]

[1] See the *Secretum Messianicum* in *Divus Thomas* of 1905, pp. 643, *et seq.*

[2] Harnack, *Essenza*, &c., pp. 138, 145.

[3] Here are the words of Harnack :—" Jesus in one of his discourses explicitly declares why and in what sense he is titled the Son of God. Not to mention the Gospel of John, we find in Matthew the following words : No one knoweth the Son, but the Father : neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him. The knowledge of God is the sphere of the divine Sonship. Hence, precisely he learned to know as Father, as his Father, the holy being who rules heaven and earth. The consciousness that he has of being the Son of God is therefore nothing but the practical consequence of having known God as Father, and as his Father. The knowledge of God, rightly understood, is the whole substance of the expression *Son of God*."—*Op. cit.*, p. 128.

If Harnack had quoted the whole verse of St. Matthew (xi. 27), from which he has garbled some words, he would have let his readers at once see the falsity of his interpretation. Just before we read : " All things are delivered to Me by My Father," words that give us the key to understand what follows : " No one knoweth the Son, but the Father ; neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son." If all things were given to Christ by the Heavenly Father, this means that He is truly His Son ; if He is truly His Son, this means that He has been generated by Him ; if He has been generated by Him, this means that only the Father knows the Son, and only the Son knows the Father, because the inner and substantial generation of God escapes all natural knowledge. Men cannot know it except by divine revelation. Hence, Christ adds that others will know it only by His divine revelation : " he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him."

If a natural knowledge of God were in question, as Harnack would have it, no revelation on the part of Christ would be necessary : that is common to all. Justly, therefore, does Palmieri say : " If Christ is a creature there may be another creature who knows the Father perfectly ; but because the Son alone has a perfect knowledge of the Father, it must be said that the Son is God. Yet more : the knowledge by which the Son knows the Father is equal to that by which the Father knows the Son.

According to Harnack, the whole Gospel is nothing more than a revelation of the paternal goodness of God.

"But then," as Bonaccorsi here justly asks, "how explain that from the origin of Christianity to the present day, the contrary has been always and universally believed, as Harnack himself admits? How were the apostles, in whose ears the echo of the words of Jesus still resounded, how were they able so to falsify the Gospel, which Jesus had confided to them, as to make the person of Jesus the central point of their preaching? How did it come to pass that while the apostles were still living, faith in Jesus the Son of God was considered a necessary condition to be enrolled in the society of Christ, and to obtain salvation? How was it that the evangelists St. Matthew and St. Mark took as the chief scope of their writings, the one to show that Jesus was the Messias, the other that He was the Lord, having supreme dominion over all creatures of this world and over the devils? How does the history of Christianity show us so many struggles and so many martyrdoms about a question of so little importance, and so foreign to the Gospel, if we are to believe the professor of Berlin?"[1]

When we consider the efforts of rationalism to elude the truth, which is so evident to simple and dispassionate souls, how can we forget the terrible words of Christ, that God hides Himself from the proud and reveals Himself to the humble?[2]

CHAPTER XLV.

JESUS CHRIST PROVED BY HIS WORKS THAT HE WAS TRULY THE SON OF GOD.

ALTHOUGH some doubt should still remain about the declarations of Jesus, and the meaning of the Messianic prophecies with regard to the divine Sonship of Christ, even this ought at once to disappear before proofs of fact. For Jesus was not satisfied only to declare by word His divine Sonship; He was not satisfied to prove by prophecies that the promised Messias should be truly

Now the knowledge that the Father has of the Son is a knowledge proper to God. Such is, therefore, also that which the Son has of the Father. And, in fact, to have this knowledge, He has no need of revelation. He even reveals it to others: there is question, therefore, of a thing that without revelation cannot be known by a creature. Christ, therefore, is not a creature."—*Se e come i sinottici*, &c., p. 169.

And all this appears still more clearly when we consider the verse that immediately follows:—"Come to Me, all you that labour, and are burdened, and I will refresh you." Everyone feels that God alone could give this invitation.

[1] Bonaccorsi, *Harnack e Loisy*, pp. 83–84.

[2] *St. Matt.* xi. 25.

the Son of God, but He also proved and demonstrated Him to be such by the works that He wrought.

One day He said to His auditors: "You sent to John, and he gave testimony to the truth. . . . But I have a greater testimony than that of John. For the works which My Father hath given Me to perfect, the works themselves which I do, give testimony of Me. . . . If I do not the works of My Father, believe Me not. But if I do, though you will not believe Me, believe the works: that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father." [1]

It is a law of common sense that every effect must have a cause proportioned to it. If Jesus Christ performed supernatural works, there must have been a supernatural power in Him; and if He performed these works with a view to prove His divinity and His natural Sonship to God, the power must have been His own, and not communicated to Him by another. In other words: He who performs miracles, or he who performs works above or against the laws of nature, is either the Author of nature, or he performs them by a power received from the Author of nature. But Jesus Christ performed true miracles, and He performed them with a view to prove that He was truly the Son of God. Therefore, He performed them by a power all His own, and not received from another. Now as God cannot lend Himself to the confirmation of an imposture, if Christ was not truly the Son of God, the divine omnipotence would not have been placed at His service.

Hence, the difference between Jesus Christ and all other wonder-workers. The latter wrought miracles or spoke prophecies by a power received from God; the former by His own power. The latter wrought miracles in the name of God or in the name of Christ; the former, in His own name. For neither Moses, nor the prophets, nor the apostles, wrought those prodigies with a view to have people believe them gods or the natural sons of God—the divine omnipotence would not have been at their command—but only to demonstrate that what they said or did in the name of God or of Christ came truly from God or from Christ. Christ instead performed supernatural works with a view to demonstrate that not only His teaching, but His very being, came from God, or was one being with the Father.

But is it then certain that Jesus Christ performed those supernatural works—works that prove Him to have been the Author and the Master of all nature?

It is enough to open the Gospel history. There we find that the sea obeyed His command, when He calmed the storm; that the elements obeyed Him, when He multiplied the loaves; that diseases obeyed Him, when He cured the sick instantaneously; that the devils obeyed Him, when He chased them from the

[1] *St. John* v. 33, 36; x. 37, 38.

bodies of the possessed ; and that the dead obeyed Him, when He recalled them to life.

If all nature obeys Jesus, we ought to say that He is truly the Author and the Master of nature, that He is God. This conclusion cannot be denied, unless on condition of denying the historical truth of those facts or their supernatural character. But no one can doubt of their historical truth after what we have said on the authenticity of the Gospels. Nor can anyone doubt of their supernatural character, for there is question of works evidently against or above the natural order ; of works that have nothing to do with the phenomena of hypnotism or spiritism ; of works examined in a thousand ways by adversaries, without their ever succeeding in giving a natural explanation of them. Therefore, our conclusion stands : Jesus is the true and natural Son of God.

The same reasoning might be employed on the miracles wrought by the apostles and saints in the name of Christ ; the same on the prophecies made by Christ with regard to His country, His apostles, His Church, His enemies—prophecies in part verified, and in part verifying themselves before our eyes ; the same, in fine, on the sanctity of His life and the excellence of His doctrine. Even the enemies of the Christian religion agree that the morality of Christ is found so much the more pure, more noble, and more sublime, the more it is understood. In comparison with the teachings of Christ, all the doctrines of old and new masters are a mere nothing.[1] Now the Nazarene having issued from a poor, obscure family, and having never frequented any school, where did He acquire a wisdom so great as, while yet a child, to astonish the doctors of the law, and afterwards all the wise men of the world ?

But there is one fact that is at the same time a synthesis or a summary of all others, and that constitutes the chief foundation of our faith—the fact of His death and resurrection. Jesus shows Himself the Author of Life even in presence of death :—

i. Because He Himself fixed the time in which He would lay down His life ; and up to that moment no one could touch a hair of His head, though many efforts were made to lay hands on Him.

ii. Because He clearly foretold all that would happen to Him ; and as He foretold, so it happened.

iii. Because in the very act by which He delivered Himself to His enemies, He made His divine omnipotence felt, they all falling to the ground at His word (*St. John* xviii. 6) ; and it was only after declaring that the hour of the power of darkness was

1 " Before the coming of Christ," says St. Thomas Aquinas, " none of the philosophers could with all his efforts know as much of God, and of what is necessary to live well, as after the coming of Christ a poor old woman knows by faith. Hence, we read in Isaias : *the earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord.*"—Expos. Symb., a. 1.

come, the hour appointed for His passion, that He permitted them to do what they wished.[1]

iv. Because the very manner in which Jesus conducted Himself in His passion and death was enough to make an unbeliever (Rousseau) exclaim: "If the death of Socrates was the death of a just man, the death of Christ was the death of a God."

v. Because the universal shock of nature at the expiration of Christ on the cross proved that He was really the Author of nature, as in fact the centurion confessed at that moment.

vi. Because He rose again after three days, as He had foretold, and His resurrection—happening while His enemies guarded the sepulchre—was the most splendid proof of His triumph over death, precisely because He was the Author of Life. Thus He demonstrated by facts the truth of what He had said: "I lay down My life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it away from Me: but I lay it down of Myself, and I have power to lay it down: and I have power to take it up again" (*St. John* x. 17, 18).

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST A STUMBLING-BLOCK FOR MODERN CRITICS.

Almost incredible are the efforts of rationalists to elude the miracle of the resurrection of Christ; convinced that "if Christ be not risen again, our faith is vain" (I. *Cor.* xv. 17). For the resurrection of Christ, as Hettinger remarks, "is the victory of the Lord over His enemies, the evident seal of His divine power, the image and sure pledge of our future resurrection and glorification, the last fruit of His labours and sufferings for the redemption of the human race. . . . If the fact of the resurrection

[1] Rèville and Stapfer (both Protestants, one a pastor and the other a theologian) would have us believe that the death of Jesus occurred quite unexpectedly. And behold how it would have happened: While Jesus was preparing to celebrate the Pasch in Jerusalem, He was warned by His disciples that the chief priests had decided on putting Him to death. He at once thought of taking to flight, and seeking refuge for Himself and His followers in Galilee. But one of His party, Judas Iscariot, betrayed Him, revealing everything to the members of the Sanhedrim, who, without loss of time, had Him arrested and executed. Thus, to the evangelical history, compiled by those who gathered from the lips of Jesus the predictions of His death and resurrection, and were afterwards witnesses of the facts that tended to the fulfilment of these predictions, we see men oppose the dreams of their own imagination, which they would pass off as the cream of criticism. Fortunately, even the rationalists themselves let this strange hypothesis die under a compassionate silence; or rather some of them openly impugned it, as did Paul Sabatïer in the "Revue de l'Histoire des Religions" (t. xxxvi., p, 179). We shall not therefore waste time in refuting it. We shall only say with Father Rose that "the person of Jesus has never been more disfigured or humiliated than in these writings, signed by an old pastor and by a professor of theology."—*Études sur les Evangiles*, p. 245.

were destroyed, Christianity would also be destroyed. Instead of a Man-God, the New Adam, with whom a new history in keeping with the original designs of God should begin, nothing would remain but the memory of a man who died in defence of his principles, over whose dry bones history in general would be silent. With the announcement of the resurrection, Christianity was introduced into the world, and the world was conquered by Christianity through faith in the resurrection." [1]

In point of fact, the apostles identify the office of their apostolate with that of being witnesses of the resurrection of Jesus Christ (*Acts* i. 22), to which they constantly appeal when they wish to prove the divinity of their Master (*Acts* ii. 22–38 ; iii. 15 ; iv. 10, *et seq.*). And does not Christ Himself in the Gospel recur continually to His future resurrection as an unanswerable argument by which to prove His divine mission ?

This explains the fury with which the enemies of Christ have always here, more than elsewhere, sharpened their weapons. One denies the prediction, another the death, a third the resurrection ; and in each case hypothesis is laid on hypothesis, so that it would require a volume merely to recount them—a fact this that would alone suffice to show how desperate is their undertaking.

We shall spare the reader the hypotheses put forward to deny the predictions of the death and resurrection of Christ : such would suffice to deny the whole Gospel. And then was it not the Jews themselves who, after the death of Christ, said to Pilate : " We have remembered that that seducer said, while he was yet alive : *After three days I will rise again ?* " (Matt. xxvii. 63–64). We shall also spare the reader some still stranger hypotheses regarding the death and resurrection of Christ—those of men who have recourse to telepathy and the monstrous doings of fakirs—and shall confine ourselves to a short examination of those most common in the past and at present, especially the latter.

The first is that of theft. While the guards were asleep at night, the apostles stole away the body of Jesus, and then spread in public the rumour of His resurrection. This is the imposture to which the Jews at first had recourse, and which the evangelists soon brought to light, so that not one of the Jews themselves durst insist upon it. And truly little is required to understand all the ridiculousness of this hypothesis. How could the guards be asleep during the noise that must of necessity have been made in opening the tomb and removing the stone ? And if they were asleep, how could they bear witness that the disciples had come and carried away the body ? Hence, St. Augustine speaks of this hypothesis as a piece of wretched cunning.

The second hypothesis is that of apparent death. Jesus, having fallen into a swoon and being supposed dead, was taken

[1] *Apologia*, &c., Part I., c. 15.

down from the cross, and laid in the sepulchre; but here he recovered, and was able to leave the place by himself, or by the aid of others, or by some chance accident (a thunderbolt, says Schuster), which dashed aside the sepulchral stone. But this hypothesis is no better than the former. The death of Jesus is attested by so many witnesses and circumstances, that, if any doubt can be entertained of this fact, we must say that historical certainty on any other fact is no longer possible.

Eye-witnesses, among whom is St. John the Evangelist, tell us that Jesus died. The soldiers, who came to break the legs of the crucified, seeing that Jesus was already dead, did not break His; but one of them, urged on by evil mind, did his best to make sure of the death of Jesus. He drove a lance so deeply into the Saviour's side that some blood and water came forth. This piercing with a lance was, in the judgment of all, sufficient to cause death, if life still remained. Afterwards Pilate did not grant the body of Jesus to Joseph of Arimathea until he had ascertained from the centurion that Jesus was truly dead. Yet more. The embalming and burial of Jesus, as they took place among the Hebrew people, would have been enough of themselves to end the life of any living being. Well, to all this what do our critics oppose? Nothing but an invention of their fancy, contradicted and confounded by the reality of events.

The third hypothesis is that of premeditated fraud. Some disciples, having an understanding with their master on the plan of giving fulfilment to the prophecies regarding the resurrection, detached him from the cross before he was dead, and hid him in a garden surrounded with rocks and belonging to friends. Being there cured and healed, he came forth to confirm the report of his resurrection. But I am of opinion that the reader himself will do justice to this hypothesis, telling me to spare myself the trouble of refuting it. For the rest, it also supposes the death of Christ not real but apparent, and may therefore be refuted by the arguments already brought forward.

Modern criticism has generally abandoned the first three hypotheses, and had recourse to a fourth—that of hallucination or imagination. The most fervent followers of Jesus, persuaded that the Messias, according to the Bible oracles, should suffer and die, and then gain immortality, were so possessed by this idea that it seemed to them as if they had Christ living before their eyes again, as it seemed to St. Paul that he saw him on the road to Damascus—thus mistaking the internal visions of their excited fancy for external and real facts. "The strong imagination of Mary Magdalen," says Rénan,[1] "had a leading part on this occasion." She imagined that she saw Jesus risen, spoke to him, touched him. Convinced by her, the apostles did the same. This psychological persuasion being once established, they

[1] In his novel on the *Life of Jesus*.

adorned the resurrection of Christ with poetic legends, such as we have in the Gospels. As would be said to-day, they objectivated their subjective impressions.

Now it is almost enough to give a glance at the Gospel history in order to see on which side is hallucination or imagination. Should not the simple fact of the obstinate incredulity of the apostles avail to stop all the babbling of those who would make them so many visionaries? Behold how a distinguished orator, Monsabrè, undoes the sophisms of an hallucinated criticism:—

"It has read the Gospel very badly, for it should have read that the obstinate incredulity of the apostles has, as its first and principal cause, the fear of hallucination. To the testimony of the holy women, they resolutely answer: 'You are visionaries; we don't believe it.' (*And these words seemed to them as idle tales: and they did not believe them.—St. Luke* xxiv. 11.) And when Jesus appears to them in the room where they are assembled, their first impression is that they see a spirit.[1] To calm their troubles and to banish their doubts, words and sensible acts are required. Thomas, more incredulous than the others, carries his audacity so far as to touch the apparition, and to lay his hand on the wounds. It is only then that he exclaims, *My Lord and my God!*[2]

"Let us consider also that hallucination is a morbid phenomenon, which happens in lively imaginations, habitually exalted. Thanks be to God, the apostles did not yield much to imagination: men of labour, they breathed the fresh air, they were healthy, and in their time they travelled immense distances with their strong feet, eager to carry the good news to the ends of the earth.

"In others, hallucination is a phenomenon purely subjective, which varies according to the bodily constitution and the mental disposition of visionaries. Now, every time that witnesses of the resurrection were assembled together (and on one occasion their number amounted to five hundred), they all saw perfectly the same object and in the same manner. The fever of imitation never works such miracles.

"In fine, hallucination exists only for a time. Though it should last for a number of years, it must at length yield to the protests of good sense, if not by the death of all visionaries. But behold, eighteen centuries have come and gone, and Christianity transmits from generation to generation the triumphal cry, *Christ is risen!* Everything moves from this fact, everything relies on this fact, everything gathers round this fact—our faith, our hope, our institutions, our worship, our history, our testimonies.

[1] "But they being troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit. And He said to them: Why are you troubled? . . . See My hands and feet: handle and see: for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have."—*St. Luke* xxiv. 37–39.

[2] Therefore, the hypothesis of a purely spiritual resurrection, lately defended by the Protestant Arnold Meyer, also falls to the ground.

Therefore, understand it well, the resurrection of Christ is not for us a truth merely speculative, which we defend with arguments, but a practical fact, for which we lay down our lives.

"Millions of martyrs have sealed with their blood that statement with which the apostles inaugurated their preaching. Hence, it follows that if criticism were right, we should have before our eyes the most monstrous of spectacles—that is to say, in the intellectual, moral, and social orders, the most important, the most general, and the most lasting effects, which had for their cause the wandering brains of some visionaries. We should have in effect an atom that generates the world—disorder that produces order—folly that leads genius, creates heroism, and requires the adoration of the human race. . . . What reasonable man will ever accept these senseless conclusions?"[1]

These arguments also hold good against Harnack and Loisy, who deny to the resurrection of Christ the nature of an historical fact, and consider it only as an object of faith. The two critics, however, set out from different points of view. Harnack distinguishes between faith in the corporal resurrection of Christ and the fact of the resurrection of Christ. The former is unquestionable, because the apostles and all Christian generations have believed in the resurrection; the latter, on the contrary, cannot be admitted for want of sufficient proof.[2] With Loisy the resurrection of Christ is an object of faith, not only because it wants the proofs necessary for historical certainty—"because the disappearance of the corpse," he says, "admits other possible explanations besides that of the resurrection"—but also because "the risen Christ no longer belongs to the order of the present life, which is that of sensible experience, and therefore the resurrection is not a fact that can be proved directly and formally."[3] Not only, therefore, is it not historically demonstrated, but it is not even demonstrable. He who has faith, believes it; he who has not faith, will never be persuaded to admit it on the basis of historical arguments, which cannot give it.

Now, we shall confine ourselves to only one observation[4]—that is, to point out the miserable sophistry and equivocation into which Loisy falls when he tries to withdraw supernatural facts from history, for the simple reason that the supernatural is not an object of the senses or of experience. Here he confounds two things: the knowledge of a fact and the judgment on the qualities of the same. A sensible fact, precisely because sensible, is always an object of experience, and therefore of history. To judge

[1] *Esposizione del dogma cattolico*, Vol. VIII., confer. 48.
[2] *Essenza*, &c., conf. ix.
[3] *L'Evangile*, &c., 3rd ed., pp. 118, 119.
[4] Whoever desires a particular refutation of Harnack and Loisy on the present question will find it in Father Rose, *Études sur les Evangiles* (c. viii. Le tombeau trouvé vide); Bonaccorsi, *Harnack e Loisy*, pp. 153–4; Palmieri, *Se e come i sinottici ci danno Gesù Cristo per Dio*, pp. 37–39.

afterwards of the quality of the fact, whether it is natural or supernatural, does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect, This is true also of other judgments that are made about the qualities of natural facts. Therefore, that the resurrection is a supernatural fact does not prevent it from being an object of history. The thesis of Loisy cannot be logically maintained unless by reducing it to that of Harnack. And then both can conclude with Professor Cheyne (of the University of Oxford) that the resurrection of Christ " is only a religious symbol, without any foundation in the concrete reality of history." [1]

And all this, why? If we examine modern criticism to its core, putting aside the prejudices of the system, there is only one argument on which its followers can rely, and on which indeed they raise all their batteries: the antilogy of the four Gospels in relating the fact of Christ's resurrection. Now this is not a finding of to-day; and it is almost enough to take in hand one of the many Concordances of the Bible to see the answer to it. But if the old books no longer please, and a new one is desired as a match for the sophisms of recent critics, I will recommend to my readers the work of Professor Cellini, published in these days by Pustet: " The Last Chapters of the Tetramorph and Rationalistic Criticism—that is, the Harmony of the Four Gospels in their Accounts of the Resurrection, the Apparitions, and the Ascension of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

Much as may be said or done, even by the most impious criticism, all will be in vain. It will always remain true that the resurrection of Christ is one of the most certain and best established facts in the history of mankind.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IS TRULY DIVINE.

A FACT, however, that ought to be still more convincing for modern unbelievers is the existence of the Christian religion, with its admirable history throughout the ages.

As the true Messias, Jesus had come to found the kingdom of God on earth—that visible and universal kingdom, that new alliance which, according to the prophets, He should inaugurate for all ages to come. And, in point of fact, Jesus founded this kingdom, by instituting His Church. He foretold the persecutions that it would meet, and the continual struggles that it would have to endure in all the centuries; but He declared that the powers of the enemy would never prevail against His Church, because He will be with it, and it will last to the end of the world. And the Church, which has now existed for nearly twenty centuries,

[1] *Studi Religiosi* of Florence, September, 1905, p. 531.

stands forward before all as an undeniable fact attesting the fulfilment of this promise.

Let us examine briefly this fact, and we shall have a direct proof of the divinity of the Christian religion. We say *a direct proof*, because the divinity of the Christian religion may be demonstrated in two ways : *indirectly*, and this is done by proving the divinity of its Author ; *directly*, and this is done by proving the divinity of the Christian religion itself. Of the first demonstration, we have treated at length in the preceding chapters. We shall now speak briefly of the second.

The rapid and wonderful propagation of the Christian religion, notwithstanding the thousands and thousands of obstacles that opposed it—its preservation unchanged amid continual terrible assaults—the testimony of millions and millions of martyrs who died for the faith—the sanctity of the Church in spite of the defects of its members—the existence of miracles, which have always accompanied the Church, and which even to-day occur before the eyes of unbelievers themselves—the excellence and sublimity of the morals and dogmas of the Christian religion, with which those of other religions can bear no comparison—the adherence of the greatest intellects to the teachings of Christianity : behold so many unanswerable arguments that demonstrate the divinity of the Christian religion.

1. *The Propagation of Christianity.*—To understand how wonderful were the foundation and propagation of Christianity we should consider :—

i. The end it had in view. This was to overthrow all existing religions and to impose on all mankind that of Christ.

ii. The obstacles to be met.—(*a*) On account of the principal object of its preaching, which was Jesus Crucified. (*b*) On account of the loftiness of its doctrine, for the most part incomprehensible to our minds. (*c*) On account of the severity of its morals, which declared war on all the passions. (*d*) On account of the social surroundings in which it was preached. Society was all infected by idolatrous and polytheistic religions. It was a prey to the greatest moral corruption. It so far mistook the natural relations between man and man as to encourage slavery.

iii. The terrible persecutions that were raised against the Christian religion. (*a*) By Jews and Gentiles. (*b*) By philosophers. (*c*) By rulers.

iv. The means adopted by Christ to overcome these obstacles.—(*a*) Twelve poor men of the common people. (*b*) Unprovided with any human aid. (*c*) Confiding solely in the promise of Christ, who said, " Behold I am with you."

v. The rapid triumph of Christianity. Notwithstanding the frightful number of obstacles that opposed the spread of Christianity, and notwithstanding the absolute want of human assistance in contending with them, the Christian religion soon succeeded in triumphing everywhere. Scarcely twenty years after

the ascension of Christ, St. Paul, writing to the first faithful, said : " Your faith is spoken of in the whole world." And Tertullian, in the time of Trajan, said : " We are of yesterday, and yet we are everywhere. We fill cities, islands, castles, freetowns, barracks, places of assembly, the imperial palace, the senate, the forum. We have left you nothing but your empty temples." Pliny the Younger says the same in a letter written from Asia Minor, where he was proconsul, to the same emperor. And so great were the effects on the converted, that in a little time the face of society was completely changed.

v. The two-fold transformation wrought by Christianity.—In point of fact, Christianity, at its appearance, wrought two great transformations : one internal, on minds and hearts, by means of the new doctrines brought from Heaven ; the other external, on social progress, through the influence of the new beliefs on common life. By the former, it wrought a spiritual redemption ; by the latter, a civil redemption. Yes, even civil. Because it was Christianity that took away social power from the tyranny and despotism of rulers, pointing out that power had its origin in God Himself and should be exercised for the public good. It was Christianity that delivered poor workmen from the slavery in which they lay,[1] ennobled labour, formerly an object of disgrace and contempt, and spread for the first time throughout the world a knowledge of that universal fraternity of all men before God which, without banishing the social hierarchy, would co-ordinate all classes among themselves for the common good, as if to form only one family. In fine, it was Christianity that took to heart the cause of the destitute and afflicted, for whom it raised those institutions which we admire throughout the centuries.

Now, a propagation so made, in such circumstances, with such obstacles, with such means, is contrary to every law of nature ; therefore, it is supernatural ; therefore, it is divine. For if the conversion of the pagan world cannot be attributed to force, or to science, or to the passions, or to any other human cause, nothing remains but to assign it to a divine cause. Either, therefore, the people were converted after the prodigies wrought by the apostles in the name of Christ, and then the divinity of the Christian religion is evident ; or they were converted without miracles, and then, as Dante, following St. Augustine, justly observes, this itself would be the most splendid and astonishing miracle of all.

Incredulity makes the greatest efforts to eliminate any supernatural intervention in the propagation of Christianity. According to Gibbon and his disciples, the spread of the Gospel is naturally explained by the unity of the Roman empire, by the construction

[1] By way of *right*, slavery was abolished from the first day on which Christianity announced its doctrines to the world ; but by way of *fact*, it could not disappear until after these doctrines had entered into the convictions of society, and thus turned the pagan world to Christianity.

of great military roads that put all the world in communication with Rome, by the enthusiasm of the masses for novelties, by the charity of the first Christians, and even by persecutions, which serve rather to diffuse a doctrine than to stifle it. Harnack also, in his recent work on Christianity in the first three centuries, has recourse to these causes and to suchlike " natural coefficients."

Now we are far from pretending that everything was an obstacle to the diffusion of Christianity. We recognise with our sublime poet (*Inferno* ii. 22) that Providence had made the Roman people, without their being aware of it, a precursor to prepare the way for the new religion. But we absolutely deny that such " natural coefficients " suffice to render an account of the admirable propagation of the Gospel, when all supernatural intervention is excluded. If the unity and peace of the Roman empire, for example, and the relative facility of communication that all the world had with Rome, were, on the one hand, an advantage for the spread of the faith, they were, on the other, a very convenient means for crowned persecutors to carry out their evil designs.

The fundamental problem always remains : how was Christianity introduced into the Roman empire ? That not only some chosen souls, but whole multitudes in all parts of the world, were carried away *by enthusiasm* to embrace Christianity—who can seriously assert it, when referring to a religious doctrine preached under the circumstances set forth ? Was the loss of property, of liberty, of life, an attraction for the masses at that time ? And if minds were favourably disposed towards Christianity, how is it that, during the first three centuries, the pagans shed torrents of Christian blood ? This is not the place to enter into more minute particulars. We shall only say in general that there is not a single one of the explanations imagined by incredulity that does not contradict itself, or mistake the effect for the cause (attributing the propagation of the Gospel to the results obtained by it), or is not radically insufficient to explain the effects produced.

2. *The Preservation of Christianity.*—The preservation of Christianity through so many centuries is a fact no less wonderful than its foundation, if we reflect that it had continually to struggle (*a*) against social persecutions, which would crush it by force; (*b*) against heresies, which would corrupt the faith; (*c*) against schisms, which would sever the Catholic bond; (*d*) against the attacks of false science, which would ruin doctrine ; (*e*) against corruption of manners among its own members, which would banish the spirit of sanctity.

Yet Christianity is preserved all the time (*a*) by its dogmas, (*b*) by its morals, (*c*) by its spirit, (*d*) by its social constitution during the early ages, (*e*) by the ever-increasing number of its followers.[1] And all this without any support but the promise

[1] For a critical demonstration and defence of these points, I may be permitted to recommend the reader to my little work on the pretended evolutions of Dogmas and Morals in the Catholic Church (Monza, Tipografia

of Christ—*I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world*—while other institutions, backed by the greatest human powers, tumble to the ground.

When the apostles were called before the Sanhedrim and were scourged that they might not continue their propaganda, a doctor of the law, Gamaliel, stood up to protest, saying: "Let them alone: for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought. But if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it" (*Acts* v. 38, 39). This was the protest of good sense; and the events that followed were a proof beyond all doubt that the work truly came from God.

3. *The Testimony of the Martyrs.*—Much as rationalistic criticism, from Dodwel to Harnack, may try to reduce the list of Christian martyrs, it is, nevertheless, certain that the first three centuries were centuries of blood for the followers of Christ, and that an immense number of each sex, and of every age and condition, gave their lives for Him.

To understand fully the importance of this fact, we have to consider two points: the motive that induced the martyrs of the first centuries to sacrifice their lives, and the circumstances that accompanied their martyrdom.

i. The motive by which the martyrs of the first centuries were induced to sacrifice their lives was that of attesting their deep conviction regarding the truth of the facts on which the Christian religion is founded. Hence they were, in the strictest sense of the word, true *martyrs*—that is, true *witnesses*—of the truth of the facts for which they gave up life. For we should not forget that the martyrs of the first centuries were either immediate

Artigianelli). Here it will suffice to quote a page from Bougaud on the immutability of the Apostles' Creed:—"For eighteen centuries it has subsisted, not hidden away in some secret part of a temple, not rolled up in a bundle like a mummy, but thrown on the highways of humanity, sung in churches, repeated every day on the lips and in the hearts of millions and millions of mankind. And not only does it subsist to the shame of all things else, which are fading and unstable, but for eighteen centuries it has had to bear the brunt of the most formidable intellectual warfare ever seen. It had its beginning on the eve of Pentecost, and it has not yet ceased. And as the sword of the spirit is the most beautiful to be found in the world, who can tell the number and variety of attacks made in virtue of the word? Now it is in close quarters with the subtleties of Greek genius, as in the days of Arius, Nestorius, and Eutyches; now it meets the impetuous eloquence of a time both trivial and sublime, as in the epoch of Luther; again, in this privileged country of the globe (France), where raillery kills with piercing witticisms, as in the period of Voltaire, or even in our days of scientific delirium, with the astonishing discoveries of science not rightly understood. Behold, for eighteen centuries this has continued: eighteen centuries of the most terrible intellectual warfare, maintained by the most choice intelligences. Now, what has been the effect of it? Has a single line of the Symbol been cancelled? No, the Creed subsists, unchanged, in its splendid integrity. It is like one of those beautiful obelisks of red granite brought from Egypt to the piazzas of Rome: the storms of four thousand years have not been able to break a fragment off them."—*Il Cristianismo e i tempi presenti*, v. III., pp. 18–19.

spectators of the supernatural deeds wrought by Christ, as the apostles, or immediate spectators of the supernatural deeds wrought by the apostles and their successors in the name of Christ. Martyrdom, as is seen, is not here invoked as a testimony of the subjective faith of the martyrs themselves, but rather as a testimony of the truth of the facts on which their faith rested. And this suffices to take away all comparison between the martyrs of Christianity and those of any other religion.[1]

ii. The circumstances that accompanied the death of the martyrs are generally reduced to two classes: (*a*) a superhuman fortitude or constancy in the midst of the most cruel and prolonged tortures; (*b*) the miracles that God wrought in their favour, so that, as Tertullian says, "the blood of martyrs became the seed of new Christians." Many witnesses, indeed, of those tortures and miracles ended by becoming Christians themselves.

4. *The Spirit of Sanctity.*—Sanctity, or the moral perfection of Christianity, results from (*a*) the purity of the Christian morals, which the Christian religion introduced; (*b*) from the moral renovation of the individual, of the family, and of society, which Christianity wrought; (*c*) from the countless multitudes of persons who, in Christianity, led a life heroically virtuous. Now, an amelioration so general, so salutary, so thorough, in the public and private manners of men, unknown to any other religion or any other code of morals, cannot be a human work; because the world, at the time in which Christianity appeared, had nothing in itself that tended towards such a renovation. Therefore, this renovation, so great and so beneficial, was a divine work.

5. *The Perennial Testimony of Miracles.*—Not only is Christianity spread after innumerable and astounding miracles—not only may the preservation of the Christian religion, in spite of all the powers of the world leagued against it, be considered a standing miracle—but God has been likewise pleased in every age to attest visibly the truth of His religion, either by miracles wrought through the intercession of holy souls (as appears from the processes of their canonisation), or by ones directly wrought by Himself for the confusion of incredulity. Even to-day have not unbelievers many miracles, critically unquestionable, before their eyes, as we have already demonstrated?

6. *The Pre-eminence of Christian Doctrines over those of any other Religion.*—This is a fact that admits of no discussion, even among rationalists. In no religion, in no system of philosophy, is there given so neat and decisive a solution of all the problems of a religious or moral life as in the Christian doctrine. No doctrine corresponds to all the exigencies of the mind and the

[1] *Ultima Critica* of Franchi (n. 419), who justly observes that when apologists use the argument of martyrdom to establish the truth of the facts on which the Christian religion rests, they limit themselves to the martyrs of the first three centuries.

heart, the individual and society, like the Christian. Perhaps all this is not a sign of its divine origin ?

"Here is a little book that is taught to children," says Jouffroy ; "read it. You will find in it an answer to all the questions put by philosophy, without an exception. Ask the Christian child : what is man ? where is he going ? how is he to go ? why is he in this world ? what will become of him after death ? how and for what was this world made ? does the human race come from one family or from many ? why do men speak different languages ? why do they fight with one another ? how will all this world end ? The little child is not ignorant on these points. Behold what I call a great doctrine : I recognise it from this, that it does not leave unsolved a single question that interests humanity" (*Miscel. filosof.*).

7. *The Testimony of Wise and Learned Men.*—Among the motives of credibility to which the Christian religion lays claim, we may in the last place add the declarations of men of large minds. The greatest geniuses that have done honour to humanity, such as a St. Augustine, a St. Thomas, a Dante, a Galileo, a Volta, a Pasteur, gloried in belonging to the Christian religion. Men eminent in all branches of knowledge have often discussed the monuments of Christian origin, and the characters of blood in which the words of our profession of faith were written ; and they have always been obliged to conclude that the Christian religion is not a work of men, but of God. Even to-day, notwithstanding so many assaults of unbelieving scientists, does not Christianity count men most eminent in every branch of learning among its followers ?

All considered, therefore, we may conclude with Richard of St. Victor : "O Lord ! if we are mistaken, it is Thou who hast led us astray ; because this faith is proved by such signs and prodigies that Thou alone couldst work them."

CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE PERSON OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

It remains for us to say something of the person, the mission, the miracles, and the doctrines of our Lord Jesus Christ.

There are attacks directed against His person : (*a*) that which denies the historical reality of His existence ; (*b*) that which admits the historical reality, but denies the divinity of His person ; (*c*) that which admits the divinity of Christ, but only by faith, and without human reason being able to give a true or proper explanation of it.

The first is that of mythic rationalism, now dying away ; the second is that of critical rationalism, so much in vogue nowadays ;

the third is that of Loisy and others, who oscillate between rationalism and Catholicism.

We have said that mythic rationalism, which makes Christ a myth and denies the historical reality of His existence, is now dying out. Because, although there are still some who carry their hatred and folly to that degree,[1] yet unbelievers as a body no longer dare to contest the historical existence of Christ. And how could they ?

i. Was it, therefore, against a myth that the first persecutors took up arms, and that the philosophers of the first centuries raged ? Was it for a myth that nearly all the Christians of the first three centuries ended their days in the midst of the most cruel tortures ?

ii. Then how explain the testimonies even of Gentiles (Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Josephus Flavius, and others) regarding the existence of Christ ? How explain the discoveries made in the Catacombs, and the thousands and thousands of monuments that ascend even to the first times of Christianity, and that attest the true and real existence of Christ ? How explain the fact of various heresies sprouting up even in the first century with regard to the person of Christ ?

iii. Moreover, that a myth might be formed, propagated, and brought into public belief, two conditions would be required : obscurity of origin, and length of time. But nothing of all this in our case. Jesus Christ appears at a time eminently historical. As we cannot deny the existence of Herod, Nero, and other men, whom history records at that time, so much the less that of Christ, because placed more in relief by the contradictions and persecutions that were directed against Him. Then the adoration of Jesus Christ, as Son of God, began at once with Him, while yet alive ; and the first faithful confessed Him with their blood.

iv. Does not all that we have said on the historical and critical value of the Gospels apply with equal force to the person of Christ ?

v. And even though we had not this accumulation of proofs, would not the very existence of Christianity suffice to belie in the most expeditious manner the mythical hypothesis ? Could a myth have the power to transform the world, to overcome so many obstacles, to impose so many sacrifices, to subject intellects of the highest order, and to form the greatest of all societies on earth ? Well did Martinet say : " If we did not know that there is no folly too great for pride when there is question of flying from God, we should never be able to comprehend how such errors could find place in the human brain." [2]

[1] A short time ago the lawyer E. Bossi of Lugano published, under the pseudonym of Milesbo, a book with the title, " Jesus Christ never existed " (Milan, 1904). Professor A. Fiori answered him with another book, " The Christ of History and of the Scriptures—a Reply to Milesbo " (Rome, 1905).

[2] *Solutions des grands problèmes*, t. I., c. 5.

Hence, modern rationalism has abandoned that hypothesis and turned to the historical Christ, whom it no longer describes in the language of hatred and with a Voltairean smile, but in terms of the utmost admiration, so far as to proclaim him " a man of the most religious mind and the most moral will that ever appeared in humanity." But he is always a man, and nothing more. An extraordinary man, if you will : a superman in the highest sense of the word, even a divine man in the mystical sense of a religious and moral ideal that knew how to be calm within itself, but always a man and not God. Because, as the rationalists say, there is a gradation almost infinite in the forces of nature—physical, intellectual, and moral ; and no one can fix the limit where it may be said, Here the human ceases and the divine begins. On the other hand, they add that, much as the figure of Christ is raised above others, yet they cannot fail to observe the traces of human weakness and the laws of progress and evolution that are manifested in him. Even he formed gradually his conscience, his ideas, his mission. Afterwards, when he had disappeared tragically from the scene of this world, his disciples remembered his works and words ; and in their most ardent love and enthusiasm, they attributed to him doings that he had never done and sayings that he had never said.

The popular imagination magnified all this, and spread it far and wide, until the synoptical evangelists made a collection of the doctrines, facts, and legends set forth, and attributed them all to Christ. In the three Synoptics, however, Christ appears only as a prophet and a wonder-worker : he is not yet God. This he became at a later period, especially by a fusion of Messianic ideas with Greek, Platonic ideas on the *Logos*. And then appears the Fourth Gospel according to John, in which Jesus is presented as the *Logos* or Divine Word incarnate : a word, this, nowhere to be read in the three Synoptics.

Such is the plan of modern rationalism.

i. Now, little is required to understand that the Christ whom it presents to us is not at all the historical or real Christ, but a fantastical or imaginary Christ, such precisely as the rationalists feign for themselves according to the prejudices of their system. A Christ different from that of the Gospels is no longer the historical or real Christ ; and whoever does not admit the Gospels, or accepts them only in part, taking whatever suits him and deceiving with regard to their origin and composition, will always have a fictitious Christ.

ii. The observations that we have made against mythical rationalism hold good therefore against critical rationalism. We will say yet more. The position of critical rationalism is logically much worse than that of mythical rationalism. Attributing the composition of the Gospels to the apostolic age, it is compelled to acknowledge that faith in Christ existed up to that time, as the Evangelists state ; and if people believed in Christ up to that time

as the Evangelists show, it was because they had facts before their eyes. So true it is that, even before the Gospels were written, we see the first Christians who give their lives in confession of the divinity of Christ.

iii. It is, therefore, ridiculous to speak of legends, formed in the apostolic age, which would have transformed the Christ-man into a Christ-God,[1] as it is ridiculous to trace belief in the divinity of Christ to an infiltration of the Platonic *Logos* into Messianic ideas. Even if we did not know that the Platonic *Logos* has nothing to do with the Personal Word of St. John,[2] the fact would suffice that the divinity of Christ was admitted and believed long before the Gospel of St. John—that is, by the first followers of Jesus Christ, who knew nothing about the Platonic *Logos*. It was not, therefore, the author of the Fourth Gospel who first affirmed the divinity of Christ; he only defended it against the attacks of Cerinthus and other opponents. And this explains at once the difference between the Gospel of St. John and the three Synoptics. These being written for people who already believed in the divinity of Christ, their authors concerned themselves only with the facts of His mortal life: facts, however, from which the divinity of Christ always appears. John instead who, according to St. Jerome, wrote his Gospel "against Cerinthus and the growing dogma of the Ebionites," had chiefly in view the divinity of Christ; and, rising suddenly, like an eagle, even to the bosom of the Father, pronounced those words which the world had never before heard: "*In the beginning was the Word . . . and the Word was God . . . and the Word was made flesh.*"

iv. Certainly the human element also appears in Christ, because He is not only God but also man. By the side of the human element, we always find the divine, verifying in Him the two-fold character announced by the prophets, that of the greatest abasement and that of the greatest majesty. This is seen in all His mortal life. He is born in a stable, but adoring angels surround Him, and at His cry rulers are terrified; He is called the son of the carpenter, and, while yet a child, He astounds the doctors of the law by His wisdom; He has nowhere to rest His head, but the winds and the sea obey Him; during His passion He is overwhelmed with pains and humiliations, but, at His last word, the earth trembles, the sun is darkened, the veil of the temple is rent, and the dead rise again; He is laid in a sepulchre,

[1] St. Peter openly declares:—"We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ: but having been made eye-witness of His majesty" (II. *Pet.* i. 16). And St. John thus begins his first Epistle: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life . . . what we have seen and have heard, we declare unto you."

[2] See Polidori, *L'autore*, &c., 1906, pp. 57, *et seq.*; Vigouroux, *Manuale* &c., Vol. III., n. 80

but He comes forth glorious and triumphant from it, conquering death itself. And precisely because the divine element was always associated with the human in Him, He never felt those uncertainties and fluctuations of conscience which the rationalists attribute to Him : uncertainties and fluctuations which they are unable to prove.[1]

v. Another sophism therefore, on which the rationalists place much reliance, also falls to the ground : that it is impossible to point out the limit where the human ceases and the divine begins, considering the endless gradations of human personality. This is a sophism already examined in regard to miracles, and is to be answered in the same way. However great the perfection to which any human person can attain, we are sure that it is a thing finite in itself and in its work, so that it must adapt itself to the laws of nature in all that it does or produces. When, therefore, we find ourselves in presence of Him who not only proclaims by word the divinity of His person, but demonstrates it by facts showing His sway over all nature, which bows reverently at His command, we know with full certainty that He is not only man but God.

But behold us at an immense rock, which seems to threaten destruction to all our arguments! "The divinity of Christ," says Professor Chiappelli, "is a thing of faith, not of science, nor of history. This considers only his humanity in the facts of his life, in the natural and human laws of its manifestations. Even those who believe in his supernatural origin, and that *the Word was made flesh* in him, may and can consider that with flesh he should take the limits, the laws, the modes of human nature. Now *this alone is the object of science.*" [2]

Loisy teaches the same : "The divinity of Jesus is not a fact of the evangelical history whose reality can be critically verified, but an internal belief with which the historian can do no more than verify its origin and development." [3] Because "Jesus entered into the history of men as man, not as God." [4] And such is also the teaching of nearly all those modern apologists who share in the philosophy of immanence.

i. But against this agnostic idea of science, which would limit all that is knowable to what is sensible, the remarks that we have already made in Chapter II. are a reply.

ii. No one has ever pretended that the divinity of Christ can be touched with the hands or seen with the eyes. Even life or the mind cannot be seen or touched. This, therefore, is not the question. It consists instead in finding if man, as intelligent,

[1] Not even Harnack, who asserts them, knows how to prove them.—*Essenza*, &c., p. 138.

[2] In *Nuova Antologia*, p. 484, April, 1891

[3] *Autour d'un petit livre*, 2nd ed., p. 130.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

can know with all certainty the divinity of Christ by means of the works performed by Him, as one can know with all certainty the life and the genius of his fellow-man by the actions that he performs. Did not Christ Himself continually appeal to His works, in order to prove His divinity ?

iii. Either, therefore, it is recognised that the divinity is truly and certainly proved and demonstrated by its works, and then it is an object of science, for it is scientifically proved and demonstrated in the same manner as the genius of a man is proved and demonstrated by his works ; or the divinity is not recognised as truly and certainly proved by its works, but only admitted by subjective faith without proof of facts, and then, for the same reason, all ultra-phenomenal knowledge ought to be denied, man being placed on a level with the beast. There is no way out of this dilemma.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE MISSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

While, according to believers, the mission of Jesus was that of redeeming man from sin, of restoring sinful humanity to the state of grace from which it had fallen in Adam, with unbelievers, on the contrary, the mission of Christ was that of a moralist purely human, who enlightens minds by his doctrine and corrects manners by his example, leaving to everyone the liberty to profit or not by his lessons. No original sin, no fall of the human race from a supernatural state, and consequently no need of redemption. The redemption of humanity consists solely in a progress or civilisation that leads mankind to a condition always higher and better.

The dogmas of original sin and the redemption wrought by Christ would be only subjective elaborations in the minds of believers, which cannot hold their ground before the reality of facts. And behold the proofs of it :—

i. Original sin supposes the fall of humanity from a supernatural state—that is, a state much more perfect than the present. Now although the beginnings of the human race are hidden in a cloud of mystery, yet a great law of development in humanity certainly exists, in virtue of which man, setting out from a primitive state little less than savage, ascends slowly towards civilisation. The various steps of this wearisome journey are marked, it is said, in the geological strata by a corresponding succession of tools, weapons, ornaments, always becoming more perfect in material and in shape. Hence, three epochs or ages of man showing the objects of his work—the stone, the bronze, and the iron. Now, all this is precisely the overthrow of what believers assert. While Christianity places the highest and most perfect

state at the beginning of humanity, historical criticism finds the original state of man at a most rudimental point, and sees humanity progressing and advancing more and more throughout the centuries, always with the cry *Excelsior*.

ii. Not enough. Even the biblical account of the earthly paradise, of the happy state of the first man, and of his pretended fall through a fault committed by him—there is no longer any critic, even among Catholics, who understands it in a literal sense. If one has not recourse to a myth, as the rationalists do, it is explained as an allegory, a symbolism, a piece of poetry, &c. This, in its last analysis, leads to the destruction of all substance in dogma as hitherto understood by Christianity.

iii. Yet more. If the dogma of original sin had a real historical foundation, it should most of all appear in the consciousness of the human race, at least in early times not far distant from the event. Instead, nothing of the kind. In all the Old Testament, theologians have not been able to find more than two texts applicable to it: that of Job, *Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine?* and that of David, *Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in peccatis concepit me mater mea.* Words these which at most prove the concupiscence inherent to human generation, and which in some cases point, not at all to original sin, but to the personal sins of our progenitors. *In peccatis* (not *in peccato*), says David, *concepit me mater mea.*

Even circumcision, which, according to theologians, would have been in the Old Testament what Baptism is in the New, proves nothing. It was not and is not anything but a means to know and distinguish the descendants of Abraham. It availed, therefore, for one single people and for them alone. And what about all the others? Catholic theologians have recourse to *the remedy of nature*, which should take the place of circumcision. But the truth is that not even they can tell us in what *the remedy of nature* consists, or where it exists. And this is so true that even the Councils of the Church have ended by recognising that there is nothing in the Old or the New Testament to support the belief of original sin except the well-known words of St. Paul—*in whom all have sinned* (*Rom.* v. 12). It is in fact to these words, and only these, that the Church appeals in her conciliary definitions on original sin. It was therefore with this apostle, it was with St. Paul, that the dogma of original sin began.

But in what way? By way of misinterpretation and compromise. It is known that the philological questions raised on the words *in quo omnes peccaverunt* of the Vulgate, which may correspond with those of the original text *eo quod omnes peccaverunt*, would suffice to overthrow the whole dogma. We also know the exegetical questions discussed between St. Augustine and the Pelagians with regard to these words. But if the Church made the doctrine of Augustine her own and condemned that of the Pelagians, it does not mean that the Bishop of Hippo con

quered even in spite of the historical reality of things, especially if reflection is made on our foregoing remarks, which do not allow such an interpretation of the words of the apostle.

And if the dogma of original sin has no foundation, that of redemption also falls to the ground :—

i. In point of fact, the first to present the death of Christ as redemptive of the human race[1] is also St. Paul. But everyone knows that his testimony comes at a time when the Christian conscience has already elaborated its own reflex thought, which therefore is not the original echo of the thought of Christ. It is from Christ himself that we ought to know if he truly died for our sins ; and on this point we cannot know his thought, because the few brief allusions intercalated in the evangelical writings are evidently posthumous retouches, due to the influence of the Pauline writings.

ii. Nevertheless, among believers themselves there was always such an oscillation of tendencies as lets us understand the uncertainty and inconsistency of the dogma. With the Fathers of the first centuries, redemption is generally viewed as a ransom from the slavery of the devil. With the scholastics of the middle ages, it is a vicarious satisfaction offered to God by Christ for man, a sinner, unable to atone. Now, on the contrary, with modern theologians, the idea of a willing and loving sacrifice prevails, so that the redemption before all and above all is considered as a work of love, not of justice.

iii. But—these rationalists at length conclude—be it a work of love, or of justice, or of both together, the redemption, as a restoration of the primitive state of grace, ought to have a reconstructive power at least equal to the destructive power of the sin of progenitors. In other words, the truth of the redemption ought to have by comparison a return to that original state from which our progenitors fell. Even the apostles were of this opinion, since they pointed out that return, for the good, in an imminent *parusia*,[2] in a speedy arrival ; and the early Christians were so persuaded that the redemption of Christ implied a full return to that happy state that, when they saw the coming of Christ delayed, they abandoned the millenarian ideas about a spiritual and temporal happiness that the just should enjoy with Christ in this life, after the manner of our first parents in paradise. The sad reality of things too soon dispersed all these illusions, and drove away for ever the hope of a return to that happy state. But what

[1] With the rationalists the death of Christ has only a moral value, like that of Socrates, inasmuch as it is a noble incitement for us to do good, especially to stand firm in our convictions, even in presence of death, and to bear our lot with resignation ; not at all a satisfactory or expiatory value for our sins, so that the death of Christ should be a true and proper sacrifice for the redemption of mankind.

[2] *Parusia* is a word of Greek origin, meaning " presence."—*Trans.*

does all this prove if not a failure in the restoration or redemption expected from Christ?

Such are the chief reasons given by modern unbelievers. If they were true, we ought to say that Christianity is nothing but a great mystification. Instead, the mystification is all on the side of the unbelievers, who distort facts in order to make them say what they really do not say, as we shall see when answering their arguments. For we must not confound criticism with critics. Criticism is one thing, and critics another. Historical criticism has no other office than to show facts as they are, neither more nor less. But critics have often their thesis preconceived, which afterwards they strive to defend, readily misrepresenting facts, because they have to say what is in their mind.

Thus it is in our case. Even though we had nothing but the deep conviction that Christianity has always professed regarding these two truths, the fall and the redemption, which form its whole life and essence, such a fact would be enough of itself to scatter to the winds all the sophisms of unbelievers. Because beliefs of this kind cannot be rooted or maintained without a motive recommending them to the world. But let us come to particulars, according to the order of the difficulties proposed.

i. Before all there is a desire to place in contradiction the teaching of faith on the original state of man with that of science, or rather with that of history, on the successive development of humanity, from a state almost savage to that in which it is now found.

We might answer that, if we prescind from the biblical account, a true and proper history of the origin of the human race does not yet exist and perhaps never will exist. The few and meagre data supplied to us by geology, paleontology, glossology, and ethnography, are not such as to authorise a peremptory conclusion.

Yet we admit as demonstrated a gradual passage from a primitive state, rudimental or nearly so, to the present stage of civilisation. But what about that? Can anything, therefore, be deduced contrary to faith? No, certainly; because what is taught by faith regards only the state of the first man, not the state of humanity, as has been already remarked (p. 31). Humanity, miserably fallen in its head, even according to revelation should travel slowly and wearily on the road of material progress. The same biblical account shows us this road ascending towards civilisation, with its successive halting-places of a wandering life, the chase, the first entrenchments, agriculture, the use of metals, the invention of arts, &c. Thus revelation alone is in a position to reconcile the results of modern discoveries with the old conviction, spread among all people, regarding a primitive golden age and a subsequent general decadence.

ii. And this same conviction, ascending to prehistoric times, would doubtless suffice to banish a legendary character from the biblical account of man's primitive state and his fall.

That there may be something symbolical or allegorical in that account, we do not deny: even the Fathers and Doctors of the Church adverted to it long before our present critics. We deny that it is only of a mythical or legendary character, and that what is said of the state of Adam before and after his fall is not true or real.

Lagrange himself, hailed as master of the so-called biblical critics of the broad school, recognises and admits that the foundation or substance of the biblical account is certainly historical, although in the circumstances and adjuncts that accompany it there may be a good deal poetic, of which, nevertheless, God made use to reveal His thought.[1]

It is not worth while to dwell on the negations of unbelievers, considering that they bring forward no solid arguments. *Quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur*—what is gratuitously asserted may be denied in the same way.

iii. We shall say, rather, that the very fact of that old conviction to which we have alluded gives likewise the most concise refutation to our critics when they assert that there was no echo of original sin in the conscience of the most remote antiquity.

Were it even true that the words of Job and David do not refer to original sin, though the contrary is quite certain from the contexts, and also from the grammatical form in which the words of David appear in the original text; were it even true that circumcision has nothing to do with original sin, though here also the opposite is quite certain, as St. Paul assures us, and with him all the ancient Hebrew tradition; were it even true, in fine, that the so-called "remedy of nature" is only an invention of

[1] The Biblical Commission in Rome has lately (June 30, 1909) answered some very important questions with regard to the first three chapters of Genesis. It tells us that the various systems invented to exclude the historical sense of these chapters, and propounded with a deceitful show of science, have no solid foundation. Hence the creation of the universe by God in the beginning of time—the special creation of man—the formation of the first woman from the first man—the unity of the human race—the original happiness of our first parents in a state of justice, integrity, and immortality—the command of God to man in order to test his obedience—the transgression of the divine precept through the persuasion of the devil under the form of a serpent—the fall of our first parents from the state of primeval innocence—the promise of a future Redeemer: all these facts are such that no doubt can be entertained regarding them. Nevertheless the Commission admits that it is not necessary to take every word or phrase in a closely restricted sense. The language in some places may be figurative or metaphorical. Thus, when God is said *to have walked in the Garden of Eden*, these words are not to be literally understood. In like manner, exegetists are free to discuss whether the Hebrew word for *day* means an ordinary day of twenty-four hours or a considerable period of time. The fathers and doctors of the Church have differed in their interpretation of various passages in the Bible, but always with submission to the Church and with respect for the analogy of faith. The Scriptures are the inspired work of God, though written in a human language suited to the capacity of men, especially men of good will. —*Trans.*

theologians—still it is always evident that humanity has shown in many ways its conviction of the existence of an original fault. So many and so great are the facts with which glossological and ethnographical studies supply us on this subject, even prescinding from the testimonies of missionaries who have gone for the first time among savage people, that it cannot be understood how men attempt to speak in the name of historical criticism, while they deny the most clearly established facts of history.[1]

Without entering into a series of particular facts, I shall mention one that will be equivalent to all: the expectation of the Messias as a Restorer of the human race. As we have shown, this is an historical fact so certain for unbelievers themselves that, not being able to deny it, they strive in a thousand ways to disfigure it; but all in vain. Now, can the expectation of the Messias as a Restorer of the human race be imagined without a conviction of the fall of humanity, which was powerless to restore itself, without the help of the Great Envoy?

iv. It remains to show how false is the assertion that the dogma of original sin is an invention of St. Paul. No; he did nothing but point out the connection of original sin with the redemption wrought by Christ, thus making clear the relations between the First and the Second Adam. Besides, how in the world can the apostle be accused of being the inventor of the dogma, if, according to the words of our adversaries themselves, the Church misunderstood the thought of St. Paul with regard to original sin? Therefore, in this case, it would be the Church and not the apostle that invented it. But the truth is that neither the apostle invented the dogma nor did the Church misunderstand him. However, if they wish to read the words of St. Paul, his argument always runs thus: Death is a consequence of sin because God made man inexterminable; but even *those who have not sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam*[2] are subject to death—that is, infants; therefore, there is a sin common to all, even to infants, which cannot be any other than that committed by Adam, *in whom all have sinned*. It is exactly of such an argument that St. Augustine avails himself in his polemics against the Pelagians.

We come to the second group of difficulties regarding the dogma of redemption, of which St. Paul would still be made the author.

i. The thing is so strange as to appear incredible to Harnack himself. He, in his Essence of Christianity, writes: "It is one of the best ascertained facts that St. Paul was not the first who gave such a deep signification to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; he only conformed to the sentiment and thought of the first Christians." And, in confirmation, he quotes the words

[1] See Monsabré, Confer. XXVI.; *Indice degli errori*, pp. 308, *et seq.*

[2] Qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem prævaricationis Adæ.—*Rom.* v. 14.

of the apostle from the First Epistle to the Corinthians (xv.): "I delivered unto you . . . what I also received: how that Christ died for our sins . . . and rose again the third day."

It is true that Loisy contradicts him, saying that these words of St. Paul "do not guarantee for us in any way that the idea of the expiatory death (of Christ) existed from the beginning with that clearness which the Pauline teaching gives to it."[1] But it is also true that the first Christians, without being critics such as Loisy, could not be ignorant of what the prophets had so clearly foretold about the redeeming death of the Messias, and what Jesus Christ had so earnestly inculcated during the whole course of His life.[2] Is it not true that from the beginnings of the human race He was promised under the idea of a Redeemer, or a Repairer of the sin committed by our first parents? Is not this the predominant idea in all the Messianic prophecies? Was it not for this that Isaias said (liii. 5–6): "He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins. . . . The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all?" Was it not for this also that the Messias was called Jesus—*because He shall save His people from their sins?*

We certainly cannot believe that the first Christians were ignorant of these things, especially as the Precursor had publicly announced Him the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world. And more than the words of Prophets or Precursor, they had before them the continual declarations of Christ Himself, who said that He was come to save that which was lost; that He was the Good Shepherd, and that He gave His life for His sheep; that God loved the world so much as to sacrifice His only-begotten Son. And on the eve of His death, He declared that He was going to shed His blood for the remission of sins, and to give His body for the salvation of the world.

How could the first Christians be ignorant of all these things—they who called Him the *Saviour of the world?* But listen to the profound answer of our critics: The just man described by the prophets is only an ideal type; the allusions to the atoning death of Christ that are read in the Gospels are posthumous retouches made through the influence of the Pauline writings.

And what are the proofs of these assertions? None whatever, except the most strange, the most extravagant suppositions, as a basis for which they exclaim: Criticism says this, Criticism does not say that! We also shall make progress by repeating once more *quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur*, and by referring the reader to what we have already demonstrated in the preceding chapters.

[1] *L'Evangile*, &c., 3rd ed., p. 113.

[2] See Il dogma della redenzione in *Studii Religiosi*, Florence, Sept.–Oct., 1906.

ii. They add: It is, however, a fact that the dogma of redemption was subject to continual evolutions, even among believing Catholics.

Evolutions explicative of it—yes, indeed; but never such as to change the substance or foundation. Thus the ideas of ransom, of vicarious satisfaction, and of loving sacrifice are only three aspects or modes of considering the same dogma of redemption. And although in writers of the first centuries there may be some expression less exact, it certainly would be a falsification of their thought to admit that they understood the ransom of Christ in such a manner that He would have been given into the power of the devil in order to liberate man, as it is a misunderstanding of vicarious satisfaction to say that "it is a most grave error to admit the necessity of the redemption, or of the incarnation, or of the death of Christ." If he who wrote these words knew theology a little better, he would see that the necessity here affirmed is only hypothetical—that is, in the hypothesis that God wishes a condign satisfaction for sin.

iii. And now we are at the last two difficulties, which would seem to be the most insoluble. The redemption of Christ would have failed on trial: (*a*) because Christ has not put an end to sin, as was predicted in the prophecy of Daniel; and (*b*) because redemption, being a work of restoration, ought to have brought us back to the original state from which man fell, whereas, even after the passion and death of Christ, we are still the same as before.

To the first difficulty we answer that the Messias should not at all put an end to the faculty of sinning (for then He should deprive us of liberty itself), but put an end to sin by obtaining pardon for it. And this He did by satisfying the divine justice, and instituting all those means by which pardon and grace are conveyed to our souls. There is no sin for whose remission the merits of Christ do not suffice.[1]

To the second we answer by distinguishing in the original state of Adam the gifts properly called supernatural, such as sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, from preternatural gifts, which do not regard the soul but the body, and which are reduced to an immunity from corporal miseries and death. Jesus Christ, by His passion and death, restored to us both these goods; but the first in the present life to those who make use of the means appointed by Him. Hence, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI., c. ii.) defines the internal justification of the sinner as "a transfer from that state in which man is born a son of the First Adam into a state of grace and of adoption of the sons of God by the Second Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour." The second instead will be

[1] Dicendum quod Christus sua passione nos a peccatis liberavit *causaliter*, id est. instituens causam nostræ liberationis, ex qua possent quæcumque peccata remitti; sicut si medicus faciat medicinam ex qua possunt quicumque morbi sanari.—S. Thom. III., q. 49, a. 1, ad. 3.

given us in the next life, He having placed as a condition that man should first pass through a state of trial, walking in the road trod by Himself. Thus a glorious resurrection, and the gifts consequent on it, will be the effect of the redemption of Christ. For this reason the apostle St. Paul never disjoins the redemption of Christ from the future resurrection of the body.

If afterwards the apostles and first Christians regarded as imminent or not the end of the world and the coming of Christ as Judge, or confounded the Messianic kingdom with the eschatological kingdom, this is not a question that concerns us in the present case.[1] It is enough for us to have demonstrated that historical criticism, through which modern unbelievers think themselves strong, not only has nothing against the dogmas of original sin and redemption, but, unless it closes its eyes against the Old and the New Testament, it is compelled to accept these dogmas as a basis for the facts that result from them.

CHAPTER L.

THE MIRACLES OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

But the most furious attacks of unbelieving rationalism were always directed against the miracles of Jesus, with a view to prove that there was nothing supernatural in them, and that consequently they demonstrate nothing in favour of His divinity. Harnack reduces the evangelical miracles to five groups: he gives in his own way a natural explanation of the miracles of four of them, and, while acknowledging those of the fifth to be inexplicable, observes that later on they also will have their natural explanation.

Here we may reduce to three the chief points on which rationalism at present dwells in impugning the miracles of Christ: (*a*) ignorance of the times in which the evangelical miracles happened; (*b*) the fascination of the religious power of Jesus on believers in His time; and (*c*) the very nature of miraculous facts, which escape all natural certainty.

1. *Ignorance of the Times.*—The evangelical miracles happened at a time in which there was not yet an exact and precise idea of a miracle, such as was afterwards formed by a progressive knowledge of the laws of nature and their value; at a time in which every extraordinary fact, every fact of great importance, was a miracle, though naturally produced like all others; at a time in which facts the most ordinary were magnified by the popular fancy, especially when there was question of personages who exercised a certain fascination on their contemporaries. Are not

[1] On this subject I may be permitted to recommend to readers my little work, *La questione biblica escatologica.*—Monza, Tipografia Artigianelli.

these the reasons why every religion that is lost in the darkness of past ages had its prophets and wonder-workers? Such, in short, are the views of Harnack, whom all the critics and hyper-critics of rationalism follow in a chorus of approval. But the answer is easy.

i. Here the question is not to know what were the thoughts of the apostles and evangelists, or what judgments they formed on the works of Christ; but what were the works actually wrought by Christ. Were they such that even to scientists of to-day they are presented as altogether supernatural—yes or no? The fact, for example, of the resurrection of Lazarus, and that of the resurrection of Christ—are they or are they not true miracles? Are they or are they not of such a nature that at every time and in spite of every progress, they will always remain naturally inexplicable.

ii. The question is now placed in its true terms. And once the authenticity of the Gospels is admitted, or even the compilation of them in the first Christian generation, as modern materialists would make out, the cause of these men is lost for ever.

iii. To speak of magnifying or altering the evangelical facts in presence of the enemies of Christ and His apostles, or after the testimony of blood that these latter rendered with their lives to those facts, is simply to become ridiculous.

iv. And it remains for us to see, also, how ridiculous is any comparison between the miracles of Christ and those of the pretended wonder-workers of other religions that are lost in the darkness of past times.

2. *The Fascination of the Religious Power of Jesus on Believers in His Time.*—A religious soul, says Harnack again, is persuaded that the natural laws are preordinated to a higher end, and that man, by means of an inward force that comes to him from the divinity, can improve the course of natural events. And although this persuasion may be only a thing of fancy or imagination, it can give rise to phenomena truly wonderful and surprising. We see that, even in the life of the body, a firm will and a strong faith produce phenomena that have something miraculous. Let hypnotic facts speak. When, therefore, we regard, on the one hand, the psychical religious power of Christ, and, on the other, the fascination that he should naturally exercise on believers in his power—because he always required faith and a lively faith before working his miracles—we easily understand the secret of all his prodigies, including the expulsion of devils from the bodies of the possessed, who were nothing but poor people suffering from nervous diseases.

This is the thesis of old rationalism cobbled up anew. But here again the answer is easy.

i. Before all, Christ not only cured the sick, but He calmed the storm, He multiplied the loaves, He raised the dead to life, and He wrought other like miracles, to explain which no fascina-

tion or fancy is sufficient. And the refutation of these miracles only because they are superior to natural powers and therefore naturally inexplicable,[1] taking from the Gospel merely what suits the principles of rationalists, is certainly not a good historical method.

ii. In the second place, the cures of the sick that Christ performed were not the effect of any fascination. He never put anyone asleep before working His miracles, but a simple sign of His will was enough to effect, even in persons far away and never seen, the prodigies asked of Him. Nor did He require faith as the cause of a miracle—for He often wrought miracles even in those who did not ask them of Him—but simply as a confession of His divinity, and of the supernatural power that ought to be recognised in Him.

iii. As for the cures of the possessed, in which rationalists see only so many cases of epilepsy or nervous disease, it is enough to refer to one single fact—that which occurred in the country of the Gerasens and of which St. Matthew speaks in Chapter VIII., v. 28–34.

iv. It is not worth the trouble to insist farther on these points when we have to deal with people who reject the supernatural in part, and are, therefore, obliged either to deny or to distort facts.[2]

3. *The very Nature of Miraculous Facts.*—A reinforcement to rationalism came lately from Loisy and his companions.

i. Loisy pretends that supernatural facts, though as sensible as can be wished, are not an object of history, of science, or of natural certainty, but only of religious faith. It is the same sophism already brought against the resurrection and the divinity of Christ. But the answer is that everything that falls under our senses, whatever its origin may be, natural or supernatural, is certainly an object of history and of natural knowledge. It pertains to the intellect to judge of this origin; but the intellect could never make such a judgment, if it had not first a knowledge of the fact.

[1] "That a storm was calmed by a word . . . we do not believe it and we never will believe it; but that cripples began to walk, that the blind obtained sight and the deaf hearing—these are things that can be absolutely denied as mere illusions."—Harnack.

[2] Do you wish an example? Behold how Rènan impugns the resurrection of Lazarus. "It seems," he says, "that Lazarus was sick. Perhaps joy at the arrival of Jesus could restore Lazarus to life. Perhaps Lazarus, yet pale with sickness, had himself wrapped up like a dead man and laid in the family tomb, and then came forth with his winding-bands, after the stone was removed. This apparition would naturally be considered by all as a resurrection." So in his novel "The Life of Jesus." It is true that Rènan is now antiquated in the camp of the rationalists, and new men have changed their tactics. But the fundamental principle always remains, which is to exclude miracles, and in this sense Harnack is equal to Rènan. So true it is that, although admitting the authenticity of the three Synoptics, Harnack explains the supernatural that is mixed therein at every turn either by distorting circumstances or by having recourse to interpolation.

ii. The same answer holds good also against the defenders of immanence, who, in miracles taken generally, and in those of the Gospel taken particularly, recognise nothing but a moral value, similar in all respects to the religious faith of Loisy.[1]

CHAPTER LI.

THE DOCTRINE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

THE last and most ferocious attack of rationalism at the present day is against the transcendency or divinity of the Christian religion.

Even if, by any possibility, it could have demolished the divinity of Christ, His miracles, and His prophecies, there would always remain one fact sufficient of itself alone for the reconstruction of the whole Christian edifice: the sublimity or pre-eminence of its doctrines above those of all other religions, and above all the teachings of men; a sublimity or pre-eminence that appears from the great transformation effected in the world by Christianity, so different from the work of all other religions; a sublimity or pre-eminence that was therefore considered at every time as one of the most evident signs of the divine origin of the Christian religion.

It was therefore natural that incredulity should employ every means to distort this fact; and it was just here that rationalism displayed all the power of its evil genius.

Given to a comparative study of religions, and to an analysis of the various philosophic systems of antiquity, it concluded that all the doctrines of Christianity are nothing but the natural production of human reason, unfolded during the course of centuries; that the most fundamental dogmas of our faith are already found in Buddhism and with the ancient masters of Greece and Rome; that moral doctrines, in particular, thanks to which Christianity came gradually to transform society, are the fruit of Stoic thought, which results specially from writers of a late period, closing with Seneca.

And a proof of the matter is offered in this, that the religious-moral ideas of Christianity are found in a more or less perfect degree among all peoples, even those who never came in contact with the Christian religion. Moreover, Christianity itself, slowly elaborated from human thought during the centuries, appears indeed in its most excellent form in Christ and the apostles, but development of religious-moral thought does not stop with them.

[1] As we have seen, there being only one true religion, all other religions must be false. Hence it is no wonder that none of those false religions have ever produced a Saint who could work miracles. Yet in the Catholic Church, which is the Church of Jesus Christ, the number of such Saints is beyond all counting.—*Trans.*

It continues its evolution with the fathers, the doctors, and the theologians, by whose treatment it undergoes such a transformation that, according to Harnack, very little of Primitive Christianity remains in the Church to-day.

Such are the ideas that are said to be acquired in the domain of criticism, and with which the new masters try to fill the minds of their disciples, so far as to place lessons of this kind in their hands by way of a Catechism. Behold, for example, how Professor Friso, of Pavia, writes in his Manual of Moral Philosophy, which makes part of the Hoepli Collection : " History, accustomed to judge impartially, and to seek the natural and human reasons of facts, sees how the ancient world mounted up slowly through its social, political, economical, and moral events, with a long elaboration of its thought and sentiment, towards that order of ideas and affections which was Christianity—even this being a natural fact and a production of the fulness of time."

Rationalism, in short, setting out from the supposition that Christ is only man and not also God, considers all the Christian doctrines as a synthesis of the moral and religious ideas that prevailed in the world before Christ, and Christianity itself as an elaboration more or less perfect of those ideas which Christ, the apostles, the fathers, and the theologians of the Church have afterwards given us.

But all this is a house of cards, which tumbles to the ground at the first touch—that is, at the first appeal to the reality of facts. The Christian doctrines are those sealed by Christ Himself, and transmitted to us by the apostles and evangelists. The fathers, the doctors, the theologians have only interpreted and explained these doctrines, but their thoughts do not enter into the constitution of the doctrines themselves.[1] The whole question is therefore reduced to the teaching of Christ.

Now, who was Christ, that all this elaboration of thought about which the rationalists dream may be attributed to Him ? If one prescinds from His divinity, and, worse still, denies it openly, He is only the son of a poor tradesman, brought up to thirty years not at school but in a workshop, naturally ignorant of what happens outside His own country, ignorant therefore of the moral and religious ideas of other peoples, also of the intellectual patrimony of his fellow-countrymen. No human or natural elaboration

[1] According to Harnack, Catholicism is a masking of the evangelical religion by the aid of the fathers, doctors, and theologians of the Greek and Latin Churches ; so that Protestantism, breaking from the Catholic Church, merely returned to primitive Christianity. Now, in dealing with an historical critic, as Harnack boasts himself, it should be enough to remind him of the peremptory demonstration by facts that in these days the Commendator, O. Marucchi, has given in his work, " The Catacombs of Rome and Protestantism " With the discoveries made in the Catacombs as a basis, he demonstrates the truth of Catholicism and the falsity of Protestantism, because even from the first centuries Christianity presents itself with the same beliefs, the same sacraments, and the same hierarchy.

of the doctrines of others in His thoughts ; therefore, no summary or synthesis. Yet this is the man who, while only a child, astonishes the Doctors of the Law by His wisdom ; this is the man who, having scarcely presented Himself before the crowds, draws from the lips of the messengers of the Pharisees the cry of amazement, *Never did man speak like this man* (*St. John* vii. 46) ; this is the man, in fine, who has given us that doctrine which has transformed the world, and has been the admiration of the centuries.

To speak then of elaboration or synthesis on the part of the apostles and evangelists, in a rationalist sense, is simply ridiculous—either because all know who the apostles and evangelists were, or because there is question of a doctrine that no one could have invented, if Christ had not revealed it. Is not the very fact that no elaboration or synthesis of human thought, before or after Christ, could produce that transformation which Christianity wrought, the most evident proof that, therefore, the Christian doctrine is not a natural production of reason ?

For the rest, rationalism has its most solemn confutation in the fact that Jesus did not adapt, but opposed, His teachings to those of the world. Hence, there speedily arose the most fierce persecution. And is not this the reason why St. Paul said that his preaching was a stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the Gentiles ?

But behold the tactics of the rationalists. They regard only the apparent similarities of the evangelical doctrine with others, and do not concern themselves about the dissimilarities and differences, which, however, are many, grave, and radical ; [1] they regard the evangelical doctrines only on the side that they reflect natural duties, easily known to all, and make nothing of the most important differences, because they consider the supernatural impossible, thus changing the historical question into a metaphysical one.

Now we do not deny that the Christian religion may have something in common with other religions or doctrines. Are we to suppose everything false that is taught in other religions or doctrines ? May not that which has more, have also less ? We deny only that the Christian religion has derived its teachings from these religions or doctrines, and that it contains nothing but what it has in common with them.

It is proper to distinguish in Christianity two classes of truths : those which can be naturally known by human reason, and those which cannot be known except by revelation. The former—such as the existence of God, the future life, the moral law—ought to exist before Christianity and to be known by all, at least

[1] It is the same method that the transformists follow when they pretend to derive man from a beast, taking as a basis the resemblances that exist between the two, and not caring about all the differences.

in a general way. Nothing more natural, therefore, than that they should be found in all religions. But in other religions they are found as teachings of human reason ; in the Christian, as teachings that come immediately from God.

Hence, the immense difference that exists between Christian and pagan morals, even from a purely ethical or natural point of view. The former are imposed in the name of God, they are binding on all, they have a precise sanction, and therefore they exercise a true and powerful influence on the conduct of man. The latter are imposed in the name of reason, they are uncertain and fluctuating like the opinions of men, they cannot point to any determinate sanction, and therefore they are of little or no efficacy in the regulation of human life. The former rest on the three dogmas of the creation, redemption, and final destiny of mankind. The latter know nothing about creation or redemption, nor can they determine in what the final destiny of man consists.

When therefore it is considered that the theology of the ancients, including the Stoics, was full of polytheism, full of deities who were patrons of vice : when it is considered that the most elevated minds ended by confounding the Divine Being with nature ; when it is considered that all the actions of men were declared subject to the inexorable necessity of fate, over which no one had control, not even the Supreme Jove ; when it is considered that the greatest masters of the Stoic school denied the immortality of the soul, or understood it in a pantheistic sense, or granted only a temporary survival, or turned directly to metempsychosis ; when it is considered that the whole scope of life was made to consist either in the enjoyment of pleasures (the Epicureans), or in the attainment of wisdom and virtue (the Stoics) as ends of themselves, and therefore the sum of wisdom and virtue was placed in that selfish apathy and imperturbability with which we are well acquainted ; when, I say, all this is considered, it will easily be understood what kind of comparison exists between Stoic and Christian morals, and how the latter can be said to be derived from the former.

All the pretended resemblances are reduced to some sentences scattered here and there in the writings of the ancients, which reflect the common ideas of reason, or are an echo of primitive tradition, or, what happens most frequently, take a quite different sense in their contexts from that understood by our adversaries. Thus, to prove that human charity and fraternity are not new ideas of the Gospel, what is done ? It is proved that the words " charity " and " fraternity " were used by some moralists, poets, or philosophers before Christ. And it is not noticed that a resemblance of names does not always imply a resemblance of ideas ; it is not noticed that while, among Christians, charity and fraternity are a precept or a law which is founded on the three dogmas mentioned above, and which therefore makes of the whole human race only one family, bound together by the chains

of the same faith in God the Creator and Jesus the Redeemer, and with the consolation of the same hope in eternal happiness—among the ancients, instead, they are only a natural sentiment of good souls, moved to pity by human miseries—a sentiment that could never by the efforts of man rise to the rank of a duty, as charity is for us.[1]

But this is not all Christianity. Besides moral and religious truths, accessible of themselves to human reason, it embraces all those supernatural truths which we admit by faith, because revealed by God, but which we could never know without revelation. To reduce the whole essence of Christianity to a natural knowledge of the paternal goodness of God, as Harnack does, is to substitute rationalist prejudice for the reality of facts.

What those supernatural truths are, the faithful know from their Catechism. Here, to avoid equivocation, we shall only say that revelation did not begin, but ended, with Christ. The fact therefore of finding with the prophets a sketch of those dogmatic and moral doctrines which Jesus Christ afterwards developed, perfected, completed, and extended, does not at all prove that natural elaboration to which the rationalists refer. And this because the prophets announced what God had revealed to them; and this same "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by His son" (*Heb.* i. 1–2).

When, therefore, the rationalists make Christ a natural production of the prophetic surroundings in which He was born and lived, and paint Him as one becoming slowly penetrated with the Messianic idea until at length He persuades Himself that He is the true Messias,[2] they prefer the dreams of their own fancy to the facts of history. This tells us that the social surroundings in which Jesus Christ appeared were not prepared by men, but by God, through the instrumentality of the prophets—prepared, however, objectively, or as regards the doctrines announced by the prophets, not subjectively, or as regards the dispositions of souls, because Jesus "came unto His own, and His own received Him not" (*St. John* i. 11).

[1] See Franchi, *Ultima Critica*, n. 328; also Talamo, *Le origini dei Cristianesimo*, &c.

[2] A writer, named James Stapler, in the *Contemporary Review* for January, 1900, informs us that at present there is a most active school of young theologians, especially in Germany, who endeavour above all things to show the importance of the Messianic element. They maintain that, like every other historical character, Christ was the creature of His time, and ought to be interpreted as a production of the conditions in which He was born and educated. According to them, Jesus Christ was confined within the ideas of His time, and His opinion of Himself was entirely Messianic. When at last death was imminent and clearly inevitable, He took refuge in the idea of a second coming in which He would obtain all the glory that He had not been able to obtain on His first appearance. In this belief He died, and left the illusion to His followers, who all expected that He would re-appear within a generation.

To speak, therefore, of comparisons between Christ and Buddha, between the doctrines of one and those of the other, as is done at present by rationalists, in order to conclude that Christianity has taken everything from Buddhism, so that Buddha should be preferred to Christ—this is the height of ignominy and the most stupid mental aberration, which has no parallel but in the conduct of the Jews who preferred Barabbas to Christ.

Apart from the fact that the very existence of Buddha is lost in myths and fables, as the darkness of his times attests, Professor Friso is obliged to ask himself the question: "Was Buddha an atheist or a believer in God?" And although his answer is a little twisted or wavering, he ends by joining those who rank him as an atheist, because the doctrines of his system really befit such a one.[1]

And then what comparisons can ever be instituted between the doctrines of the one and those of the other?

Perhaps in morals? But the object for which one ought to live, according to Buddha, and at which one arrives by living honestly is *Nirvana;* and *Nirvana* is a kind of everlasting sleep, an annihilation of one's individual existence, an absorption of the individual in the bosom of Brahma (the God of the Indians, who is confounded with the universe), or, as Professor Friso says, it is "a vanishing into the supreme principle of all things." Thus, all the evils of life are at an end! Now, is not the mere comparing of these stolid doctrines with the sublime and most pure morals of the Gospel a thing more than ridiculous? And will men have the courage to maintain that Christian asceticism and monasticism are derived from Buddhist asceticism and monasticism. And all this in the name of history and criticism?[2] Poor history and poor criticism!

[1] Friso, *Filosofia Morale*, p. 17.

[2] They say: "It is a fact that Buddhist monasticism exists, with practical asceticism and penitentiaries that agree perfectly with those of Christian monasticism; therefore, since Buddhism was before Christianity, it is proper to say that the latter copied from the former." And they do not consider that even though the original institution of Buddhist monasticism, as it actually is, were historically certain, there would always be an abyss between Christian and Buddhist monasticism, as regards the animating principle that inspires the practices of one and the other. Christian monasticism prompts entirely to the practice of the evangelical counsels, so as to make easy the attainment of eternal life and a more intimate union with God. Buddhist monasticism instead has no idea of the love of God, because the morality of Buddha is atheistic, and therefore has no rational term at which it aims. And being without charity towards God it is also without charity towards men. In point of fact, as Weber, an unsuspected witness, observes, the love of the neighbour in the religion of Buddha does not pass the limits of castes, or at most rises to a patriotic sentiment; but the love of mankind in general (much more the love of enemies) was unknown on the banks of the Ganges and the Indus (*Histoire ancienne*, &c., French trans., Paris, 1861, p. 186). We have said "even though the original institution of Buddhist monasticism, as it actually is, were historically certain." But is it certain? Our adversaries suppose it,

Perhaps in religious belief? But the belief in the Indian *Trimurti*, in the Buddhist incarnation and creation, has nothing to do with Christian faith in the three dogmas of the Trinity of Divine Persons, the Incarnation of the Word, and the Creation of the World out of nothing: we should indeed be ignorant of the most elementary notions of the Catechism, if we insisted on comparisons such as these. In point of fact, the Trimurti is nothing but a numerical union of three divinities (Brama, Visnù, and Siva), who appear successively in the worship of the people: divinities so different by nature and operation that the first two are continually wrestling with the third, who is a kind of malicious genius. Nothing therefore, even from afar, shadows forth a unity of nature in a trinity of divine persons. The Buddhist incarnation then is nothing but a kind of metempsychosis. Visnù does not become incarnate only once, but continually, now in one way and now in another, to combat Siva. Where is there an idea of the Incarnation of the Word here? We have at most a mixture of errors, in which we find an echo of ancient traditions on the fall of man and angel. The same is to be said of the dogma of creation, notwithstanding that it treats of a rational truth. Brahma is not the creator of the universe, like Jehova with the Hebrews. He is only its vivifying principle. He is the mind mixed up with the great body.[1] And this is pantheism.

And they are called great men or great wits who make modern criticism consist in paradoxical resemblances such as these![2]

but they do not prove it. Instead of that, able critics are of opinion that the material practices of Buddhist asceticism are now quite different from what they were before Christianity, owing to modifications and infiltrations received from contact with Christianity and Christian monasticism. For we must not forget that in the first century of our era St. Thomas was in India; that in the second century Pantenus went thither from Alexandria; that in the fourth century Frumentius went, sent by St. Athanasius; that in the fifth century, when there were many Christians, and an ecclesiastical hierarchy was already established, many monks went thither, who formed various religious communities with our usages and flourished until the seventh century. An invasion of the Saracens having occurred, it put an end to Christianity in those places; and it was only in the thirteenth century that the Franciscans, in the sixteenth that St. Francis Xavier, turned to evangelise those people. But the influence of Christian practices had already penetrated among those nations, and even though the spirit was driven out, much of the body remained—that is, many of the external practices of Christianity and Christian monasticism, which now pass for institutions of Buddhism. Certainly the testimonies that St. Francis Xavier received from old Indians in the sixteenth century, so much the more candid as they were the more confidential, confirm this view.

[1] Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet.

[2] Jacolliot pretends that not only the doctrine, but also the life of Christ, as narrated in the Gospels, and even the name Jesus Christ, are importations from India. And there are still people among us who regard seriously such charlatans of history, of criticism, of science, and of common sense! (see De-Harlez, *The Bible in India*, and *Civiltà Cattolica*, Jan. 1 and Feb. 19, 1898). Against these insane attempts to substitute Buddhism for Christianity, Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire wrote thus a few years ago:—"It is

But behold the great and formidable argument that critical rationalism proposes as its last for us. We admit, it says, the pre-eminence of the Christian doctrines over those of the pagan world; we recognise all the influence and efficacy of Christianity during the course of centuries. But does it follow thence that its doctrines are truly supernatural, and that we cannot and should not substitute for them others much better, and more suited to the requirements of the times and the progress of humanity? No, certainly. Who is not aware that human thought is continually making progress, and that likewise the practical rules of individual and social life should correspond to the new wants of minds more emancipated and society more advanced? Christianity, willingly or unwillingly, has had its day. It is still in the middle ages, and we are in the twentieth century; it is stationary, and humanity goes ahead. And what, as a matter of fact, is the reason of the decadence in the Latin races, compared with the Anglo-Saxon, if not precisely this, that the former are crystallised with the Catholic Church in the Christianity of the middle ages, whereas the latter, by the Reformation and freedom of opinion, have opened a way for thought in every direction? "If religion has so few followers now," says Graf, "it is because it stands still; let it move on, and countless multitudes will follow it." [1]

Such maxims, which to-day are sung and resung in every key, do not fail to make a certain impression on light and superficial minds. But they are worthless rhetoric, and nothing else.

No progress of thought or evolution of conscience can remove the dependence that we all have on God as our first beginning and last end. No progress of thought or evolution of conscience can remove the historical fact of a Divine Christian revelation, or the obligation that is therefore incumbent on all mankind to receive the word and the command of God. No progress of thought or evolution of conscience can therefore do without the Christian religion in the attainment of eternal life; and, however much boasting there may be to-day about emancipation from dogma, about liberty of conscience, about moral independence, it will always remain true that no one can attain salvation but by believing and doing what God commands to be believed and done. Behold why the apostle St. Paul said: "Jesus Christ yesterday, and to-day, and the same for ever" (*Heb.* xiii. 8). And behold

not so serious an attempt as a rehabilitation of Buddhism; it is at most a literary fancy, which itself is not without inconveniences. Souls have evils enough to trouble them, without adding one more. Let people admire, as much as they please, the character of Buddha, his intentions, and his whole life; but let us avoid his deleterious doctrines. Buddhism ought to enter into history, and to keep there the place due to it; but it should not enter into hearts."

[1] *Per una fide*, Milan, Treves, 1906, p. 84.

why Christ Himself said: "Heaven and earth shall pass away. but My word shall not pass away" (*St. Mark* xiii. 31).

It is therefore simply ridiculous to pretend to substitute other doctrines for those of Christ: the more so, if they are sought in the modern scientific world. Who does not know that all modern science is agnostic, or without any care about *the beyond* (if it is not openly denied), and that the great aims of study are a knowledge of nature and the advantages of the present life?[1] Now, all this does not satisfy and will never satisfy the inmost cravings of the heart and soul, but will rather serve to increase them. After all the discoveries of science, a question will always arise from the depth of our being: *Is this all?* And this question will never have any answer but: *Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity.* And then: "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his soul?" (*St. Mark* viii. 36). And behold the Christian religion points out to us and makes clear for us everything that regards *the beyond*, of which reason can tell us little or nothing, science can tell us nothing, and of which everything is certain by faith, because the only-begotten Son, He who is in the bosom of the Father, has revealed it (*St. John* i. 18).

Finally—and this is still more important—so far is scientific progress from being able to take the place of faith, that faith itself is necessary not only for the wants of the soul and the interests of the future life, but also for the wants and interests of the present life. This we have already demonstrated (p. 62 and p. 83), and we do not wish to repeat. We shall only say that an indirect or negative proof is supplied to us to-day by the very condition in which society finds itself.

All feel that thus there is no going forward, and that the secret evil which gnaws society is the want of religion and morality. All feel that the social question is a moral question, arising specially from the work of unchristianising the world, which has been in great measure accomplished to the injury of society. All feel, in short, that only through the Christian religion can society recover its life and its moral power, even in presence of economical and political evolutions, because in it alone we discover the foundations

[1] When we consider, on the one hand, the moral impotence of reason to know with certainty all religious truths even of the natural order (see p. 86), and, on the other, the pretence of modern science to solve all problems and to take the place of faith, though remaining in the field of facts and phenomena, we speedily understand how Brunetière could say: "During six thousand years, so much progress made in science has not enabled us to take one step in a knowledge of our origin, of our nature, of our end. So long as science has no answer to give to these questions, it will be only what Pascal calls it, a *distraction*; that is to say, a mode of preventing us from thinking on the only questions that concern us, and from falling into that despair in which our inability to give an answer would plunge us." This secular powerlessness of science to solve the greatest spiritual and moral problems is what Brunetière calls the "bankruptcy of science."

of that fraternity which draws all men together, secures justice, guarantees right, facilitates duty, and maintains peace and social order. In it alone we understand clearly the origin and nature of man ; the origin and nature of the family ; the origin and nature of society ; the origin and nature of social power, its scope, the good that it ought to procure for society, the duties of men towards one another, and the grave sanctions attached to those duties.

And behold why one of the deepest thinkers of our age, a man who was an historian, a philosopher, a critic, an artist, and a naturalist at the same time, Hippolitus Taine, after professing positivism and unbelief in his youthful writings, should in his mature years, and in his best work, which is *The History of the Beginnings of France*, come forward to render to the Christian religion this splendid homage :—" We appreciate all the value of what Christianity has done for modern society. Whatever of honesty, of good faith, of justice remains in it, is due to Christianity. No argument of philosophers, no culture of artists or literary men, no sentiment of chivalry or military honour, no code of laws, no administration, no government can be of any real use without Christianity. Outside of Christianity there is nothing that can withhold us from following our natural inclinations to evil, or hinder us from rushing into those depths of degeneration and depravity which end in barbarism. Even to-day the old Gospel is the best auxiliary that society can call to its aid."

What are we to say, therefore, of the pretended decadence of the Latin races by reason of their Catholic Christianity ? Is it true that the Protestant nations are more advanced in the way of civilisation and progress because separated from the Catholic Church, or because they no longer profess Primitive Christianity in its integrity, as it is professed in the Catholic Church ? The answer is in what has been already said. For the rest, that accusation is a sophism and a lie.

It is a Sophism.—Because those men who boast the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon races over the Latin do not consider that scientific material progress and civilisation may be brought about by a variety of causes extraneous to religion, such as the more or less industrious character of a people, the geographical position, the fortune of arms, and other like circumstances : all things that can never generate a civilisation and progress truly worthy of man—that is to say, a moral civilisation and progress, which imply a raising and directing of man and society towards their proper goal, as we have elsewhere (p. 63, *et seq.*) demonstrated.

It is a Lie.—Because even with regard to material civilisation and progress, the Latin races do not yield to others, as might easily be shown with history and statistics at hand.[1] If there is decadence in Catholic nations, it is not in comparison with Pro-

[1] See Napoleone Colajanni, *Latini e Anglo-Sassoni*, Naples, 1906.

testant ones, but rather in comparison with what they themselves were once and what they are now. For a movement of reaction against the moral and religious doctrines of Christianity made too much entrance after the Reformation, even under the eyes of Catholic princes and governors : a movement that led to that unchristianised state in which society now finds itself, and, consequently, to that feeling of unhappiness and that want of moral power which are the chief causes of social dissension. But what does all this prove if not the impossibility of true progress and true social civilisation without the help of the Christian religion ?

It is easy to play with sophisms. The truth is that if there were no Catholic Church—a power essentially conservative—Christianity would long ago have disappeared from the face of the earth, and the peoples would have relapsed into that state from which they had been delivered.

CHAPTER LII

THE OPPONENTS OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

Why then is it that nearly all men of science have no longer any relish for Christ or Christianity ? Why do they no longer see in Jesus Christ the Son of God, but only a son of man, only a master of moral and religious doctrines, more or less suited to our times ?

Here we have a fact that makes perhaps the deepest impression on weak minds, and often causes them to waver in the faith. Yet if it is considered a little more closely, this fact settles nothing, but rather becomes a confirmation of the words of Christ, who, as He had foretold the infidelity of His fellow-countrymen, also foretold that they would have imitators.

Meanwhile—fact for fact—we can oppose that of other contemporary scientists who believe in the divinity of Christ ; that of all the greatest geniuses of mankind who have bent their knee to the outraged victim of Golgotha ; that of all the greatest apologists who have studied and sifted in every manner the proofs of Christianity ; that of the greatest thinkers and unbelievers of our age who returned to the Christian Faith, as an Emilius Litrê, a Julius Simon, an Alexander Manzoni, an Hippolitus Taine, an Ausonius Franchi, a Ferdinand Brunetière, and many others, whom for brevity sake we omit. If, indeed, science were the natural enemy of faith, as it is painted, would it not be impossible to explain the return of these men, not only most learned, but who knew exactly, and reduced to atoms, the most specious and formidable objections against the Christian religion ?

It is true that the great wits of contemporary unbelief, who look with an eye of pity on the multitude of believers and have always the word " science " on the top of their tongue, say that

all those great thinkers are not worth a fig, because it was the natural physical sciences that opened the eyes of men, and made evident to them the falsity of all religions, including the Christian. But apart from the answer that we have already given in its place, it is also true that the natural physical sciences have never prevented the most distinguished cultivators of them from believing in the Christian religion.[1] Perhaps we are not to regard as eminent naturalists and Christian believers a Copernicus, a Galileo, a Newton, a Pascal, a Cauchy, a Jussieu, a Cuvier, a Fleurens, a Liebig, a Herschel, a Leverrier, a Secchi, a Stoppani, and so many others ?[2] A half science may withdraw from God, but a full and complete science is that which leads to Him. And this is the reason why men truly great in knowledge glory in being believers, while shallow dabblers take pride in their incredulity.

As a matter of fact, who are the men in our days that no longer

[1] See Bricarelli, *Un pregiudizio intorno ai più insigni naturalisti*, 2nd ed., Roma, 1906. A German Protestant, Dr. Dennert, has made a short summary of the religious opinions of three hundred learned men, chosen among those who during the last four centuries were most distinguished in the natural sciences—botany, physics, astronomy, biology, geology, anatomy, &c. The work of Dr. Dennert was lately published in Berlin. We shall give some of the important notices found in it. In the first period—that is, from the 15th century to the 17th century, Dr. Dennert mentions 82 scientists: in this number he counts 79 believers, and among these the most celebrated practised their religion, as Newton, Huygens, Leibnitz, Kepler, Galileo, Copernicus. In the second period—the 18th century—55 names are quoted: they contain 5 unbelievers or indifferentists, 11 of faith unknown, and 39 believers, who admitted the existence of God, of the soul, of revelation. Among the most illustrious, we note Herschel, Linneus, Werner, Boedhave, Bradley. The third comprises the 19th century. In it the number of scientists is much more considerable. Dr. Dennart cites 167 eminent scientists: of this number 124 are believers, 27 have no philosophical opinions well known, and only 12 are not believers. Among these are counted some materialists, as Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin. As for the last-mentioned, whom Dennert places in the number of unbelievers, it is well to note that he never pronounced in favour of materialism. For a long time, Darwin admitted the existence of a supreme intelligence; afterwards, he at least always doubted. A horrible doubt. he said, but it always returned. But in comparison with such citations, how many, how clear, how beautiful the declaration of Christian faith made boldly by such men as Hermitus, Pasteur, Hanij Jarady, G B. Dumas, Cauchy, Ampére, and so many others ! In fine, out of 300 scientists cited by Dr. Dennart we find 242 believers, spiritually convinced, absolutely repudiating materialism, proclaiming a perfect harmony between faith and science.

[2] The reader will observe that among the men named here and in the last note several did not belong to the Catholic Church. But it is greatly to their credit that they acknowledged the divine origin of the Christian religion; for it shows a good disposition of mind and heart. It is also to the credit of the Christian religion that men so enlightened felt unable to deny its existence, though they failed in distinguishing the Catholic Church from all others. We may hope that further graces before the last hour helped to unite them, if not with the body, at least with the soul, of that Church which alone has been entrusted with the guardianship of the true faith.—*Trans.*

believe in the divinity of Christ? They are generally those who no longer believe in the existence of God or a future life. And why? For the usual causes of unbelief. There are some learned men, or rather most learned in physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, history, and so on through every branch of knowledge, but who take no interest whatever in anything relating to God, to Christ, to religion. On their tomb might be placed the epigrammatic epitaph written for Aretino, and which we reproduce so modified as to suit our case:—

> Here lies Aretino, the Tuscan poet:
> He spoke of everybody except Christ,
> And excused himself, saying, I don't know Him.

As for those who are represented as positive unbelievers, because they continually cry out against the Christian religion, what knowledge have they of it? There are writers who have spent twenty years in reviling the Gospel, and not one day in reading it. There are others who know by heart all the objections that are made against the Christian religion; but the answers, which have been given for centuries to these objections, they have never seen or heard. Of Christianity and the proofs on which it is founded they have no other knowledge but what is formed on the false lines of those who have hitherto combated it in the schools and in books.[1] Hence, nothing more common in our days than to meet lawyers, doctors, engineers, politicians, scientists, &c., who are ignorant of the most elementary points in the Catechism, and yet undertake, right or wrong, to pronounce sentence on the most difficult religious questions, so that it is a misery to hear them.

"And whence comes this singular privilege granted to religion," as was one day asked with deep irony, "that every person is permitted to handle it without scruple, and what in other matters is called impertinence is here set down to gentility? Look, for example, at the Bible. Is there any profane book, ancient or modern, that has been so illtreated as the divine code, by those critics, no less bold than clever, who speak with more reserve of mythology than of the sacred annals—so that some of them

[1] Young men, who enter the public school to be prepared by instruction and education, as on a noble wrestling-ground, for the battle of life, are obliged to learn everything but Jesus Christ and His religion—that is to say, everything but what ought to be known best of all. "Every time that I go on a commission of examination," said Villari in his speech at Florence on the centenary of Savonarola, "I cannot help reflecting that if one of us asked the scholars something about the miracles of Jesus Christ or the legends of the Saints, people would begin to laugh, and to inquire: Is this man come down from the moon? But if instead one of us asked about the myth Venus or Mercury, and the scholar did not know how to answer, it would appear to all quite reasonable that he should be reproved. . . . I remember being engaged once with poor Gabelli in a commission to draw up programmes. We said: Why ought there to be mention of Mahomet and the Koran, and not of Jesus Christ and the Gospel? Nevertheless, we had to yield."

seem to make one part history and another part fable? Who would dare to argue about physics or chemistry as some men do about religion? Who would not be ashamed to utter in regard to natural sciences those solemn fanfaronades which are every day spoken and printed in regard to theological matters? Everyone lays waste this field in his own way. Every scribbler, when he does not know what to write about, falls on religion as the prey of the first comer, and profanes with his foolish ignorance a belief as old as the world. No one would venture to prattle recklessly on light or heat, on oxygen or hydrogen; but of God, of the Trinity, of Redemption, of the chief truths and august rites on which public and private morals rest everyone may speak ill with impunity."[1]

To all this is added an idolatry of science, even where it has nothing certain. Hence, Arthur Graf is obliged to say: "How many unbelievers who, while they mock at all religious faith, accept as irrefutable dogmas the assertions, the conjectures, the fancies, the errors, the lies, and every rash word of a supposed science, regarded *a priori* as infallible, without even suspecting that certain doctrines of this supposed science may in a future more or less remote, more or less near, cut the same figure as astrology and alchemy now do!"[2]

But let us be just. Besides this crowd of presumptuous ignoramuses, whom St. Jude defines as blasphemers of what they know not, there is another class of opponents who have studied Christianity, studied it deeply and seriously. They are the followers of historical-critical-biblical rationalism, which at present flourishes in all civilised countries, and especially in "learned Germany." Who would question, for example, the portentous erudition of an Adolphus Harnack in the matter of historical critical knowledge about the origin of Christianity?

We acknowledge it loyally; we are even grateful to contemporary rationalism for having demolished in great part the work of ancient mythical rationalism, as likewise we are grateful for the historical critical vindication of so many Christian documents, up to yesterday contested.

But modern rationalism, no less than the ancient, has an insurmountable barrier before its eyes, which hinders it from bringing together all truth: it is the systematic denial of the supernatural. This is the great prejudice that makes it turn its looks from truth, even when truth appears with the evidence of facts. We have seen it, and touched it with our hand, during the course of our treatise. As unbelieving scientists are no longer willing to recognise in the physical order any relation of dependence with *the beyond*, and therefore reduce everything knowable to what is sensible, so do rationalists act in the historical

[1] Vincenzo Gioberti, *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*
[2] *Per una fede*, p. 85.

order with regard to facts of the Old and the New Testament. They recognise the historical side as long as they can explain it naturally; but scarcely has a natural explanation become impossible, because some visible miracle intervenes, when they have recourse to legends, to interpolations—to all that cheating and sophistry of which we have been witnesses.

And why so much obstinacy and so many efforts against the evidence of facts? The last and secret reason is and always will be that indicated by the Gospel: pride in the mind and passion in the heart.

The Christian religion proposes to us to believe in mysteries profound, inscrutable, inaccessible to our reason; and proud, haughty minds disdain to lower themselves to what they cannot comprehend. Thus are verified the words of Christ, that the great and sublime truths of God, welcomed with joy and gratitude by humble souls, are hidden from the proud and wise ones of the world (*St. Matt.* xi. 25). "In religion," said the great thinker Pascal, "there is enough light to illumine docile minds, there is enough darkness to overwhelm proud ones."

And another writer, no less profound, completing the thought, justly added:—"The actual order of Providence permits that the obstinate man can resist the faith, while every man of a sincere disposition can easily arrive at it. Now, this precisely is the twofold character of the moral certainty of faith. Because, on the one side, as its evidence results from a variety of proofs, it is easy for him who wishes to dissent to withdraw attention from their immense number and from the invincible force of their combination, analysing them one by one, and, so to say, anatomising them in such a manner as to deprive them of life, of the very great force that synthesis confers on them, so as to render a mistaken faith possible by the sophistication of scepticism; on the other, as its proofs are proofs of fact, they are accessible to the most mediocre genius, and form by their number and their contrast a perfect evidence."[1]

Besides mysteries to believe, the Christian religion also imposes precepts to observe; and as these may be thought too hard and troublesome for the passions, to which the evangelical law allows no truce, we are told that they do not come from God, but from man. Rather, to say the truth, the Credo is hated because the Decalogue is hated, as more than one unbeliever has been obliged to confess. And where there is hatred, there is passion; and where there is passion, there the mind does not see its way to a knowledge of truth. Passion is for the mind what a coloured glass is for the eye. In other terms, it obscures the judgment, and attaches the intellect to what pleases it. To find the truth and to rest in it, we must love it; but passion does not love the truth, and therefore turns the mind away from it. Hence, we read in

[1] Taparelli, *Saggio Teoretico di Diritto Naturale*, n. 244.

St. John (iii. 20): "Everyone that doth evil hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, that his works may not be reproved."

Let the opponents of Christ try therefore as long as they choose to disguise themselves under the mantle of science. The true cause of their unbelief is to be sought in indifference, or in religious ignorance, or in the prejudices more or less inveterate to which they have been enslaved—in the conceits and pride of their minds or in the passions and malice of their hearts. It has been recognised and acknowledged by one of the most obstinate unbelievers of our time, St. Beuve, who left written the following words:—"Take the greatest antichristians: Federigo, Laplace, Goethe, and such others as have disowned Jesus. Study them well: in their hearts and in their minds there was something wanting. Those who deny Him, will pay the penalty."

CHAPTER LIII.

A LAST WORD.

The bounden theme of an unbelieving press during latter years has been the crisis of the faith and the decline of Christianity before the historical, critical, scientific progress of our days.

The song is not new for him who knows the history of the Church. But if, indeed, history is still a guide of life, it seems to us that unbelievers ought to come to a very different conclusion. The existence of Christianity for twenty centuries is, on the one hand, a confirmation of the promise of Christ, *the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*, and, on the other, a guarantee for the centuries to come.

The period through which we are passing is certainly one of the saddest. But he who scarcely knows how to reflect, understands at once that the crisis is not at all on the part of the faith or of Christian doctrine, now more than ever consolidated against the attacks of criticism, but rather on the part of modern thinkers, on the part of scientists and others, who have made a divorce from Christ and the Church.

Let us speak plainly. All the assaults on Christianity to-day come from materialism and agnosticism. The former says that everything is matter; the latter says that nothing can be known beyond matter. Both rest on positivism, which reduces everything knowable to what is sensible.

Thus the pretended conflict between science and faith means, in its last analysis, a struggle between sensism and spirituality; and all those arguments which vindicate for man his nature as a rational being, also vindicate his right and his duty to be a believer and a Christian.

This right and this duty are beginning to be recognised, at least in part, by modern scientists themselves, thanks to the reaction

that has been inaugurated against materialism, hitherto trumpeting itself as the only scientific system. We had an example hereof some years ago on the occasion of the fifth International Psychological Congress held in Rome; and it is with the greatest satisfaction that to-day we read a page from Arthur Graf, until yesterday an unbeliever and now in search of truth.

"Materialism," he says, "is truly the greatest disgrace of the last century, as well as its greatest misfortune. We can no longer understand how so dull and incoherent a doctrine, which shows in all its parts an astonishing mental insufficiency, and an absolute incapacity even for proposing the problems that it presumes to solve, could have usurped the title of philosophy, and spread like an epidemic that could not possibly be resisted. But it may be said that the worst of the evil is now over, although its effects remain, and will not cease so rapidly. The times are distant in which Louis Andrew Fuerbach thought that he could give a summary definition of man in the elegant aphorism, "Man is what man eats"; and Charles Vogt thought to solve the problem of the soul, asserting (but after Cabanis) that as the kidneys secrete water, so the brain secretes thoughts, inclinations, sentiments; and the inconclusive little book of Büchner could appear the latest gospel of truth incontrovertible and immutable. To such folly is opposed not only philosophy, but also science, which had need of nothing but to return to itself. Justly does Liebig express the thought of all the most cautious, most honest, and most authoritative scientists, when he defines materialism as a philosophy for amateurs in natural science; and to-day perhaps, there is not a single scientist, worthy of the name, who professes himself a follower of it. Scientists are now agnostics, parallelists, monists, pluralists, idealists, or even spiritualists; they are no longer materialists." [1]

But the hour has not yet struck for abandoning ourselves to those easy lyrics to which some of ours are given on a glorious religious renaissance. We have rather a return to the doctrines of Kant, whose criticism has become the platform of modern wisdom. The barrier raised by him between phenomenon and noumenon, between the natural and the supernatural, has so pervaded thought in our days that there is no scientist now who is not convinced that *the beyond* is all an affair of sentiment, of will, of the exigencies of the soul, of the wants of the heart—not one for which reason can give a true and proper demonstration. Voluntarism, pragmatism, moral dogmatism, the philosophy of action and immanence, and other such systems, which spring up from day to day like mushrooms, and with which even some Catholic apologists show themselves enamoured, have here their point of departure.

Certainly, even in the scientific world, there is now felt an in-

[1] *Per una fede*, Milan, Treves Brothers, 1906.

distinct need of quitting the deadly gulf of materialism and positivism, and ascending to a purer atmosphere. And we often see the most gifted minds rising up against the pretended dogmas of unbelieving science, and going in search of a faith, vindicating for themselves the right to come again to an understanding with God in the name of reason and science. But the old prejudices of rationalism scarcely ever allow them to see the whole truth. Either they stop at a Being superior and spiritual indeed, but also finite as nature is finite;[1] or, if they arrive at God, they are content to recognise Him as the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, but not also as a Father who has revealed to us all the tenderness of His love in His own Son, given to us as a Redeemer and Master.[2]

Not only so, but many of those who approve of a Christian renaissance, would, however, wish "a Christianity purified and rejuvenated"—that is to say, without dogmas, without laws, without the interference of any official authority to regulate its practice. We have thus a *New Christianity*, so justly lashed in these days by Father Frustino,[3] which hinders those who are on the other bank from coming over to us, and draws many of ours to them. It is again rationalism, which turns its back on Protestantism. Yet, logically speaking, there is no middle way between infidelity and Catholicity. Hence, Proudhon himself had to say: "If you believe in God, be a Catholic Christian; but if you do not believe in Him, deny everything, because between these two alternatives there is no place for anything but ignorance or bad faith."[4]

Nevertheless, to correct these rather sombre tints, there are two facts before us which are worth all the others, and which open the heart to the hopes of a more joyful future for the Church and for society.

The first is the universal movement of minds awakening on the religions question. Believers and unbelievers have shaken off that worldly apathy which kept them divided into two opposite camps, without ever looking one another in the face. To-day

[1] "I believe in a supreme, spiritual Being; but I do not believe that this Being is infinite, omnipresent, impassible" (Arthur Graf, *Per una fede*, p. 64.) Speaking then of the soul, he says:' 'Not only do I believe that I have a soul which will never die; but I also believe that I have a soul which was never created" (P. 67).

[2] "I know well the pretence of modern times that it does not become the dignity of God to speak to men. Hence, a dumb God has been invented, a deaf God, a proud God, who shuts Himself up in the silence of a *Great Lord*. But what sort of a God, do you think, is this God? He is the God of certain people who are themselves too *Great Lords* to speak to God, and do not pray to Him, because it does not become their dignity to go on their knees. That God will never be the God of the human family."—Bougand, *Il Cristianesimo e i tempi presenti*, Vol. III., c. 9.

[3] *Le Tentazioni del Secolo*, Genoa, 1906.

[4] *De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise.*

more than ever the struggle rages between them: perhaps never before did the religious question occupy the minds of more earnest thinkers. A proof of it is the ardour of critical studies about religions in general and Christianity in particular; a proof of it is the biblical question, which becomes more engrossing day by day; a proof of it is the continual collisions between Christian doctrines and those of other parties in settling great social problems, some of which become hourly more threatening; a proof of it is this new psychological study, which examines the wants of the soul—wants that grow more acute with progress and civilisation,[1] and that cannot be satisfied from the resources of nature, or by the vague notions of a future life found in non-Christian religions.

Now, all this, we believe, will finally lead our adversaries to a more clear and perfect knowledge of Christianity, and of its titles to be recognised as the only true religion. The advance already made in opposition to independent criticism encourages us. Begun with intentions altogether negative, it has demolished in a short time the work of mythical rationalism, and has vindicated the historical value of nearly all the books of the New Testament. A few years more, and the same will happen for those of the Old. To-day more than ever we may repeat for our adversaries the words of Tertullian in regard to the conduct of the Church: "One thing meanwhile she earnestly desires, that she may not be condemned unknown." [2]

The other fact, no less important, is the need of religion that is every day more keenly felt in society, and the conviction, every day taking deeper root, that in Christianity alone is to be found the moral force that can restrain social passions, and secure for all their rights and duties better than the brute force of armies. Willingly or not, it is beginning to be understood that science, progress, industry, civilisation, politics, power, &c., are not enough for the government of peoples; that the social question is above all a moral question, and that a morality independent of God or without God is suited only to overturn society from its foundations; that every external reformation—civil, social, economical, or political—will avail little or nothing, if it is not accompanied by that internal reformation which the Christian religion alone can procure. In fine, it is beginning to be understood that the Christian religion, as Montesquieu had to admit, forms not only the happiness of the future life, but also that of the present life, in accordance with the words of Christ: *Seek*

[1] "It may and must be said that the want of religion does not diminish—nay, it increases—with the growth of the soul. It is not possible that the human spirit, always becoming more conscious of itself, should not become at the same time more uneasy about its destiny, or not endeavour to find out if that destiny corresponds to its aspirations."—Graf, *Per una fide*, p. 8.

[2] Unum gestit interdum, ne ignorata damnetur.

ye therefore first the kingdom of God, and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you (*Matt.* vi. 33).

These are the reasons, taken from facts, why we look forward confidently to the future, saying with St. Paul: *Jesus Christ yesterday, and to-day, and the same for ever* (*Heb.* xiii. 8).

ADDENDA

SYLLABUS OF CONDEMNED PROPOSITIONS.

Decree—Wednesday, July 3, 1907.

With truly lamentable results our age, impatient of restraint in investigating the highest causes of things, not unfrequently follows what is new in such a way that, abandoning as it were the inheritance of the human race, it falls into the most grave errors. These errors will be so much the more pernicious when they affect sacred studies, the interpretation of the Holy Scripture, the principal mysteries of faith. It is greatly to be deplored that even among Catholics not a few writers are to be found who, crossing the boundaries fixed by the Fathers and by Holy Church itself, seek out, under the pretext of higher intelligence and in the name of historical considerations, that progress of dogmas which in reality is their destruction.

Lest errors of this kind, which are daily spread among the faithful, should take root in their minds and corrupt the sincerity of faith, it has pleased His Holiness Pius X., by Divine Providence Pope, that the chief among them should be noted and condemned through the office of this Holy, Roman, and Universal Inquisition.

Wherefore, after a most diligent examination, and after taking the opinion of the Reverend Consultors, the Most Eminent and Reverend Lord Cardinals, the General Inquisitors in matters of faith and morals, judged that the following propositions are to be condemned and proscribed, as by this general decree they are condemned and proscribed :—

1. The ecclesiastical law which prescribes that books regarding the Divine Scriptures are subject to previous censure does not extend to students of criticism or of the scientific exegesis of the Old and New Testaments.

2. The interpretation given by the Church to the Sacred Books is not indeed to be despised, but it is subject to the more accurate judgment of exegetists and to their correction.

3. From the ecclesiastical judgments and censures passed against free and more scholarly exegesis it can be gathered that the faith proposed by the Church contradicts history, and that Catholic dogmas cannot really be reconciled with the true origin of the Christian religion.

4. The magisterium of the Church cannot, even by dogmatic definitions, determine the genuine sense of the Sacred Scriptures.

5. Since only revealed truths are contained in the deposit of faith, under no respect does it pertain to the Church to pass judgment on the assertions of human science.

6. In defining truths the Church learning and the Church teaching so work together that nothing remains for the Church teaching but to sanction the common opinions of the Church learning.

7. The Church, when it proscribes errors, cannot exact from the faithful any internal assent, by which the judgments issued by it are accepted.

8. Those who make no account of the condemnations passed by the Sacred Congregation of the Index or by the other Sacred Roman Congregations are to be regarded as free from all blame.

9. They who believe that God is really the author of the Sacred Scripture show a great deal of simplicity or ignorance.

10. The inspiration of the books of the Old Testament consisted in this, that the Israelite writers handed down religious doctrines under a peculiar aspect, either little or not at all known to the Gentiles.

11. Divine inspiration does not so extend to the whole Sacred Scripture that each and every part of it is free from all error.

12. An exegetist, if he wishes to apply himself usefully to biblical studies,

should first of all lay aside every preconceived opinion of the supernatural origin of the Sacred Scripture, and interpret it in the same way as all other merely human documents.

13. The Evangelists themselves and the Christians of the second and third generations artificially made up the evangelical parables, and so gave a reason for the little fruit of the preaching of Christ among the Jews.

14. In many narrations the Evangelists reported not so much things that are true as things that, although false, they thought would be more profitable for their readers.

15. The Gospels up to the time when the canon was defined and constituted were continually increased by additions and corrections; hence, there remained in them only a faint and uncertain trace of the doctrine of Christ.

16. The narrations of John are not properly history, but a mystical contemplation of the Gospel; the discourses contained in his Gospel are theological meditations devoid of historical truth about the mystery of salvation.

17. The Fourth Gospel exaggerated miracles not only that the wonderful might be more apparent, but also that they might be more suitable for pointing out the work and the glory of the Incarnate Word.

18. John indeed claims for himself the name of a witness concerning Christ, but in reality he is only a distinguished witness concerning the Christian life, or the life of Christ in the Church, towards the close of the first century.

19. Heterodox exegetists have expressed the true meaning of the Scriptures more faithfully than Catholic exegetists.

20. Revelation could be nothing but the consciousness acquired by man of his relation with God.

21. Revelation, constituting the object of Catholic faith, was not completed with the Apostles.

22. The dogmas that the Church sets forth as revealed are not truths come down from heaven, but are an interpretation of religious facts that the human mind acquired for itself by laborious efforts.

23. Opposition can exist and really does exist between the facts related in Sacred Scripture and the dogmas of the Church resting on them, so that facts which the Church believes to be most certain may be rejected by a critic as false.

24. An exegetist is not to be condemned who puts together premises from which it follows that dogmas are historically false or doubtful, provided that he does not directly deny the dogmas themselves.

25. The assent of faith rests ultimately on a mass of probabilities.

26. The dogmas of faith are to be held only according to their practical sense—that is, as preceptive rules of acting, but not as rules of believing.

27. The divinity of Jesus Christ is not proved from the Gospels; but it is a dogma that the Christian conscience has deduced from the notion of the Messias.

28. Jesus, while He was exercising His ministry, did not speak for the purpose of teaching that He was the Messias, nor did His miracles tend to prove it.

29. It is lawful to grant that the Christ whom history shows is far inferior to the Christ who is an object of faith.

30. In all the evangelical texts the name *Son of God* is equivalent only to the name *Messias*: it does not at all mean that Christ is the true and natural Son of God.

31. The doctrine concerning Christ that Paul, John, and the Councils of Nice, Ephesus, and Chalcedon deliver, is not that which Jesus taught, but that which the Christian conscience conceived regarding Jesus.

32. The natural meaning of the evangelical texts cannot be reconciled with what our theologians teach of the conscience and the infallible knowledge of Jesus Christ.

33. It is evident to anybody who is not carried away by preconceived

opinions that either Jesus professed an error regarding the immediate coming of the Messias or the greater part of his doctrine as contained in the Synoptic Gospels is without authenticity.

34. A critic cannot assert that the knowledge of Christ had no limits except on an hypothesis that cannot historically be conceived, and that is repugnant to the moral sense—namely, that Christ as man had the knowledge of God and yet was unwilling to communicate the knowledge of a great many things to his disciples and to posterity.

35. Christ had not always a consciousness of his Messianic dignity.

36. The Resurrection of the Saviour is not properly a fact of the historical order, but a fact of an order merely supernatural, neither demonstrated nor demonstrable, which the Christian conscience gradually derived from other facts.

37. Faith in the Resurrection of Christ was from the beginning not so much about the fact itself of the Resurrection as about the immortal life of Christ with God.

38. The doctrine of the expiatory death of Christ is not evangelical, but only Pauline.

39. The opinions of the origin of the sacraments with which the Trent Fathers were imbued, and which beyond doubt influenced their dogmatical canons, are far different from those which now justly prevail among searchers into Christian history.

40. The sacraments had their origin in this, that the Apostles and their successors, swayed and moved by circumstances and events, interpreted some idea and intention of Christ.

41. The sacraments are intended only to recall to the mind of man the ever-beneficent presence of the Creator.

42. The Christian community introduced the necessity of baptism, adopting it as a necessary rite, and attaching to it the obligations of the Christian profession.

43. The practice of conferring baptism on infants was a disciplinary evolution, which became one of the causes why the sacrament was divided into two—namely, baptism and penance.

44. There is nothing to prove that the rite of the sacrament of confirmation was used by the Apostles; but a formal distinction between the two sacraments, baptism and confirmation, does not pertain to the history of primitive Christianity.

45. Not everything that Paul narrates of the institution of the Eucharist (I. *Cor.* xi. 23–25) is to be taken historically.

46. In the primitive Church there was no idea of a Christian sinner reconciled by the authority of the Church, but only very slowly the Church became accustomed to such an idea. Nay, even after penance was acknowledged as an institution of the Church, it was not called by the name of a sacrament, because it would be regarded as a disgraceful sacrament.

47. The words of the Lord: *Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins ye shall retain, they are retained* (*John* xx. 22–23) do not at all refer to the sacrament of penance, whatever it pleased the Fathers of Trent to assert.

48. James in his epistle (v. 14–15) did not intend to promulgate any sacrament of Christ, but to commend a pious custom, and if perchance in this custom he notices any means of grace, he does not take it in that strict manner in which it has been taken by theologians who described the nature and the number of the sacraments.

49. The Christian Supper gradually assuming the nature of a liturgical action, those who were accustomed to preside at the Supper acquired a sacerdotal character.

50. The elders who had the office of watching over assemblies of the faithful were instituted as priests or bishops by the Apostles to provide for the necessary ordering of the increasing communities, not properly for perpetuating the Apostolic mission and power.

51. Matrimony could not become a sacrament of the New Law until later in the Church; for, that matrimony should be regarded as a sacrament, it was necessary that a full theological explanation of the doctrine of grace and the sacraments should first take place.

52. It was foreign to the mind of Christ to found a Church as a society that would last on earth for a long course of centuries; nay, in the mind of Christ the kingdom of heaven, together with the end of the world, was very soon to come.

53. The organic constitution of the Church is not unchangeable; but Christian society is subject to perpetual evolution as well as human society.

54. Dogmas, sacraments, hierarchy, in what pertains to the ideal as well as to the real, are only interpretations and evolutions of Christian intelligence, which, by external additions, increased and perfected the little germ hidden in the Gospel.

55. Simon Peter never even suspected that the primacy in the Church was committed to him.

56. The Roman Church became the head of all the Churches, not by an arrangement of Divine Providence, but through merely political conditions.

57. The Church shows herself hostile to the progress of natural and theological sciences.

58. Truth is no more unchangeable than man himself, since it is evolved with him, in him, and by him.

59. Christ did not teach a determinate body of doctrine applicable to all times and all men, but rather began a religious movement adapted or to be adapted for different times and places.

60. Christian doctrine was in its origin Judaic, but by successive evolutions it became first Pauline, then Joannine, and at last Hellenic and universal.

61. It may be said without paradox that no chapter of Scripture, from the first of Genesis to the last of the Apocalypse, contains doctrine wholly identical with that which the Church delivers on the same subject, and that therefore no chapter of Scripture has the same meaning for a critic as for a theologian.

62. The chief articles of the Apostolic Symbol had not the same meaning for Christians of the first ages as they have for Christians of our time.

63. The Church shows herself unequal to the task of effectively defending evangelical morals, because she obstinately adheres to unchangeable doctrines that cannot be reconciled with modern progress.

64. The progress of science demands that a reform should be made in the ideas of Christian doctrine regarding God, the Creation, Revelation, the Person of the Incarnate Word, and Redemption.

65. Modern Catholicism cannot be reconciled with true science unless it is transformed into a non-dogmatic Christianity—that is, into a broad and liberal Protestantism.

On the following Thursday, the fourth day of the same month and year, an accurate report of all these things having been made to our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius X., His Holiness approved and confirmed the Decree of the Most Eminent Fathers, and ordered that each and every one of the above-mentioned propositions should be held by all as condemned and proscribed.

PETER PALOMBELLI,

Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition.

ADDENDA

GLOSSARY

[Seeing that this work, though intended chiefly for young people, contains in some parts a number of scientific or technical terms, which usage has established as the most precise, suitable, and expressive, and which the author could not avoid without having recourse to much circumlocution in their stead, we have thought it well to add, with the second edition, a short glossary, so that their meaning, and the meaning of a few other words, may, if required, be easily found.—*Trans.*]

Acrop'olis, a fortress or castle in a city.

Aesthet'ics, a science that treats of the beautiful in nature and art. St. Augustine's definition of beauty is *unity in variety.* The Church has always employed the arts — especially architecture, painting, sculpture, and music— in elevating man to noble sentiments. When she is poor, she is content to have Mass in a barn, or even in the open air; but when means are at her command nothing can exceed the splendour of her public worship. She has worthy ideas of a divine service.

Agnos'tic, one who denies that God can be known. The materialist says that there is nothing beyond matter; the agnostic says that if there is anything beyond matter it cannot be known. Is it a good argument that if things are invisible, they are also unknowable? Should we not rather say that as sound, which is invisible to the eye, is perceptible by the ear, so many things above nature are perceived by reason, and still better by a faith that is grounded on revelation?

Allu'vial, deposited by means of water.

Amphib'ious, able to live on land or in water.

Anal'ysis, the separation of a compound into its elements. See *Synthesis.*

An'imism, same as Fetichism, *which see*

An'thropomor'phism, the doctrine that attributes a human form to the Deity.

Antin'omy (much the same as **antil'ogy**), a contradiction, real or apparent, between laws and rules. For example, that the Christian life is both austere and joyful; that the Church is both the opponent and the promoter of civilisation.

Apol'ogist, one who speaks or writes in defence of a subject.

Ascet'icism, the practice of austerity.

A'theist, one who denies the existence of God. The atheist regards himself as free to lead either a virtuous or a vicious life, since he has neither reward nor punishment to expect hereafter. According to him the greatest saints and the greatest criminals have the same fate after death.

Autogen'esis, self-production.

Autonoma'sia, a figure of speech that uses a proper for a common name, as *Nero* for a *tyrant,* or a common for a proper name, as the *Liberator* for *O'Connell.*

Bathyb'ius. This name is derived from Greek *bathus,* deep, and *bios,* life. It was first given to a substance found in *deep sea* soundings, and supposed by Huxley and Haeckel to explain the origin of life—to be the missing link between inanimate and animate nature. The unfortunate *bathybius,* however, was soon

shown to be merely a chemical compound, not a living thing at all. It must be acknowledged that a great deal of nonsense or jargon, often with a sprinkling of words from the Greek, passes under the name of science.

Biol'ogy, a science that investigates the phenomena of life.

Bud'da, or Bood'ha, the name of an Indian prince who founded a false religion.

Canon'ical. In regard to Scripture, all the books placed by the Church on the list of inspired works are called canonical—that is, approved as a rule for Christians, or admitted by the Church. Those placed there from the beginning are called *protocanonical;* those placed there afterwards, *deuterocanonical.* See note, p. 158.

Carbonif'erous, producing coal.

Cer'ebral, pertaining to the brain.

Chem'istry, the science that ascertains the component parts of matter, with the laws relating to their union.

Chronol'ogy, the science of measuring time.

Chrys'ales, caterpillars in their dormant state before becoming butterflies, moths, &c.

Cic'atrise, to heal a wound.

Co'dex, a manuscript, generally in book form, as distinct from *volumen,* a manuscript in roll form.

Cosmog'ony, a theory of the origin and formation of the universe.

Cos'mos, the world or universe; opposed to chaos. "It would be a crime," says Plato, "to treat of created things, and to pass over their Author." "I thank Thee, O my Lord and Creator," says the celebrated astronomer, Kepler, "for all the ecstasies of joy that Thou hast granted me in the contemplation of Thy works."

Creta'ceous, chalky.

Criticism, the art of judging on the merits of a literary work, &c., It is the office of a qualified critic to distinguish what is true from what is false—not merely to cut the ground from under another's feet.

Crusta'cea, a general name for animals with an outer jointed shell case, but no skeleton, as the crab, lobster, &c.

De'ist, one who believes in God, but not in revelation; one who believes in the existence of God, but not in His Providence. See note, p. 94.

Deter'minism, a theory that denies human liberty or the freedom of the will.

Devo'nian. See Triassic.

Divin'ity, the nature of God, the Divine Being.

Dog'ma, a truth of faith.

Dynam'ics, a science that treats of the force or power of moving bodies.

Eloh'im, the first name that God gives Himself in Genesis. The other name is Jahve or Jehovah. Lord corresponds to Jehovah and God to Elohim. The expression "I Jehovah" occurs frequently; "I Elohim," never. Priests are always priests of Jehovah; never of Elohim. The idea that passages of Genesis in which Elohim occurs were written by one author, and those in which Jahve occurs by another, is very absurd. Even in speaking of a man, do we not give him different names or titles?

Empir'ic, resting only on experience.

E'ocene, relating to the dawn of the present state of creation. (See Miocene and Pliocene.)

Eth'ics, a science that treats of the leading principles of morals. The first principle of the moral law is that *we should keep to the order of nature.* Being obliged to keep to this order, which is the way to eternal happiness, we are therefore obliged *to do good and to avoid evil.* Virtues are to be practised and vices avoided.

Ethnol'ogy, the science of races.

Evolu'tion, a theory that every kind of animal or plant, even man himself, has been gradually developed during countless ages from one or two monads or animalcules—a theory worthy only of men who have not yet learned the alphabet of religion or good sense.

Exege'tist (or **Ex'egete**), an interpreter of the meaning of Scripture (not necessarily a critic).

Fakir' (or **Faquir'**), a Mahometan hermit.

Fanfaronade (**fan-far-o-nad'**), blustering talk.

Fe'tichism (or **Fe'tishism**), a practice common among African negroes, of worshipping trees, stones, &c., as the abodes of spirits.

Final'ity, the object or purpose for which anything is done.

Fos'sil, the remains of plants or animals, changed into a stony substance, and found in the crust of the earth. Fossils show the period at which organic life began, before which period the heated condition of the earth rendered life impossible.

Gener'ic, pertaining to a genus, race, or kind.

Gen'esis, a production or formation.

Geol'ogy, a science that treats of the structure of the earth. Although it is generally believed that about six thousand years have elapsed since the creation of man, there is much difference of opinion about the length of time during which the earth was previously in course of preparation for him. Some say thousands of years; others, millions. But, however long that time was, it would always fall infinitely short of eternity.

Gla'cial, icy. The glacial epoch is so called from the signs of the smoothing and scraping action of glaciers or icebergs on the surface of rocks over which they passed with heaps of gravel and boulders embedded in them.

Glossol'ogy (same as **Glottol'ogy**), the science of universal grammar.

Hallu'cin'ation, a delusion, a fancy.

Hel'lenist, a Jew living outside Palestine, among the Greek-speaking nations. His language was Greek, not Hebrew.

Histol'ogy, a science that treats of the tissues in animals and plants.

Hyp'notism, the art of producing a peculiar kind of sleep, very dangerous in many respects, but sometimes perhaps, with certain safeguards, allowable.

Hypoth'esis, something assumed on which to build an argument. Thus from a few words of a man not likely to be suspected of partiality, Dr. Atkinson, Professor of Sanscrit in Trinity College, we may assume that there was a high degree of refined taste in Ireland in former days, when the country was completely Catholic. Speaking of Irish poetry, as it has come down to us, he says:—"I believe Irish verse to have been about the most perfectly harmonious combination of sound that ever existed. I know of nothing in the world's literature like it." This is very high praise for the Irish language, since Italian is said to be music spoken.

Im'manence, a theory that the mind requires nothing from without for the perfect and natural evolution of its faculties; a theory that religious convictions are acquired by a process as mysterious as faith itself, and have little to do with faith or science. It may be said that absolute immanence is the same as pantheism or monism, *which see*. Immanence, pragmatism, and a variety of other recent errors, are all included under the general name of *Modernism*. These figments of false philosophy, shallow erudition, and audacious criticism are, as we learn from Pope Pius X. (Encyc. *Com. rerum*), "a hotbed of error and perdition, commonly known as *Modernism*, from its craving for unhealthy novelty."

Im'mate'rial, not consisting of matter. Thus the soul is immaterial. It is a spiritual substance and is immortal. When separated from the body it continues, and in a much freer manner, the operations of the understanding and the will. It no longer needs the phantasms of the imagination, as in this life.

Incommen'surabil'ity, the quality of having no common measure or standard of comparison.

Inter'polate, to insert words not belonging to a text.

Jah've, one of the names given to God in the Old Testament; Jehovah and Jahweh are other forms of the same word. The Jews, out of reverence, did not pronounce this name when reading, but instead used **Ado'nai** (which, like Elohim, means Lord). The word was spelled with four letters **YHVH,** equivalent to **JHVH** or **YHWH.** Originally, there were no vowels used in Hebrew.

Le'sion, a hurt or injury.

Linguis'tic, relating to language. A race of men has never been found that could not speak, nor a race of animals that could speak.

Log'ic, the science or art of reasoning. It is of the greatest service in the acquisition and in the communication of knowledge.

Magiste'rium, the authority of the Church to explain the Scriptures in matters of faith and morals.

Mam'mal, an animal that suckles its young.

Mam'moth, a very large species of elephant, now extinct; its fossils are found in Siberia.

Mas'todon, a large thick-skinned animal, like an elephant, once common in Europe and America, but now extinct.

Mate'rialist, one who holds that the human soul is only a result of the particular organisation of the matter of which the body is composed; one who holds that nothing exists but matter. The Vatican Council uses very strong language regarding such doctrine; "If any one *is not ashamed* to assert that nothing exists but matter, let him be anathema" (*De Deo,* Can. 2).

Messi'as, Christ, the promised Saviour.

Metaph'or'ical, not to be understood in a literal sense. Thus Michael Angelo was said to be a man of four souls, inasmuch as he was an architect, a painter, a sculptor, and a poet. In like manner, Our Lord calls Herod a fox. Such language gives a very vivid expression to ideas.

Met'aphys'ics, the science or knowledge of immaterial things, as distinguished from that of material things. The word is derived from Greek *meta,* after or beyond, and *phusis,* nature; for this science rises above nature, above all that is material. In the metaphysical order there are many things that the finite mind of man cannot adequately comprehend. He must therefore find his safety in submission to the teaching of the infallible Church of God.

Metem'psychosis, the supposed passing of a soul after death into the body of another man or of a lower animal.

Mil'lena'rian, relating to a theory that the saints, after rising from the dead, will reign on earth with Christ for a thousand years.

Mi'ocene, less recent (in regard to Pliocene, *which see*).

Mod'ernism, a new name for the old errors of rationalism, materialism, &c.

Mol'luse, an animal of soft body, without skeleton, such as the oyster.

Mon'ism, a theory that makes of all creatures so many phenomena of one only being. How true is the remark of Cicero, "There is nothing so absurd that has not been said by some philosopher!" (*De Divin.*)

Mon'otheism, the doctrine that there is only one God.

Mys'tery, a hidden truth, which we cannot fully comprehend. God, in revealing it, is satisfied that we should have only a limited knowledge of it, and yet believe it firmly on the authority of His word. For he is infinite truth. He can neither deceive nor be deceived. If we could know everything about a mystery, then it would no longer be a mystery, and the opportunity of acquiring merit by faith would cease.

Mythol'ogy, a system of fables with regard to false gods.

Nat'uralism, a doctrine that denies revelation and miracles, inasmuch as what is natural is the same always and everywhere.
Ne'ocrit'ic, a new kind of critic.

Occult', hidden, secret.
Omnip'otent, infinitely powerful. Although God is omnipotent, yet He cannot do things that are repugnant to reason, such as to make a square circle, or opposed to His perfections, such as to tell a lie. Miracles, like mysteries, are not *against*, but *above*, reason. A prophecy is the same wonderful thing in regard to knowledge as a miracle in regard to a fact.
O'olite (o-o-lite) a variety of limestone.
Or'ganism, a body with living organs. The structure of the eye, ear, and other organs is the same in all men. Here we see design, skill, and uniformity.
Ontolog'ical, pertaining to the attributes of beings.
Os'tracise, to exclude, to banish.

Pa'leolith'ic, a term applied to the earliest portion of the prehistoric stone period.
Pa'leontol'ogy, a science that treats of the animals and plants found fossil in the crust of the earth.
Pan'theism, a doctrine that nature or the universe is God. If pantheists make all things spiritual, materialists make all material. The theories in which a number of German, French, and English philosophers (so called) indulge, are so full of obscurity that their language is often unintelligible. They seem ready to pervert everything good. St. Paul tells us (*Rom.* I., 20) that such men are *inexcusable*.
Paral'ogism, a false argument; an unwarrantable conclusion. The following is a very absurd paralogism of Protestantism:—"There is no distinction to be made between mortal and venial sins; all sins are mortal of their own nature; but no sins are mortal to him who has faith."
Pathol'ogy, a science that treats of the nature of diseases.
Pen'tateuch, the five books of Moses.
Per'mian, relating to a deposit found abundantly in *Perm*, in Central Russia.
Phan'tasm, an image formed in the imagination as in a mirror.
Philol'ogy, the science of language. Language is necessary for the full development of reason.
Philos'ophy, literally a love of wisdom; and wisdom is a most perfect knowledge of things. The object of philosophy is to know whatever can be known by the natural light of reason; whereas that of theology is to know whatever has been revealed by God. Hence, philosophy is the handmaid of theology. The chief branches of philosophy, as far as reason is exercised without the aid of revelation, are logic, metaphysics and ethics. Philosophy leads to magnanimity. No one, as a rule, is better suited than the man of philosophic mind to take the initiative in any great work, or to carry it on to a successful issue.
Phys'icist, a student of nature. Formerly nature was viewed under both a physical and a metaphysical aspect. Modern scientists refuse to go a step beyond the physical. They cannot see that man, consisting of body and soul is the link that connects the visible with the invisible world.
Phys'iol'ogy, a science that treats of the vital functions of the organs in plants and animals.
Pli'ocene, a term applied to the Upper Tertiary deposits, as containing a greater percentage of recent shell-fish than the Miocene or the Eocene, *which see*.
Polem'ics, controversy; disputation, offensive rather than defensive, on religious topics.
Pol'yth'eism, a doctrine that there are many Gods.
Pos'itivist, one who excludes from philosophy everything but the natural phenomena of knowable things, and regards inquiry into first and final causes as useless.

Positivists maintain that only what falls under the senses is real; everything else, according to them, is only a phantom of our imagination. Their favourite maxim is that *knowledge ought to stand on facts*. Unfortunate men, who are strangers to a right understanding of this world, and who entertain no hopes of a better! The aforesaid maxim may be used by Catholics in a proper sense; for they examine into the *causes* of facts. Experience gives us facts; reason traces their causes. Reason alone, without revelation, proves the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, the free will of man, &c. Revelation banishes every shadow of doubt.

Post'humous, coming after death.

Poten'tiality, the power to become actual. Thus, the oak is potential in the acorn. But when Tyndall says, "All our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, and all our art—Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, and Raphael—are potential in the fires of the sun;" is not such language like the roving of a madman?

Prag'matism, a theory that seeks the proofs of moral and religious truths more in the heart than in the head, more in the subject than in the object. Thus, the pragmatist says, "This doctrine pleases me, and is advantageous for me; I need it; therefore it is true and good."

Primor'dial, existing from the beginning.

Pro'toplasm, the material basis of life.

Prov'idence, the care of God over His creatures. This care does not exclude a prudent foresight on the part of man. St. Thomas, speaking of the different states in society, says that human nature inclines one man to one path in life and another to another, according to the diversity of individual characters. "From this diversity," he continues, "and at the same time from the arrangement of Divine Providence, which disposes of all things, it happens that one man chooses one occupation, as, for instance, agriculture, and another man chooses another. And similarly it happens that some persons choose a married life, and others a contemplative." (*Summa*, Supplement, q. 41, a. 2.)

Pseu'donym, a false name.

Psychol'ogy, the science of the phenomena of the mind (which is also called the *intellect*, inasmuch as it understands truths, and *reason*, inasmuch as it infers from knowledge already acquired). According to Catholic psychology, all our knowledge comes first through the senses. Then the mind by abstracting, reflecting, combining, &c., forms new ideas. Thus, having seen gold and a mountain, we can imagine for ourselves a mountain of gold. There is no such thing as innate ideas. The mind cannot think without the aid of phantasms, which are formed in the imagination. A blind man can have no idea of colour, nor a deaf man of sound. Psychology is sometimes taken to mean in general the science of the soul. It is also called Anthropology—that is the science of man; it then relates both to soul and body.

Quater'nary, in geology a term applied to the outermost portion of the earth's crust.

Rab'bi (or **Rab'bin**), a title meaning *master*, given to learned men among the Jews.

Rat'ionalist (usually taken in a bad sense) one who admits nothing but what is contained within the limits of human reason; one who has no faith in the Bible or in miracles. The rationalist, though appealing to reason, is generally most illogical. The Catholic, on the other hand, is certain that nothing can ever be true in philosophy if it is false in theology. "Between faith and reason," says the Vatican Council (*Const.* IV.), "there can never be any real contradiction."

San'hedrim, an ancient Jewish council of great authority.

Seep'tic, one who doubts or denies the truths of religion. There is no ground left for discussion with such men, since they reject the clearest evidence. The same man that has the hardihood to deny the very existence of matter runs for his life from an angry dog.

Schist, a term applied to the varieties of slate-rock.

Sen'sism, a theory that all our ideas are only sensations somewhat modified. It is one thing to say that all our knowledge comes first through the senses, and another to say that all our knowledge consists in the apprehension of the senses. The knowledge of beasts can never rise to immaterial things.

Sep'tuagint, a Greek translation of the Old Testament, made by seventy interpreters. We are not bound to believe (says St. Augustine) that it is inspired as well as the original Hebrew text. Yet most of the texts of the Old Testament contained in the New Testament are taken from it.

Silu'rian, relating to extensive fossiliferous strata first worked out in the district between England and Wales, formerly inhabited by the *Silures*.

Soph'ism, a deceitful argument. There are many kinds of it. One short example may suffice :— *Christ is eternal ; but Christ was born in time ; therefore, Christ is both eternal and not eternal.*

Spir'itism, a system that professes to evoke departed souls, and, by their agency, to acquire knowledge or perform actions naturally impossible.

Stra'ta, layers of rock, gravel, sand, clay, &c. All the wonders that we find in strata, fossils, and the rest of creation have been wrought by God in order that man may know and love Him. Inanimate creatures, such as the sun, moon, stars, &c., and irrational creatures, such as beasts, fishes, birds, &c., do His will, but they can neither know nor love Him. The happiness of man in eternity depends on his knowing and loving God in time. God has now put us on our trial ; we can choose either to do or not to do His will ; the period of apprenticeship will soon come to an end.

Syl'labus, a list.

Syn'onym, a word of the same meaning as another in its primary idea, but with a shade of difference in its secondary.

Syn'thesis, the uniting of elements into a compound. See *Analysis*.

Tal'mudist, one who believes in the Talmud, which is an old Jewish work, consisting of two parts ; (1) the *Mishna*, or law of God, and (2) the *Gemera*, or collection of traditions and comments.

Tel'epathy (or **Telep'athy**), the direct communication of one mind with another at a distance.

Tellu'ric, pertaining to the earth.

Terminol'ogy, the words or phrases used in a particular science or art.

Thau'matur'gus, a wonder-worker.

Tet'ramorph, a name sometimes given to the Four Gospels. In Christian art it means the union of the attributes of the Four Evangelists in one figure, winged, and standing on winged fiery wheels, the wings being covered with eyes.

Theol'ogy, the science of divine things as revealed. It is the queen of sciences. It is like the sun among the planets. Hence, in former days, no university was ever established without its chair of theology.

The'orem, something to be *proved*, as distinguished from problem, which is something to be *done*.

The'sis, a proposition to be defended from objections ; a theme to be developed ; the essay itself.

Tran'scendent'alism, an abstruse kind of philosophy, associated with the name of Kant. He sought the origin of knowledge within the mind of man—independently of all experience.

Transfor'mism, the same as Evolution, *which see*.

Trias'sic, pertaining to the Trias, or triple series of New Red Sandstone. This series is complete in Germany, but in England the middle layer is wanting. The

Old Red Sandstone is called Devonian, from its abundance in Devonshire.

Veg'etative, having the power of growing.

Volit'ion, the power or act of willing.

Vol'untarism, a system that puts the will before the intellect, or regards the will as man's highest faculty.

Vul'gate, the Latin version of the Bible used in the Catholic Church, and approved by the Council of Trent. It is chiefly, as a translation, the work of St. Jerome (+ 420). He translated all the books of the Old Testament, except the Psalter, from the original Hebrew and Chaldee, and revised the Latin version of the New Testament. The Church styles him the greatest of her Doctors in expounding the Scriptures.


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